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Abstract 
 
Research on firm’s investment behaviour is central to corporate finance. Investment policy can 
be explained by many corporate finance theories involving the choice of financing (debt vs. 
equity vs. internal funds), agency costs (management vs. monitoring blockholders), asymmetric 
information (between management and providers of external finance) and moral hazard (the 
choice of level of risk of an investment project). Research on governance focuses on whether 
internal and external governance mechanisms improve firm value and profitability, and 
shareholder wealth. This focus on profits and returns continues to dominate the management 
literature, despite the widespread recognition that investment behaviour is at the basis of firm 
growth and productivity and contributes largely to shareholder value. Studying investment 
behaviour allows assessment of whether the controlling owners are re-investing their gains in 
long-term assets or taking them out as cash or dividends. These alternatives have drastically 
different implications for firm productivity growth and the dynamism of the economy. This 
thesis addresses this issue and investigates the question of how governance influences 
investment behaviour. I argue that investment depends not only on individual governance 
mechanisms but also on a combination of these mechanisms. In order to test and provide 
evidence supporting this argument, this thesis contains three essays that consider the effects 
on corporate investment behaviour of transparency and disclosure (TD), ownership networks, 
blockholders and board composition, and studies the effects of substitutability or 
complementarity between these governance mechanisms. The Russian context serves as an 
appropriate setting to examine these effects since governance plays a bigger role in this 
emerging economy than in a developed economy. 
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Thesis Introduction 
 
The Russian economy is in need of production modernization. According to the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), Russia invested about 20% of GDP in 2011 (see Figure 20, page 182, 
Appendices), which is low compared with other emerging economies (31%) or the newly 
industrialized Asian economies (26%). The economy cannot continue to grow purely on the 
basis of natural resources. Most Russian firms have old and fully amortised production assets 
inherited from the soviet regime, and heavy use of outsourcing rather than reliance on own 
production. The current average longevity of equipment in Russia is 18-19 years in contrast 
with the more desirable 7-8 years (Aganbegyan, 2008). According to Dzarasov (2011), in spite of 
the prolonged recovery in 1999-2008, capital investment by Russian firms was low and deficient 
in quality. Given the adverse demographic trends, productivity improvement through higher 
corporate investment and innovation has to be the primary source of long-term growth in 
Russia (source: International Monetary Fund, 2012).  
A fundamental question in corporate finance is to what extent capital is allocated to the most 
appropriate investment projects. In the perfect world envisaged by Modigliani and Miller 
(1958), funds flow such that the marginal product of capital is equated across every project in 
the economy. In the real world, there are several frictions that prevent this even flow. 
Perhaps the most important and pervasive factors influencing the efficiency of corporate 
investment are those related to corporate governance that arise from agency problems and 
information asymmetries (Stein, 2003). In general, and in Russia in particular, the inability of 
investors to access full information about firms and their projects leads to asymmetric 
information between investors and firms, resulting in credit rationing (Fazzari et al., 2008, 
Driver and Temple, 2012).  
This lack of transparency affects Russian firms’ valuations. For example, Russian-listed oil and 
gas firms have an average Enterprise Value to Reserves multiple of 1.2; the multiple is 7.5 for 
10 
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Latin America, 10.8 for Asia and 14.3 for the US and Canada.1 This lack of transparency also 
limits the ability of Russian firms to raise external finance for much needed production 
investment (Boycko et al., 1994). In addition, Russia has weak investor protection and 
underdeveloped capital markets. Although an increasing number of Russian firms have been 
able to cross-list abroad, the majority continue to suffer from under-investment with investors 
reluctant to take high risks given the uncertain returns on their investments. 
As a result, half of Russian investment in fixed assets is funded by internal funds. Russia is the 
world’s least leveraged major economy, in both the private and public sectors, with total debt 
of less than 50% of its GDP, compared to 230% for the UK and over 350% for Japan.2 Hence, 
Russia provides an interesting setting for studying the impact of corporate governance on 
allocation of funds to investment projects. Corporate governance and transparency make 
investment-intensive industries more attractive to investors and, thus, permit managers to 
commit resources to investment in long-term assets.  In other words, corporate governance 
provides the accountability and transparency to ensure the equitable distribution of the 
resulting wealth among investors (Clarke, 2004).  
The institutional corporate governance environment in Russia is truly unique compared to the 
other BRIC countries, i.e. Brazil, India and China. For example, Russia has the largest equity 
capital market amongst the BRIC countries. According to the World Economic Forum 2012 
Global Competitiveness Report, the Russian and Brazilian economies are the most developed 
among the BRIC countries. In China, standards of business ethics and corporate accountability 
are below the levels of those in Russia. However, despite considerable progress, among the 
BRIC economies, the effectiveness of Russia’s regulatory infrastructure is lagging. The relative 
ineffectiveness of Russia’s regulatory infrastructure is due primarily to weaker requirements for 
compliance with the Governance Code, for companies listed in the lower tiers of the local stock 
markets. Growth in domestic capital markets could provide the motivation for more companies 
                                                          
1
 Source: Prosperity Capital Management, Feb 2009. Back to basics: the investment case for Russia’. EV/Reserves 
ratio for Lukoil was 1.5, while ExxonMobil reached 17.4 times. Enterprise value (EV) is defined at the sum of firm’s 
market value and net debt. 
2
 Source: IMF, Eurostat, OECD, 2008 data. 
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to upgrade their listings to top-tier quotation lists (about 26 companies in 2008) from the lower 
tiers of some 300 actively traded companies. 
How do I define corporate governance? The term governance comes from the Greek kubernân 
(to steer a ship), used first by Plato to designate the governing of men. In modern English, the 
term governance means the action or manner of governing (Drori, 2006). In this thesis, I define 
corporate governance as the ways by which suppliers of funds ensure returns on their 
investment (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Becht et al., 2003) or by which firm managers can 
commit to returning funds to investors and, thus, attract external financing (Tirole, 2005).  
Why is corporate governance receiving so much current attention? Bibliometric analysis of 
references to the term governance reveals a clear increasing trend in the use of this term since 
1970 in social science (see Figure 16, Figure 17, Figure 18 in the US literature and Figure 19 in 
the Russian literature on pp. 180-181 in the appendices). One reason is the proliferation of 
scandals and crises, both in the West (BP, Enron, Tyco, Parmalat etc.) and Russia (asset 
stripping, transfer pricing and tunnelling).3 The scandals and abuses are just manifestations of a 
number of structural reasons why corporate governance has become more important for 
economic development and investments. 
The terms transparency and disclosure (TD), central to governance discourse, began to appear 
in the literature in the mid-1990s. Enhanced firm TD practices means investors benefit from 
being provided with an opportunity to gain insights into the firm’s business operations and 
financial data. Even if the information disclosed by the firm is negative, investors will benefit 
from the decreased risk of uncertainty. Corporate governance, and transparency in particular, 
can take on particular importance in emerging markets where investors do not always benefit 
from the same protections as are available in more developed markets. Improvements in 
corporate governance practices lead to improvement in accountability systems, minimizing the 
risk of fraud or self-dealing by managers or controlling shareholders. 
                                                          
3
 The transfer out of firms of assets and profits to the benefit of those that control them. 
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While transparency and disclosure might at first glance, appear to be the same things (and are 
often used interchangeably), they are different. Firms can disclose huge amounts of 
information that is of no particular value to users, which often applies to Russian firms. 
Important information can be withheld. Disclosure can be irrelevant or, worse, appear to be 
manipulated such that it conceals the true picture of the state of the firm. For example, the 
disclosure of ownership in Russian firms highlights how TD diverge. While most companies 
properly disclose their ownership, the true owners and the extent of their control are often 
hidden behind complex legal structures such as offshore holding companies and trusts. For 
example, most firms in Russia comply with general disclosure requirements. However, 91% fail 
to provide information on a variety of issues, including major shareholders.4 Thus, few firms 
have transparent ownership structures.  
The world’s biggest private litigation case so far concerned one exiled oligarch suing another 
oligarch over US$5.5 billion owed for the transfer of assets. In this case, the initial ownership of 
assets was so opaque that the plaintiff could not produce a single written document to prove 
that he had indeed been an original owner of the assets he was allegedly stripped of. All 
arrangements had been carefully hidden from public view, aided by intermediary and off shore 
entities. In the end, the plaintiff lost the case.5 These examples justify why appropriate TD 
practices are important in the Russian context, and constitute one of the main mechanisms of 
governance discussed in my thesis (Chapters 1 and 2). 
TD practices depend on ownership structures and other ownership characteristics. I adopt a 
novel perspective of ownership in this thesis by examining the effects of owners’ connectivity 
to one another through ownership of shares (Chapter 2). More connected controlling 
shareholders may provide more relevant resources to the firm, such as information about and 
finance for investment opportunities. On the other hand, more connected owners may be 
particularly powerful and prone to expropriation. However, powerful owners potentially might 
be monitored by other large shareholders, thus reducing the downsides of ownership networks. 
                                                          
4
 Source: IFC Survey on Corporate Governance Practices in regions, Section 2.2.1., p. 25, August 2003 (see 
www.ifc.org/rcgp). 
5
 See, e.g., an account published in The Guardian, retrieved online 8 May 2013 at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/nov/07/abramovich-berezovsky. 
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Since corporate governance concerns itself with the actual behaviour of firms and their officers, 
it deals, among others, with matters such as how boards of directors operate, and their role in 
monitoring managers and shareholders (Claessens, 2003). Boards of directors are composed by 
insiders, i.e. executive or non-executive officers, and independent directors, not affiliated to the 
company. Most Russian companies are controlled by a single shareholder (blockholder) who is 
well informed about the affairs of the firm and able to closely monitor the firm’s management.6 
The remaining equity capital is held by minority shareholders who lack the resources and 
information to effectively monitor management and defend themselves against the potential 
abuses of large shareholders. In other words, the conflicts happen not between the 
shareholders (principals) and managers (agents), as in the Anglo-American diffuse ownership 
model, but between major and minority shareholders (‘principal-principal’ agency conflicts7). In 
the concentrated ownership set up, independent directors take on special importance since 
they protect the interests of minority shareholders. However, the results of a survey conducted 
by the International Finance Corporation (IFC), show that the ratio of independent to non-
independent directors, at 1:9, on the average Russian board leaves much room for 
improvement. Independent directors (18%) and minority shareholder representatives (9%) still 
constitute a minority on most boards. 8  This thesis highlights the importance of board 
independence in the Russian context as a mechanism to monitor majority shareholders to 
delimit minority shareholders’ expropriation and tunnelling, which results in more efficient 
allocation of funds to investment opportunities (Chapter 3). 
My research focuses on the period 2000-2010, which was a time of rapid political and economic 
change in Russia when Mr Putin succeeded Mr Yeltsin as President of Russia in March 2000. 
Since 1998, Russia has achieved an incredible turn-around to become the world’s 7th largest 
                                                          
6
 In Russia, absolute control represents 50% plus 1 share of common equity capital. 
7
 These conflicts centre on TD, dilution (through share issuance, mergers, etc.), asset stripping and transfer pricing, 
bankruptcy, limits on foreign ownership, management attitude to shareholders, and registrar risk. A 2011 survey 
by the Russian Institute of Directors shows also that governance of dividend policy, dividend payout, and the 
stability of dividend policy are inadequate. 
8 IFC Survey on Corporate Governance Practices in Russia’s Regions, Section 2.2.1, p. 25, August 2003 (see 
www.ifc.org/rcgp). 
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economy measured as Purchasing Power Parity (PPP).9 The Russian context serves as a natural 
experiment for studying the longitudinal effect of governance over this eventful period. In 
developed countries, governance is stable over time. The improvements to Russian governance 
over the last 10-20 years provide enough variation to test the relationship between corporate 
governance and investments, in fixed effects and instrumental variable frameworks. The main 
governance system studied is TD, supported by other systems of governance such as 
shareholder ownership structure and characteristics and board structures. 
To my knowledge, there is very little published empirical research on the direct effects of 
governance on investment behaviour in Russia. Fairly well cited, but now not very recent paper 
by Perotti and Gelfer (2001), focuses on the moderating effects of ownership structures on the 
investment-cash flow relation in Russian financial and industrial groups (FIGs). The authors 
investigate whether the specific governance structure of Russian FIGs favours a better 
allocation of resources. Their results suggested some evidence of internal capital reallocation or 
opportunistic value transfers for those FIGs where the bank (or financial institution) was in 
control of the group. This research focuses on a relatively small sample (70 firms) in a cross-
sectional setting and does not address potential endogeneity issues between ownership and 
investment. Much debate in their paper deals with multilayered agency problems, resulting in 
FIGs’ controlling shareholders exploiting internal capital markets for private gain and 
expropriating wealth from minority shareholders.  However, in the Russian context, resource 
aspects of FIGs such as owner networks are equally important, and the agency costs of FIGs 
have to be weighted against the benefits resulting from strong formal and informal, social 
relationships among group affiliates. Moreover, the authors do not address how other 
governance mechanisms, such as board independence can mitigate agency conflicts. 
The research on investment and its relationship with cash-flow in developed economies is 
broad (Fazzari et al., 1988, 2000, Kaplan and Zingales, 1997, 2000, Hubbard, 1998; Moyen, 
2004; Raith et al., 2007; Brown and Petersen, 2009). The papers that introduce the governance 
framework into investment-cash flow relation, do so by focusing on one governance 
                                                          
9
 Source: Prosperity Capital Management 
15 
94 
 
mechanism rather than a bundle (Kathuria and Mueller (1995), Hadlock (1998), Gugler and 
Yurtoglu (2003) and Lin et al. (2011) for the USA, Gugler (2003) for Austria, Haid and Weigand 
(2001) for Germany, Degryse and de Jong (2006) for the Netherlands, Pindado and de la Torre 
(2009) for Spain, and Goergen and Renneboog (2001) and Pawlina and Renneboog (2005) for 
the UK). I contribute to these papers in three ways. Firstly, by testing and extending the 
boundary conditions of traditional investment theory to an emerging economy context, where 
the state and oligarchs play important roles not present in developed economies.  Secondly, by 
analyzing how a combination of mechanisms (ownership and directorship), rather than a single 
governance mechanism affects investment behaviour. The effectiveness of a particular 
mechanism is contingent upon other governance mechanisms that simultaneously operate in a 
firm (Rediker and Seth, 1995; Aguilera et al., 2008; Desender et al., 2013). Thirdly, I analyse the 
effects of TD practices and ownership networks on investments in the Russian context to test 
the boundary conditions of resource dependence and agency theories. To my knowledge, this is 
the first study to combine analysis of ownership networks and corporate governance and their 
impact on firms’ strategic long-term investment. 
The few other papers on Russia address single corporate governance mechanisms (mainly 
ownership), and examine their impact on performance outcomes not directly related to 
investments such as firm value or profitability measures (Estrin and Wright, 1999; Filatotchev et 
al., 2001;10 Black, 2001; Black et al., 2006; Goetzmann et al., 2003; Judge et al., 2005; 
Okhmatovskiy, 2009; Estrin et al., 2009); and productivity11 measures (Jones, 1998; Linz and 
Kruger, 1998; Filatotchev et al., 2001;12 Earle and Estrin, 2003; Rachinsky and Guriev, 2005). 
These studies tend to focus on a cross-section or a relatively short time period in the immediate 
period following the collapse of the Soviet Union. For a complete review of this post-
privatisation literature, see Djankov and Murrell (2002) and Estrin et al. (2009). My data sample 
                                                          
10
   This research deals with the impact of concentrated ownership on firm performance and investment (cross-
section, small sample 85 observations). It uses 5 dependent variables, one being investment, measured in terms of 
investment in fixed assets in 1999 as a percentage of its level the previous year. Since this research primarily deals 
with performance and productivity measures, I classify it under these categories, rather than as investment 
literature. 
11
 Many post-privatisation studies focused on the efficiency of privatization and used TFP and labour productivity 
as dependent variables to test privatization outcome. 
12
 Same as the note above.  
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spans the time period 2000-2010 and covers important changes in governance practices 
following the introduction and implementation of the new Russian governance code in 2002-
2004. My thesis results are based on variations in governance pre- and post- change in 
governance regime. In particular, they capture the emergence and changes in oligarchic groups 
over the last decade.  
Finally, I contribute to Perotti and Gelfer’s (2001) by examining the impact of multiple and 
resource-related aspects of governance on investment behaviour in Russia, for the extended 
period 2000-2010. 
The thesis is organized as three self-contained essays in order to study corporate governance 
and firms’ investment behaviour within a transition economy. The research question addressed 
in this thesis is: how does governance influence firms’ long term investment in fixed assets? 
Russia is one of the largest, most complex, and dynamic of the transition economies and 
provides interesting material for governance studies (Fox and Heller, 2000). Russian context is 
particularly appropriate to study this research question as Russia is in urgent need of 
modernization and productive investment (Ledeneva, 2013). Thus, Russia was chosen as the 
research setting for this thesis, which seeks to better understand the relationship between 
corporate governance and investment in productive assets in Russia and in transition 
economies more broadly. 
Essay 1 examines whether adopting good governance standards alleviates constraints on 
financing investment via improved internal efficiency or access to external capital. In my 
analysis, I distinguish between oligarch-owned firms and state owned enterprises (SOEs) 
according to how their investments react to governance and financing constraints. On the one 
hand, SOEs are poorly governed judging by their TD scores, hence any improvements to their 
governance might have a significant effect on the level of their capital investment. On the other 
hand, it might be that SOEs are subject to soft budget constraints, where investment is not 
significantly and positively related to internal funds, meaning that SOEs have access to other, 
cheaper sources of financing.  
17 
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Essay 2 investigates the effects of ownership networks and transparency on investment. 
Building on resource dependence and agency theories, I argue that ownership networks might 
compensate for the lack of institutional structures in emerging economies and might provide 
the necessary resources or accountability to enable firm growth through long-term 
commitments of capital. Much debate in developed economies has been focused on ‘under-
contextualised’ nature of agency theory, and a challenge remains to more explicitly understand 
how corporate governance is impacted by different organizational environments in different 
institutional settings (Wright et al., 2013). Contextual resource and networks aspects of 
corporate governance play a predominant role in emerging economies. I hence analyse the 
network of ownership and association ties to Russian oligarchs and to the state. Russia is a 
country with a strongly developed cultural and educational system that has promoted strong 
social and political ties and shared values among businesses of oligarchs and other groups 
(Estrin et al., 2009). Moreover, Russia inherited from the Soviet Union the remnants of 
networks based on reciprocal favours (Puffer and McCarthy, 2007) which are still embedded in 
inter-firm relations. I examine how a firm’s position in an ownership network and its corporate 
governance practices in terms of TD interact in their impact on long-term investment, and how 
this interaction depends on type of ownership.  
I compare different types of network ties, single or multiple controlling owners, state, 
conglomerate, and industry association ties, to distinguish types of resources or oversight that 
might be available through the network. 
Essay 3 examines the effects of block ownership and board composition on the sensitivity of 
firms’ investment spending to the availability of internal funds. The focus is again on two 
dominant forms of majority owners or blockholders in Russia – state and oligarchy - and the 
evolution of their roles during 2000 to 2010, as Russian institutions improve and mature. I 
analyse how investment of oligarch-controlled firms with independent directors on the board, 
as opposed to only ‘inside’ directors, reacts to internal funds. I run the same test for the SOEs 
with independent directors and SOEs with ‘insider’ boards. 
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Table 1 presents outlines of the three essays. The main hypotheses tested in the thesis are 
combined into a conceptual framework (Figure 1). Chapter 1 elaborates the direct impact of TD 
on investment. Chapter 2 examines the moderation of TD on investment interacted with 
networks (analysed through the latent concepts of ‘resources’ and ‘principal-principal agency 
costs’), Chapter 3 studies the impact of four main ownership and board combinations (i.e. state 
and independent directors, state and inside directors, oligarch and independent directors, 
oligarch and inside directors) on the sensitivity of investment to resources (internal cash-flow).   
Figure 1: Empirical design 
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Table 1: Summary of the empirical essays 
Essays Governance and investment 
1 Examines the direct influence of TD on investment via internal capital markets and 
how these governance practices moderate the effect of financing constraints on 
investment in external capital markets.  
2 Examines the interaction between TD practices and ownership networks in their 
influence on investment. It analyses types of network connections in terms of their 
implications for resource dependence and principal-principal agency costs. To further 
investigate this interaction, it distinguishes between different types of ties and firms’ 
positions in a network. 
3 Examines the influence of ownership and board structure on the sensitivity of 
investment to internal finance.  
Data 
Below I briefly describe the main variables used in the thesis. Although the raw TD and financial 
data belong to the same dataset, there are some minor differences between the three stata.dta 
files used for each of the three chapters primarily due to the addition of new variables, e.g. 
dummies, network variables and interactions. In particular, the second chapter uses additional 
ownership and network data not exploited in chapters 1 and 3. Further descriptions for 
variables used in one of the chapters only are provided in data sections of each chapter. 
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Table 2:  Main variables used in the thesis 
Variable Description 
Investment Dependent variable. Capital expenditures on fixed long term assets (from cash-flow 
statements). In differences of natural logarithms. Lags are used as independent 
variables. Investment is persistent and dynamic as lags of investment at t-1, t-2 and 
t-3 are significant for investment at t. 
The results are provided for the non-imputed data. However, the main results do 
not change when trimming for 1% outliers and winsorizing 13 at 1%. 
TD score Transparency and disclosure scores. Used in differences of natural logarithms. The 
original values are on a scale of 0 to 1, 1 being the highest (most transparent score). 
Sales Annual revenues. Used in differences of natural logarithms, at t and t-1. 
Gross cash flow A proxy for internal finance. Calculated as a sum of net income after tax and 
depreciation and amortisation charge. Used in differences of natural logarithms, 
lagged at t-1.  
Debt New long term debt, in natural logarithms, computed by taking the difference 
between total long term debt at t and total long term debt at t-1. Since some firms 
have no new long term debt in a given year,  I add 1 to these 0 values before logging 
them: ln(debt +1). 
New equity New common equity raised (in natural logarithm), computed by subtracting from 
common stock at time t, common stock at time t-1 and income before extraordinary 
items at t-1. Since some firms have no new equity in a given year,  I add 1 to these 0 
values before logging them: ln(ceq +1). 
Tobin’s Q Tobin’s W is computed by dividing average annual market capitalisation by total 
assets. In first differences. Data for ulterior years are not always available. 
Financing 
constraints 
Dummy variable, taking the value 0 for unconstrained firms, i.e. firms that paid 
common or preferred dividends and did not issue common equity; and 1 for 
constrained firms, i.e. those firms that issued new common equity. Theoretical 
justification for the construction of this variable is in section 1.4. 
 
In 2009, TD scores were compiled by Standard and Poor’s credit agency for the 90 largest and 
most liquid publicly traded Russian companies (see Appendix 2) for the complete list of 
companies). The breakdown of firms used in each year is presented in Table 3. As Table 3 
describes the characteristics of my unbalanced panel, it is worth discussing possible sample 
selection issues 14.  
                                                          
13
 Note that winsorizing is not equivalent to simply excluding data, or trimming. In a trimmed estimator, the 
extreme values are discarded; in a winsorized estimator, the extreme values are instead replaced by certain 
percentiles (the trimmed minimum and maximum). 
14 A selected sample is a general term that describes a non-random sample.  
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Standard and Poor’s uses two criteria to select the companies: size and liquidity. As a rule, the 
liquidity of stocks is positively correlated with the size of the company, but there are 
exceptions, especially in cases of minor free-float. There are more than 300 public companies in 
Russia, and this sample may not be representative of all Russian public companies. As the larger 
companies tend to be more transparent than smaller ones, my sampling method is likely to 
cause an upward bias in assessing transparency of the entire population of public Russian 
companies. On the other hand, as the companies included in the survey account for about 80% 
of the cumulative capitalization of the Russian stock market, they represent a majority of the 
Russian economy in terms of assets and operations. 
Table 3: Total number of firms with TD scores per year 
Year Total  Included in 
the previous 
year (>=2 
consecutive) 
Included in 
two 
previous 
years (>= 3 
consecutive) 
State-
controlled 
(SOEs) 
Oligarch-
controlled 
Institutional 
Investor-
controlled 
Missing 
data 
2002 42 n/a n/a 15 10 1 16 
2003 60 40 n/a 18 13 1 28 
2004 60 54 38 20 15 1 24 
2005 67 55 49 20 20 1 26 
2006 70 50 42 20 20 2 28 
2007 79 62 44 22 22 2 33 
2008 90 71 54 19 24 4 43 
2009 90 71 55 18 22 1 49 
TOTAL 558 n/a n/a 152 146 13 247 
TOTAL % 100% n/a n/a 27% 26% 2% 44% 
 
In spite of using an unbalanced panel, the data are persistent. For example, if I select a sub-
sample from the panel with three consecutive non-missing observations of TD score, the results 
from Chapter 1 are unchanged (cf. further discussion in section 1.4). 
Figure 2 shows that TD scores continued to grow on average from 2002-2003 to 2008, and then 
remained at same levels in 2009 (could be due to the fact that the sample of firms remained at 
90, but also firm TD practices suffering from credit crunch in 2008-2009). 
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Figure 2: Total Transparency Index 
 
 
Graphical representations of data 
I start the graphical analysis with presenting the raw, untransformed data. Figure 3 shows the 
scatter plot of firm investment (Y-axis), in million RUR, on TD score (scale 0-1, X-axis), total 
sample (left panel), and split by unconstrained/ constrained firms (right panel). The data shows 
that many Russian firms do not have significant capital investments. The unconstrained firms 
invest more than constrained. There are a few outliers with extremely high investments and 
above average TD scores. 
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Figure 3: Scatter plot of Investmentit (RUR million) on TDit 
Total sample Split by unconstrained/ constrained 
 
 
 
Since we are using normalised data (in natural logarithms), the next figure shows the 
ln(Investmentit)-ln(TDit) relationship for both unconstrained and constrained firms. 
ln(Investmentit) and ln(TDit) are highly correlated. 
Figure 4: Scatter plot of ln (Investmentit) on ln (TDit)  
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Since we are using a dynamic equation of investment, our dependent variable is in first 
differences - ∆ln (Investmentit), represented in Figure 5.  
Figure 5: Normalised histogram of ∆ln (Investmentit), the dependent variable 
 
We plot ∆ln (TDit) on X-axis and ∆ln (Investmentit) on Y-axis for the total sample, and by 
financing constraints in Figure 6. 
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Figure 6: Scatter plot of ∆ln (Investmentit) on ∆ln (TDit) 
Total sample Split by unconstrained/ constrained 
 
 
 
Since the samples show some outliers, we trim the sample for 1% outliers of ∆ln(Investmentit) 
in Figure 7. The charts show weak correlations between TD and Investments, with a steeper 
slope for constrained firms. 
Figure 7: Scatter plot of ∆ln (Investmentit) on ∆ln (TDit), by fin constraints - trimmed 
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Since my models are run in fixed effects, the relevant correlations are with respect to 
deviations from means.  I present the data, net of fixed effects (means) in Figure 8, for total 
sample and by interaction effect (financial constraints). I also present in the bottom left panel 
the interaction effects trimmed for 1% outliers of ∆ln(Iit)- mean(∆ln(Iit)). The data is very weakly 
correlated. In the bottom right panel, I present the interaction effects winsorized by 1% at 
∆ln(Iit)- mean(∆ln(Iit)). The data is weakly correlated. 
Figure 8: Scatter plot of ∆ln(Iit)- mean(∆ln(Iit)) on ∆ln(TDit)- mean(∆ln(TDit))  
Total sample By financing constraints  
 
 
Trimming ∆ln(Iit)- mean(∆ln(Iit)) for 1% outliers 
– by financing constraints  
Winzorising  ∆ln(Iit)-mean(∆ln(Iit)) – by 
financing constraints 
  
 
I also present the data in levels (although it is not used in regressions), net of fixed effects, for 
illustrative purposes.  
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Figure 9: Normalised histograms of ln (Iit)-mean (ln(Iit)) and ln(TDit)-Mean(ln(TDit))  
ln (Iit)-mean (ln(Iit)) ln(TDit)-Mean(ln(TDit)) 
  
 
Figure 10: Scatter plot of ln(Iit)- mean(ln(Iit)) on ln(TDit)- mean(ln(TDit)) 
ln(I)it-mean(ln(I)it) on ln(TD)it-
Mean(ln(TD))it – total sample 
 
ln(Iit)-mean(ln(Iit)) on ln(TDit)-Mean(ln(TDit)) – 
by financing constraints 
 
 
 
 
Overall, the graphical representations suggest that some variability exists in the data and that, 
although some outliers exist in within transformation, they are not driving the results.  When 
excluding the outliers (trimming, winsorizing), the main results remain unchanged. Further 
graphical analysis can be found in Appendix 2 from page 183. 
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Identifying variability in the data 
The graphical representation of the data helps to visualise the variability in TD scores to justify 
for fixed effects and GMM. A large body of empirical research suggests that certain governance 
structures drive improved performance and investments, but this research suffers from 
endogeneity issues. It is often difficult to ascertain if the causation is reversed (e.g. investments 
driving governance) or if governance is merely a symptom of an underlying unobservable 
factor, which also affects investments. Thus, it is difficult to determine what the parameter 
estimates actually suggest (Wintoki et al., 2012). 
I respond to these endogeneity concerns in a specific setting, the relationship between TD and 
investments. I apply a well developed panel GMM estimator (Arellano and Bond, 1991; Arellano 
and Bover, 1995) to a data set of Russian listed firms over a period from 2002 to 2009. I 
demonstrate that the panel GMM estimator can be used to control for such sources of 
endogeneity, as unobservable heterogeneity, simultaneity and dynamic endogeneity15.   
An important aspect of the GMM methodology is that it relies on a set of ‘internal’ instruments 
contained within the panel itself: past values of governance and investments can be used as 
instruments for current realizations of governance. This eliminates the need for external 
instruments.  
However, the dynamic panel estimation methodology has its limitations. There is a potential 
problem with weak instruments, which becomes greater as the number of lags of the 
instrumental variables increases. This represents an empirical trade-off. Increasing the 
instruments’ lag length makes them more exogenous, but may also make them weaker. While 
weak instruments do not appear to drive the specific results in my thesis, this may be an 
important issue in other settings. 
Griliches and Hausman (1986) note that the bias resulting from correlated errors in variables 
may be magnified when using panel data estimators. Since the dynamic panel GMM estimator 
                                                          
15
 The term ‘dynamic endogeneity’ has sometimes been used to refer to the type of endogeneity that arises from 
the possibility that a firm’s current actions will affect its control environment and future performance, which will in 
turn affect its future control environment.  
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relies, at least in part, on first-differencing, dynamic panel estimators may not eliminate 
measurement error bias unless strong and difficult-to-verify assumptions about serial 
correlation in the measurement error are made.  
The use of lags as instruments also relies on a key assumption, that the empirical model 
includes every variable that could conceivably jointly affect both the dependent and 
explanatory variables (Hansen and Singleton, 1982). Given the imperfect nature of proxies in 
empirical research, this is unlikely to be the case. Thus, one should be careful in relying too 
much on the statistical tests that examine the validity of the lagged instrument set in justifying 
their use of dynamic panel data estimation. However, misspecification is likely to be as big a 
problem with OLS and traditional fixed effects estimations as well, and these methods are 
generally not accompanied by any specification tests. Thus, even given the occasional weakness 
of the specification test accompanying the dynamic GMM estimator, it likely still dominates 
inference from OLS or fixed-effects estimation if the underlying economic process is dynamic. 
Finally, I reiterate that the dynamic panel GMM estimator does not solve all endogeneity 
problems. When available, natural experiments or carefully chosen strictly exogenous 
instruments remain the preferred way for consistently identifying the effect of an explanatory 
variable on a dependent variable. However, given the infrequent occurrence of natural 
experiments, and the relative scarcity of exogenous instruments, inference in corporate 
governance research is likely to continue to rely on cross-sectional regressions using panel data. 
Further interpretations of results and tests of panel fixed effects and GMM models are 
discussed in empirical sections of the thesis chapters.  
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Chapter 1: Corporate Governance as a Mechanism to Mitigate Financing 
Constraints on Investment 
 
1.1. Introduction 
 
This chapter researches the influence of corporate governance, measured by transparency and 
disclosure practices, on investment behaviour. I address two primary and distinct questions. 
First, does good corporate governance help internal capital markets to channel the right 
amounts of capital to each project within the firm? In other words, can corporate governance 
improve firm transparency and the efficiency of internal capital budgeting so that the funds are 
allocated appropriately among investment projects? And second, does good corporate 
governance help external capital markets to channel the right amount of capital to each firm? 
In other words, by being better governed, are firms able to attract adequate amounts of 
external capital to lift financing constraints on investment projects? Although these two 
questions are logically distinct - in the sense that the workings of the external and internal 
capital markets appear to be quite different - an overarching goal of this research is to 
emphasize how governance regulates capital allocations across and within firms. Corporate 
governance is one of the curative mechanisms that arise endogenously to mitigate the effect of 
financing constraints on investment outcomes. 
Both research questions addressed in this chapter have been subject to prior empirical and 
conceptual study although the first question, on the impact of governance through internal 
capital markets, has been less well studied relative to the second question. The theoretical and 
empirical literature focuses on explaining capital budgeting practices on the basis of 
information and agency problems within the firm. This literature identifies cases where certain 
governance structures, through their impact on internal capital markets, can lead to either 
increases or reductions in the efficiency of capital allocation. This literature includes works by 
Rajan et al. (2000), Williamson (1975), Scharfstein and Stein (2000), to name a few (for a more 
extensive review, see Stein, 2003). Research on the impact of governance through external 
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capital markets is more mature and includes seminal works by Hubbard (1998), Schleifer and 
Vishny (1997) and Johnson et al. (2000). 
Corporate governance, through firm transparency, plays a crucial role in giving firms access to 
external capital and, thus, mitigating financing constraints on investment. Arguably, the 
importance of governance is underestimated by managers of funds-rich state-owned firms, but 
adopting high governance standards might still improve their firms’ internal efficiency and 
financing structure. I test the effect of corporate governance on financing constraints through 
investment, a factor that has not been tested extensively in the Russian context; most of the 
literature examines the effect of governance on firm value, profitability and performance, 
which are very widely used indicators of shareholder value. In summary, the research gap 
addressed by this chapter is the relationship between transparency and disclosure practices, 
financing constraints, and investment behaviour in an emerging economy context. 
Related studies on corporate governance in Russia include Black et al. (2006, 2001), 
Goetzmann, Spiegel and Ukhov (2003), and Kuznecovs and Pal (2012); and Durnev and Kim 
(2005), and Klapper and Love (2004) (cross-country). These studies tend to focus on one year 
(in case of surveys) or a relatively short time period. Thus the access to the unique data 
computed by Standard and Poor’s (S&P) on TD rules in the period comprising reforms of 
governance code in 2002-2004 16 allows me to update the effect of governance on investment 
in Russia. I go beyond this literature in that my analysis highlights the different investment 
behaviours of the state and oligarchs. The present chapter contributes also to the literature on 
financing constraints (Hubbard, 1998; Moyen, 2004; Raith et al., 2007; Brown and Petersen, 
2009). 
Countries vary substantially in their predominant mode of firm governance. For simplicity, I 
compare two models: an external, diffuse shareholder model, and an internal concentrated 
blockholder model. In the presence of weak protection of shareholder rights, weak law 
enforcement, as well as less efficient capital markets, the predominant ownership structure is 
                                                          
16
 A new Code of Conduct was issued by the Federal Securities Commission (FSC) in February 2002, effective in 
2003, reflected in firms’ accounts from 2004.The code’s major objective was to provide a framework for corporate 
governance in Russian firms (Puffer and McCarthy, 2003) 
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concentrated. The main risks that beset emerging economies, including Russia, are principal-
principal conflicts, that is, conflicts between the ‘controlling’ and the minority shareholders. 
These conflicts centre on transparency and disclosure, dilution (through share issuance, 
mergers, etc.), asset stripping and transfer pricing, bankruptcy, limits on foreign ownership, 
management attitude to shareholders, registrar risk, dividend policy and dividend payout.  
I contribute to the literature on concentrated blockholder models (Grossman and Hart, 1980; 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Leland and Pyle, 1977; Aghion and Tirole, 1997; Claessens et al., 
2000) and, more specifically, to work on politically connected firms, since state controls 
between 50 and 70% of Russian listed firms (Fisman, 2001; Faccio, 2006; Frye and Iwasaki, 
2011; Okhmatovskiy, 2010). Russia’s unique institutional context allows longitudinal study of 
the effects of corporate governance on investment behaviour. In developed countries, 
governance is stable over time. The improvements to Russian governance over the last 10-20 
years provide enough variation to test the relationship between corporate governance and 
investments, in fixed effects and instrumental variable frameworks. Only a few studies examine 
governance in the Russian context over an extended period.  
The findings in this chapter suggest that governance impacts on investment through internal 
capital markets and also that private ownership concentration could replace good governance. 
Specifically, I find that governance does not impact significantly on investments in the case of 
oligarch firms. This reinforces the theoretical and empirical findings of a curvilinear relationship 
between governance and concentration of ownership (Guriev et al., 2003). Up to a certain limit, 
ownership concentration has a positive effect on corporate governance. Above that threshold, 
the relationship becomes negative. Empirical findings suggest that the threshold is at about 
50%, which reinforces the importance of corporate control market. I find also that governance 
matters most for fixed investment by SOEs. State companies make up 80% of the value of stock 
market in China, 62% in Russia, and 38% in Brazil.17 
Another important finding is related to the zero sensitivity of cash flow to investment for SOEs. 
In emerging economies context, zero sensitivity of cash flow to investment is interpreted as 
                                                          
17 Sources: Deutsche Bank, Fortune and The Economist 
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evidence of a weak form of soft budget constraints (Lizal and Svejnar, 2002). Firms face soft 
budget constraints if there is willingness of government or some other institution to provide 
additional resources or to otherwise bail them out.18 A positive sensitivity of cash flow to 
investment can be interpreted as evidence of financing constraints (Fazzari et al., 1988). When 
estimating the impact of governance on capital investment through external capital markets, I 
find that corporate governance matters for investment in firms that are a priori financially 
constrained.  
While corporate governance influences investments, the opposite could be argued that capital-
intensive firms might decide to improve transparency and disclosure levels in order to obtain 
more investment (reverse causality). More importantly, the relations between governance and 
investment are likely to be dynamic (unobserved heterogeneity and simultaneity). For example, 
current investment will affect future governance choices and these, in turn, may affect future 
firm investment. I address endogeneity using dynamic panel data (Arellano-Bond Generalized 
Method of Moments – GMM - version) and vector autoregression (VAR) techniques. 
The dynamic panel GMM estimator incorporates the dynamic nature of governance 
relationships to provide a valid and powerful instrument that controls for unobserved 
heterogeneity and simultaneity (Wintoki et al, 2012). The use of GMM estimator is also strictly 
required where the lagged dependent variable introduces Nickell’s bias (Arellano, 2003). The 
dynamic modelling approach has been used in other areas of finance and economics where the 
structure of the problem suggests a dynamic relation between the dependent and independent 
variables. Examples include governance and research and development (R&D) (Driver and 
Guedes, 2012), external finance constraints and investment (Whited and Wu, 2006), internal 
finance and investment (Bond and Meghir, 1994), economic growth convergence (Caselli et al., 
1996), labour demand estimation (Blundell and Bond, 1998), and economic growth (Beck et al., 
2000). The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2 presents the 
theoretical framework; Section 1.3 describes the data and the empirical proxies for corporate 
governance. Section 1.4 demonstrates the empirical relationships between governance, 
                                                          
18
 See Kornai (1979, 1986, 1998) for an introduction to and discussion of the concept of a soft budget constraint. 
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financing constraints and investment; Section 1.5 reports robustness checks. Section 1.6 
concludes. 
1.2.  Theoretical Framework 
 
Financing constraints affect all publicly listed companies and particularly in emerging markets 
where debt and equity capital markets are underdeveloped or illiquid (La Porta et al., 1997, 
2000). Modigliani and Miller’s seminal work on the irrelevance of the financing structure has 
given rise to various models generally without reference to the possible influence of financing 
factors. However, by relaxing Modigliani and Miller’s assumptions, especially those related to 
the symmetry of information, firms experience financing constraints in the presence of 
imperfect and inefficient markets. The higher the asymmetry of information or the lower the 
standards of governance, the higher is the effect of governance on financing constraints 
(Hubbard, 1998) where such constraints exist.  
If asymmetric information between managers (owners) and investors is severe, investors will 
tend to rely on general assurances, such as corporate governance practices and indices that 
companies are complying with good practice. This effect of governance on financing constraints 
is illustrated in Figure 11. First of all, according to a well-known finance theory, there is a 
‘pecking order’ in managers’ choices of finance for investment projects. Internal finance is 
preferred before accessing external finance (Myers, 2003). This preference ordering 
corresponds to a kink in the supply curve where the cost of finance rises as the firm expands 
beyond the point that can be met from internal resources.  If the demand for investment funds 
intersects the rising portion of the supply curve, the return to investment will have to be higher 
to justify the cost. Good governance can flatten the upward part of the supply curve if 
information and transparency reassure investors, hence alleviating financing constraints (Figure 
11). In other words, the external market more closely resembles the perfect capital market in 
which the firm can access the external capital market at rates equal to internal resources. At 
the same time, governance can translate the demand curve to the left or right depending on 
whether it depresses (governance can have contradictory or negative effects, e.g., through 
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reducing managerial security or empire-building)19 or encourages investment in fixed assets 
directly, as it disciplines managers and owners and reduces the occurrences of tunnelling ( 
Figure 12). 
Unconstrained firms will still benefit from good governance since it improves their operational 
transparency and efficiency. To my knowledge the interactive effect of governance and internal 
finance (cash flow) on investment has been under-investigated in investment studies on Russia. 
For illustrative purposes suppose that the demand curve initially cuts through the supply curve 
close to the kink point and the equilibrium is at point A (Figure 11). If at this point internal 
finance were to fall short of expectations (a translation to the left of the kinked supply curve as 
indicated), the firm might find itself finance-constrained in that finance would now only be 
available at a rate that could not justify the previous level of investment. The equilibrium moves 
from A to B (step 1) so that investment drops from C0 to C1. In a perfect capital market there 
would have been no change to the level of investment. The sensitivity of the fall in investment 
depends upon the slope of the supply schedule beyond the kink, which in a ‘better’ governance 
regime falls only to C2 (step 2).      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
19
 Governance is not expected to be reducing investment as managers in Russia do not over-invest 
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Figure 11: Governance effects on the supply for finance  
Source: Driver and Temple (2012) 
 
Figure 12: Governance effects on the demand for finance  
 
Source: Adapted from Driver and Guedes (2012) 
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By improving governance or reducing the asymmetry of information between agent and 
principal (external shareholder or debtholder), I hypothesize that the firm could mitigate 
financing constraints in the following (non-exhaustive) ways: 
Hypothesis One. Internal capital market channel: Good TD may improve the firm’s internal 
efficiency making cash-flows more visible and controllable, and promoting more efficient 
allocation of internal funds stimulating investment expenditure; and 
Hypothesis Two. External capital market channel: the firm’s greater transparency will attract 
external investors and provide greater access to local and global financial markets, enabling the 
firm to raise more funds externally via capital markets mitigating financing constraints on 
capital investments. 
In terms of observable variables, I expect TD to positively influence investments (hypothesis 1). 
I also expect the interaction between TD and a proxy of financing constraints to positively 
influence investments (hypothesis 2). This means that for firms a priori financially constrained, 
an improvement in TD leads to an improvement in investments.  
Referring back to Figure 11, the steeper the upward-sloping portion of the supply curve, the 
higher the cost of capital. Whether governance has the effect of making this slope shallower 
can be investigated by testing its interaction effect with a measure of financing constraints, as 
in hypothesis 2. Further analysis of the interaction effects is conducted in the section 4 
’Empirical Specification’. 
Conceptually, the claim that governance will positively affect investment cannot be 
straightforwardly justified. Jensen (1986) argues that managerial opportunism leads managers 
to overinvest in ‘pet’ projects that do not create shareholder value; therefore, good governance 
might stop managers from investing and ultimately reduce investment. Jensen’s argument is 
based on events in the late 1970s and early 1980s related to US oil companies, which wasted a 
lot of money on pet projects and diversification. These acquisitions were unsuccessful partly 
because of the absence of managerial expertise outside the oil sector. The oil industry had large 
increases in free cash flow. However, the evidence shows that the oil firms continued to invest 
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in exploration and development even though the rate of return probably had a negative net 
present value (NPV) (McConnell and Muscarella, 1985), rather than paying out the excess cash 
to shareholders. The overinvestment problem is likely to be more pronounced in stable, cash-
rich companies in mature industries with few growth opportunities. 
The Russian institutional context allows me to hypothesize that there are no reasons to expect 
Russian managers to overinvest. Most Russian firms already have old and fully amortised 
assets, due to the legacy of the soviet regime and heavy use of outsourcers rather than reliance 
on own production. As stated in Section 1.1, the current average longevity of equipment in 
Russia is twice its desired levels. In spite of the prolonged recovery in 1999-2008, capital 
investment by Russian firms is still low and of poor quality. Russian firms are characterized by 
inseparability of management and control due mainly to the influence of large shareholders 
over management. This influence over management is not unusual for firms with concentrated 
ownership (R. Murdoch, R. Branson and C. Koch preside respectively over News Corp, Virgin 
Group and Koch Industries and control their management entirely). But unlike in Europe and 
the US, there are legal loopholes in Russia allowing the majority shareholders (with the consent 
of managers) to funnel funds out of firms rather than to invest in long term assets and 
infrastructure. They seek to maximize short-term rents because of the uncertain legacy of their 
assets acquired in the 1990s’ privatisations, often through crime and bribes, which undermines 
investment and leads also to conflicts between majority and minority shareholders. The 
majority of Russian firms consider their productive assets to be underinvested and obsolete in 
the face of growing competition and market demand (Aganbegyan, 2008, Dzarasov, 2011). 
Referring back to  
Figure 12, I do not expect governance to make the demand shift to the left. This institutional 
impediment to investment growth supports my hypothesis of good governance improving 
investment. 
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1.3. Data 
The mechanisms of governance can be assessed according to board and management 
structures, to shareholder rights, to transparency and disclosure of information, etc. Table 17 
on page 183 in the appendices compares the methodologies of different institutions used to 
measure levels of corporate governance. All are based on more or less similar criteria. The TD 
score is the most frequent measure of governance standards and appears in the methodologies 
of four out of five institutions. I use unique corporate governance variables from the TD 
rankings of S&P. 
Black et al. (2006) analyse the various measures of corporate governance in Russia and 
conclude that sophisticated governance indices are not necessarily better predictors. They 
found the S&P TD scores to be more useful measures of governance, in that they predicted 
Tobin’s Q and, therefore, may correspond to the elements of governance that matter to 
investors. Black et al. (2006) state that, in this respect, TD scores outperform the more complex 
S&P governance indices. 
Based on previous research findings, I decided to use S&P TD scores as my proxies for corporate 
governance. The TD scores produced by S&P for 90 companies consist of three components: 
ownership structure and shareholder rights; financial and operational information; and board 
and management structure and process. These three sub-scores are positively correlated with 
one another. The checklist methodology consists of searching for 110 TD attributes relating to 
the three components (for the full list of attributes see Table 34 in the appendices). Each 
attribute is scored on a binary basis to ensure objectivity, and the scores for the three 
components are based on the scores for individual attributes. Scoring accounts for information 
included in three major sources of public information - annual reports, web-based disclosures, 
and public regulatory reporting (such as publicly available statutory documents filed with the 
Federal Financial Markets Service (FFMS), the Russian financial markets regulator, the Frankfurt 
Stock Exchange, UK Listing Authority (UKLA), the UK Financial Services Authority (FSA), and the 
US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), available on the web sites of companies and 
stock exchanges or the respective regulatory authority). According to the weighting system, 
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public disclosure - regardless of its source - yields 80% of the maximum score for each item in 
the check list used for data compilation. The remaining 20% of points (10% each) are awarded if 
this information is also available from the other two sources. This methodology reflects the 
notion that replication of information in various sources represents value for investors since it 
makes the information more easily accessible. The value of replication, however, is incremental 
relative to the fact of disclosure. 
The S&P methodology is constructed from the perspective of an international investor, which is 
reflected in the list of attributes. 
Table 4: Example questions, survey of transparency and disclosure 
 
The strengths of the TD score lie in its usage and applicability. First, there is enough inter-firm 
and temporal variation among scores to make the TD score an interesting variable for a 
longitudinal study. 2009 scores range from 20% for the lowest scored company to 80% for the 
highest one. There is room for improvement in future Russian TD scores. In 2009, the 
transparency index, calculated as the average score for the 90 Russian companies, was only 
56%; in 2003, the last year that this survey was conducted in the UK, France and US the scores 
for these countries were respectively 71%, 68% and 70%. 
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Second, TD scores matter for investors, especially foreign ones, since they are willing to pay the 
highest premium for Russian firms with the best governance practices relative to firms from 
other countries (McKinsey, 2002 - Global Investor Opinion Survey). Examples of these firms 
include MTS, Vimpelcom and Wimm-Bill-Dann, which have higher trading multiples relative to 
their counterparts (Shekshnia, 2004). 
Third, transparency and disclosure are integral to corporate governance (Patel et al., 2002). TD 
practices are an important component of the corporate governance framework (OECD, 1999) 
and a leading indicator of corporate governance quality. Beekes and Brown (2006) find that 
firms with higher corporate governance standards make more informative disclosures. 
Transparency and full disclosure of information is important for emerging markets and 
particularly Russia, where external capital is necessary to sustain the high growth rate and the 
biggest agency problem centres on asymmetric information and expropriation by majority 
shareholders (Aksu and Kosedag, 2006). 
However, the TD scores produced by S&P used in this paper have not been analysed previously 
in connection with financing constraints on investment in Russia or other emerging markets. 
Most research that uses TD scores focuses on their interaction with firm value. Patel et al. 
(2002) provides a series of bi-variate correlations of price-to-book ratios to TD scores for six 
emerging countries,20 and finds that for five markets, this correlation is positive. Aksu and 
Kosedag (2006) provide evidence that firm size, financial performance and market-to-book 
equity best explain the variation in TD scores of the firms listed on the Istanbul Stock Exchange. 
Doidge et al. (2007) test a model of how country characteristics, such as legal protections for 
minority investors and the level of economic and financial development, influence firms’ 
implementation of measures to improve the transparency of their Profit and Loss Statement 
(P&L). The authors find that country characteristics explain much more of the variance in TD 
ratings (39%-73%) than observable firm characteristics (4%-22%). Patel and Dallas (2002), in 
one of the first studies on TD, highlight that firms with good TD practices have lower costs of 
capital. In their seminal research, Gompers et al. (2003) included TD as one of the components 
                                                          
20
 Does not include Russia. 
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of corporate governance index and found that stronger rights in the US have led to better firm 
performance. Similarly, Klapper and Love (2004) and Black et al. (2006) considered TD 
parameters along with other corporate governance practices. Black et al. (2006) have used 
alternative governance indices provided by other agencies and investment banks and shown 
that governance positively influences firm’s value.  Kuznecovs and Pal (2012) find that TD scores 
significantly boosted the performance of firms, particularly for utility firms. The general 
consensus in this literature is that better TD practices tend to lower the cost of capital, boost 
performance and increase firm value. 
The TD score gives a ranking for a firm based on publicly disclosed information. It is an objective 
measure in the sense that the information is either disclosed or not. The accuracy of the 
information, however, is not entirely assessed. To an extent, the disclosure of audited accounts, 
especially if they accord with IFRS or US GAAP standards and/or are conducted by a top-tier 
auditor, is some measure of the accuracy of the information disclosed. However, for more 
’subjective’ governance measures, Russian companies tend to engage in ‘window dressing’, and 
good governance practices are limited to a box ticking paper exercise. Is an independent 
director really independent? Or, vice versa, is he so remote from the firm’s operations as to be 
purely a public relations figure? Nevertheless, TD scores by S&P are more reliable and complete 
than other measures of governance for Russian listed firms (for methodology on other 
governance measures, see  Table 30 on page 183 in the appendices). 
TD and governance standards in Russia are improving gradually as more and more Russian firms 
participate in international capital markets. In 2009 over 60 Russian companies were listed 
abroad. S&P TD scores show that companies listed on the main markets of the London Stock 
Exchange (LSE) and the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) were substantially more transparent 
than those not listed.21 The data also show that companies electing independent directors to 
their supervisory boards have higher levels of transparency.  
                                                          
21 Companies traded only in Russia had an average transparency index of 50%, whereas the transparency index for 
companies listed on the LSE was 63% and 74% for NYSE-listed firms. 
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Table 5 lists number of observations, mean, median, standard deviation from mean, minimum 
and maximum observations for the raw variables used in empirical specifications. The TD total 
score is broken down into three sub-scores: financial and operational disclosure, ownership and 
shareholders rights, and board and management structure. The total score is an algebraic sum 
of the three sub-scores. Financial data are from the Compustat Global database for all Russian 
firms listed in Russia or abroad in the period 2000-2010. Investment is defined as annual capital 
spending on tangible assets. Ownership data were collected from annual reports, web-based 
disclosures and business publications.  
Average annual sales for the sample are 2.1 billion euros22 which is quite high due to some large 
outliers and high standard deviation. Median annual sales are 486 million euros. Average 
capital investment amounts to 347 million euros and median investment to 57 million euros. 
The averages for the three sub-scores over the entire period are 51, 49 and 45 percent 
respectively. 
Table 5: Summary statistics 
 
 
Since the panel has missing data, when testing the models with many dependent variables, the 
number of non-missing observations drops as the number of variables increases. For example, 
                                                          
22
 Exchange rate EUR/RUR of 40.8 over 01/01/2000-31/12/2010 period. 
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Table 11 on page 51 contains five dependent variables and the specification is tested on the 
whole sample (model 1-2), oligarchs-controlled firms (model 3) or state-controlled firms (model 
4). I compare patterns of non-missing (+) and missing (.) values. The output is produced in Table 
6. For the total sample, the number of non missing observations for all variables as per Table 11 
is 284 (+++++), for the oligarch-controlled is 89, and for state-controlled is 91, which 
corresponds to the total number of observations for each sample as reported in Table 6 below. 
 
Table 6. Patterns of non-missing and missing values 
For total sample For oligarch-controlled firms 
 
For state-controlled firms 
 
 
  
 
Also, given that I have an unbalanced panel, I need to present the summary statistics relating to 
the subsequent regression analyses (i.e. Table 11 and Table 12), including sub-groups of firms 
(SOEs, Oligarchs). In this way, the number of observations in summary statistics corresponds to 
the number of observations in subsequent regression tables. For example, model (1) of Table 
11 has a total of 281 observations and I present below summary statistics for this group of 
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firms. To calculate such statistics, I set a selection of all independent variables and the 
dependent variable 23 used in Model (1) of Table 11 to non -missing. 
Table 7: Summary statistics for non-missing observations 
 
 
Summary statistics for sub-groups 
There are two main subgroups of firms – controlled by the state (50% + 1 share) or controlled 
by an oligarch. Other groups of firms are those controlled by institutional investors, but also 
those without a majority shareholder with either a blockholder – 25% +1 share, or a dispersed 
ownership24. 
 
 
                                                          
23
 One can repeat the same analysis for Model (2), where we add one more regressor – Tobin’s Q, for a total 
number of 198 observations (less than model (1) due to missing data on Tobin’s Q). Similar steps could be 
undertaken for models of Table 12. 
24
 There are 7 observations for firms controlled by institutional investors, when controlling for other regressors. 
There are 68 observations for firms without a majority shareholder. 7+68+56+67=198 corresponds to the total 
sample when controlling for other regressors. 
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Table 8: SOEs 
SOEs have lower than average TD scores and investment. Board and Management structures 
disclosure is particularly low with an average of 46%. 
 
Table 9: Oligarchs 
Firms controlled by oligarchs have higher than average TD scores. They are especially good at 
disclosing financial and operational information. Average investment of oligarchs is also higher 
than average investment of SOEs. The median investment is lower than SOEs , and this might be 
due to some outliers. 
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There is significant correlation between firm size (proxied by sales) and its corporate 
governance (Table 10). Larger publicly listed firms tend to be more attentive to appropriate 
governance levels. Investment is strongly correlated with gross cash-flow, which is in line with 
mainstream finance theory. New debt is strongly correlated with governance; the higher the 
governance standards, the lower the cost of capital due to reduced moral hazard and, 
therefore, more access to external financing. 
 
Table 10: Correlations 
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1.4.  Empirical Specification 
Let us define the empirical specification. Investment is a flow variable, and as such it is very 
sensitive to obstacles. Investment is the by-product of the process by which the capital stock 
catches up with its desired level; and there are essentially three types of adjustments observed: 
(a) ongoing frictionless flow (maintenance); (b) gradual adjustments (e.g. refinements) and (c) 
major and infrequent adjustments. Investment equations can be run as ‘Q’, Euler or accelerator 
models. Q models use Tobin’s Q based on the idea that if Q is greater than 1, then a firm has an 
incentive to invest. Euler models are dynamic disequilibrium models that are estimated 
indirectly. Accelerator models can take many forms and relate to sales on the assumption of 
some constancy of the investment to sales ratio (which can be modified by including other 
variables). Both Q and accelerator models can be run in error correction form because they are 
both based on the idea of a target that may not be in equilibrium so disturbances from the 
target can be modelled.  
My approach is in the spirit of Mairesse et al. (1999), in that rather than focusing on finding the 
‘correct’ model of investment, I have chosen to use an accelerator model in error correction 
form. This formulation encompasses the earlier literature and can be related to firm-level 
empirical work trying to ascertain the sensitivity of investment to financial constraints. Most 
research shows that investment is non-stationary so the error correction model is preferred. 
Error correction models have been used for capital investment and R&D investment in a 
number of papers, such as Becker and Hall (2009), Bond et al. (2003), Mairesse et al. (1999), 
Bond et al. (1997) and Bean (1981). An accelerator model in error correction term has the 
advantage over Euler or Q models of allowing to explicitly separate the specification of a long 
run determinants of investment from that of short run adjustment and expectation lags. We 
can thus assume that sales and investment are proportional in the long run, as in the simple 
neoclassical theory, while in the short run the dynamic relating the two may be more complex.   
                    (             )                                          1), 
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where      is the first difference of the logarithm of investment. An alternative proxy for 
investment used in the literature is the ratio 
   
      
⁄ , where     is investment and       is the 
capital stock (fixed assets) at the end of the period t-1.25 
However, by using     , I avoid reliance on    which contains biased fixed assets valuation. In 
other words,    is based on the assumption of depreciation of fixed assets and, hence, is less 
accurate than    .     represents a vector of the variables which have been emphasized as 
determinants of investment from a variety of theoretical perspectives. It includes first 
difference of sales in logarithms     . It also includes a debt term to control for possible 
omitted variable biases and to evaluate the changing role of external finance on investment 
(Bond and Meghir, 1994; Brown and Petersen, 2009). 
The rationale for the inclusion of lagged investment term, based on formal models of 
investment behaviour, is the presence of adjustment costs of investment (Brown and Petersen, 
2009).          which is the first difference of the logarithms of the firm’s gross cash flow at 
the end of period t-1 is defined as the sum of net income and depreciation and amortisation 
charges. The coefficient of           represents the potential sensitivity of investment to 
fluctuations in available internal finance and could reflect the presence of financing constraints 
on investment.  
The term (             ) is the error correction term, where        is natural logarithm of 
capital investment and        is natural logarithm of sales at the end of period t-2. The error 
correction term represents the long-run properties of this model. ‘Error correcting’ behaviour 
requires that      , so that investment above the desired level is associated with lower 
future investment, and vice versa.      is the first difference of governance (natural logarithm), 
                                                          
25
      can be approximated by the investment rate  
   
      
⁄ . Proof:  
   
      
⁄   
    
      
⁄          
                    (
   
      
⁄   )           , where     is the (natural) log of the desired  capital stock 
for firm i in the period t. 
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proxied by the TD score.    controls for year fixed effects, and     is a random error term. The 
unit of analysis is firm i at time t. Firm fixed effects are removed by first-differencing. 
Hypothesis One: Good TD can improve the internal efficiency or transparency of the firm, cash-
flows become more visible and controllable, and there is more efficient allocation of internal 
funds stimulating investment expenditure. 
I believe that transparency and disclosure facilitates accountability of boards and managers, 
and, in a broader economic context, stimulates economic competitiveness and capital 
investment. In Table 11 I test for the direct effect of governance on investments. 
Table 11: Investment and direct impact of governance, fixed effects 
 
 
Governance is statistically significant in Models (1), (2) and (4). In terms of economic 
significance, and since I consider a linear relationship between TD and investment, a 1% 
increase in TD score, ceteris paribus, means a 0.338% increase in investment, according to 
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Model (2) for example. The t-test on the error correction term ect shows that ect’s coefficient is 
different from 0 and significant in all three models, which means that cointegration exists. In 
other words, the error correction model is a representation of the short-run dynamic 
relationship between sales and investment, in which the error correction term incorporates in 
the model long-run information on sales and investment. I test for heteroscedasticity in the 
error terms with White’s test (White, 1980) by reporting White’s robust standard errors.   
In models (2)-(4), I control for investment opportunities - Tobin’s Q (∆qi,t-1). Tobin’s Q is 
responsible for the drop in observations – some firms were only recently listed or lacking share 
price information in early panel years. Tobin’s Q is positive and significant of investment – more 
investment opportunities lead to more investment, providing support for the findings in the 
classical investment literature. If I control for firm size with first difference in total assets, in 
addition to controlling with first and second differences in sales, the results of model (1) are 
unchanged. If I split the panel into two parts - according to the existence of controlling majority 
shareholder (50% plus 1 share) or not, governance remains a significant and positive factor for 
investment in the presence of a majority shareholder, whether this is a state entity or a private 
investor. The results for a dispersed ownership sub-panel are inconclusive partly due to its 
smaller size. 
Including fixed effects in all models in Table 11 is equivalent to time-demeaning all the 
variables. Thus, controlling for the past investments would account for the dynamic nature of 
investments. In additional (untabulated) analysis, I carry out the dynamic fixed effects 
regression using lags of investment difference at t-1, t-2 and t-3 as regressors to investment 
difference at time t, controlling for other firm characteristics and time dummies. The analysis 
shows significance in these coefficients, confirming persistent and dynamic nature of 
investment and justifying the inclusion of lagged dependent variables on the right hand side of 
the model.  
In spite of using an unbalanced panel, the data are persistent. For example, if I select a sub-
sample from the panel with three consecutive non-missing observations of TD score (a total of 
225 observations), the results for Model (1) and (2) are statistically unchanged. 
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I then analyse the companies owned by majority shareholders and look at the sub-panel with 
an oligarch as the controlling shareholder, and at the sub-panel with the state as the controlling 
shareholder (SOEs). I find that governance significantly and positively influences investment in 
the latter case (cf. Table 11 Model (4)). This might be interpreted as greater transparency and 
disclosure being a positive factor for investment in SOEs. SOEs are poorly governed; their TD 
scores are much lower than the average score or scores of non-SOEs, therefore, any 
improvement to their governance might have a significant impact on the level of their capital 
expenditure. The coefficient of governance in the state-sub panel (0.94) is triple that for the full 
panel (0.34).  
While governance is important for SOEs, I notice that the coefficient of gross cash flow is 
insignificant. The absence of sensitivity of investment to internal funds in the case of SOEs could 
be evidence of soft budget constraints, which means that cash-rich Russian SOEs are not 
financially constrained. Another explanation of non-sensitivity of investment to cash flow would 
be that SOEs operate in frictionless markets, i.e., it is cheaper to issue external than internal 
funds. Asymmetrically, oligarch-owned firms are more sensitive to the levels of internal funds 
(significance in the           coefficient), while governance matters less to them than to SOEs. I 
lag the difference in gross cash-flow by one year to avoid reverse causality since once the firm 
has invested, it might become financially constrained. 
The state is involved in many Russian firms whether through direct shareholdings, board 
membership or other shareholders being members of the Parliament (Duma), etc. To account 
for any state involvement, I split my panel into two sub-panels: with (any share ownership, 
board directorship, etc.) and without any kind of state involvement. The results for the sub-
panel of firms with state involvement are less significant (coefficient range of 0.185-0.250, table 
not reported) than for those firms with a strictly controlling state ownership stake. Companies 
with some state involvement as opposed to state control might be better governed so that 
investment reacts less strongly to changes in governance. 
To validate my results with panel fixed effects, I run ordinary least squares (OLS) on the means 
of the explanatory variables (cf. Table 35 on page 196 in the appendices) and control for fixed 
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effects (industry, listing, foreign shareholder). I confirm that governance has a significant and 
positive impact on investment. I find that firms in the metals and mining, oil and gas and 
diversified telecommunications sectors have a higher propensity to invest than in other sectors. 
I find significance in neither the ownership nor listing variables. 
Hypothesis Two: By being more transparent, the firm attracts external investors, has greater 
access to local and global financial markets, and is able to raise more external funding via 
capital markets, which in turn mitigates financing constraints on investment. 
I argue here that transparency towards investors and the general public is essential for 
accessing local and international capital markets and, thus, diversifying sources of funding, 
which mitigates financing constraints on investment. 
A recent stream in the finance literature (see Brown and Petersen (2009) for a comprehensive 
review) argues for the inclusion of external finance in investment studies. Including debt issues 
would control for possible omitted variables bias and evaluate the role of external finance on 
investment. Carpenter (1995) argues that, in the investment equation, the focus is not only on 
cash-flow but also on the fundamental difference in the role of debt finance in the firm’s 
financing decision. For constrained firms, debt is a source of external finance used to fund 
profitable investment projects. When these firms issue new debt, it represents a relaxation of 
the constraint and there should be a large and positive change in investment. Goergen and 
Renneboog (2001) justify the inclusion of debt by saying that debt captures potential 
bankruptcy costs and the tax advantages of debt. They find that a high level of leverage leads to 
a reduction in investment as the bond market and banks require high premiums to compensate 
for the bankruptcy risk if internally generated funds do not suffice for investment spending.  
Moyen (2004) constructs two models: an unconstrained model in which firms have access to 
external financial markets, and a constrained model in which firms have no access. She does 
not include debt in the regression and finds that it magnifies cash flow sensitivity of 
unconstrained firms, i.e., she implies that omitting debt from ICF regressions may lead to 
upward biased cash flow coefficients. Raith et al. (2007) model investment and internal funds 
and show that the relationship between the two variables is a convex U-shape: in particular, for 
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sufficiently low levels of internal funds, a further decrease leads to an increase in the firm’s 
investment. If internal funds are sufficiently negative, a further decrease in internal funds might 
make it optimal to increase borrowing to such a degree that there may be a negative 
correlation between investment and cash flow. Brown and Petersen (2009) control for external 
finance and instrument cash flow to eliminate the contemporaneous correlation between 
external finance and the cash flow variable. For the reasons stated above, I control for the use 
of debt finance in the investment equation. 
Table 12: Investment and external finance, fixed effects 
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Here, I only analyse long term debt, while about 50% of debt on the sampled firms’ balance 
sheets is short term debt. The firms are still not highly leveraged; on average, they have 1.5x 
Debt/EBITDA multiple. There is a broad range of firms contracting new long term debt, from 
firms controlled by the state to firms controlled by private shareholders.  
Governance is significant in models (1) and (2) in Table 12. New long term debt positively and 
significantly affects capital investment. 
A common approach in the financing constraints literature is to separate firms into groups 
according to a priori criteria related to the presence of financing constraints and to regress 
capital investment on cash-flow and Tobin’s Q, a proxy for investment opportunities26. 
Researchers have used a variety of criteria to categorize firms (see Hubbard, 1998). Some split 
the sample by firm size (Carpenter et al., 1998, Chevalier and Scharfstein, 1995), some by 
dividend payouts, both are proxies for net worth. Other a priori groupings are based on more 
direct proxies for information costs, e.g., firm’s underwriting costs (Calomiris and Himmelberg, 
1995). Most studies find that firms that are a priori more likely to face binding financing 
constraints exhibit greater sensitivity of investment to cash-flow, for example, Fazzari et al. 
(1988, 2000), Hubbard (1998), Whited and Wu (2006) and Bond and Van Reenen (2007), but 
Kaplan and Zingales (1997, 2000) criticize this view. 
Another popular approach that I use in Table 12 Models (2) and (3) is to measure financing 
constraints directly and interact them with the variables of interest (cash-flow, governance, 
etc.). Goergen and Renneboog (2001) construct financing constraints as a dummy variable that 
is set to 1 if a company issues new equity, reduces dividend payments, omits dividends, or is 
financially distressed (files for bankruptcy). Gertler and Hubbard (1989) interact cash flow with 
a dummy for periods of recession showing that, between 1970 and 1984, US manufacturing 
firms exhibited a higher sensitivity of investment to cash flow during recessions. Amore et al. 
(2012) defines as financially constrained those firms that are either young or credit dependent 
(have an S&P credit rating).  
                                                          
26
 Although some studies suggested that Tobin’s Q contains measurement error (Ericksson and Whited, 2000; 
Hennessy et al., 2007). 
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My sample is rather small to separate the firms into groups. Instead, I create a variable for 
financing constraints that categorizes firms as constrained and unconstrained and interact this 
variable with governance. Financing constraints is a dummy variable, taking the value 0 for 
unconstrained firms, i.e., firms that paid common or preferred dividends (following Fazzari et 
al., 1988; Bond and Meghir, 1994) and did not issue common equity (Angelopoulou and Gibson, 
2007) and 1 for constrained firms, i.e., those firms that issued new common equity. Seifert and 
Gonenc (2010) found that firms in emerging economies finance their investment needs mainly 
with equity, the opposite of what would be expected under the pecking order theory. 
Statistically, Russian firms have low leverage and in this situation, I could argue that external 
equity is raised before debt to finance their deficits. If firms want to raise equity, being 
transparent is more important to them since they are facing public investors hence the 
improvement in TD scores will give them better chances in raising equity and drive investment. 
While for the banks, TD scores are less important: they know the information already (whether 
through secondary issue or not), since they monitor the firms through covenants. I lag financing 
constraints by one year to avoid reverse causality since once the firm has invested, it might 
become financially constrained. 
In model (3) of Table 12, the interaction term between financing constraints and governance is 
statistically significant and positive. It means that financially constrained firms benefit 
significantly more from improved TD practices than unconstrained firms.  In economic terms, a 
1% increase in TD score of financially constrained firms, holding the other predictor variables 
constant, means a -0.25+0.639=0.389% increase in investment, according to Model (3). This is 
evidence that companies with financing needs suffer from underinvestment, and it provides 
support for Hypothesis 2 when I control for constrained firms. Corporate governance matters 
and has positive impact on investment for firms that are a priori financially constrained. 
The results are unchanged when adjusting the dependent variable for the outliers at 1% and 
winsorizing. 
57 
94 
 
1.5.  Robustness Checks 
In this section, I address some potential concerns about the data and econometric 
methodology. One such is endogeneity. Endogeneity problems are frequent in studies that 
analyse corporate governance practices at firm level (Klapper and Love, 2004). This is because it 
is generally difficult to find exogenous factors or natural experiments with which to identify the 
relations being examined (Wintoki et al., 2012). First, there is the problem of reverse causality. 
A fast growing firm, for example, may adopt better governance practices in order to ensure 
access to external financing at lower cost. These growth opportunities will be reflected in the 
market valuation of the firm, inducing a positive correlation between governance and Tobin’s 
Q. It is more questionable whether, after controlling for growth opportunities with Tobin’s Q, I 
would still find reverse causality between investment and corporate governance.  
If I assume that firms and investors care about governance, and TD scores in particular, then a 
positive change in investment or cash flows might improve the TD score. Would firms try to 
influence S&P in order to get a higher TD score through the increase in investment or cash 
flow? This seems rather cumbersome, since there are other direct ways of improving the score, 
such as publicly disclosing more information. So if reverse causality between investment and TD 
scores exists, it is not very intuitive. If I use another proxy for corporate governance, such as 
board structure, reverse causality is more obvious because the board structure is the firm’s 
decision ultimately and not that of an external institution. 
Dynamic panel data (Arellano and Bond version) are often used to address the issues of 
causality, unobserved heterogeneity and simultaneity (Wintoki et al, 2012). Investment data 
are not as fat-tailed as high frequency share data for example, so GMM is unlikely to be 
spurious. Here, I use difference GMM and system GMM with collapsed instruments (Roodman, 
2009). I make a small sample adjustment and report t-statistics and the Wald chi-squared test. I 
also report robust standard errors which are consistent with panel-specific autocorrelation and 
heteroscedasticity. GMM estimation should in principle be able to correct for the biases due to 
both the presence of correlated effects and simultaneity. 
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In Table 13, I report the results of the specification tests – the AR(1) and AR(2) first-order and 
second-order serial order correlation tests. The AR(2) test yields a p-value range of   0.1-0.3, 
which means that we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no second-order serial correlation. 
I also produce a Hansen test for over-identification. The dynamic panel GMM estimator uses 
multiple lags as instruments. This means that the system is over-identified, and provides me 
with the opportunity to carry out the over-identification test. Table 13 and Table 14 show the 
results of the Hansen test for the GMM estimates, difference and system respectively. The 
Hansen test yields a J-statistic which is    distributed under the null hypothesis of the validity 
of my instruments. The results in Table 13 and Table 14 reveal a J-statistic with a p-value in the 
range of 0.1-0.5, meaning I cannot reject the hypothesis that my instruments are valid. I tested 
also for exogeneity of a subset of my instruments in GMM using difference-in-Hansen test of 
exogeneity (not reported) which is a test of the exogeneity of a subset of instruments. GMM 
estimator makes an additional assumption that any correlation between the endogenous 
variables and the unobserved (fixed) effect is constant over time, and this assumption can be 
tested directly using a difference-in-Hansen test of exogeneity. The results showed that I 
cannot reject the hypothesis that the additional subset of instruments used in the GMM 
estimates is indeed exogenous. Taken together, the specification tests provide empirical 
verification for my argument that my instruments for governance are exogenous with respect 
to investment. 
Models (1) in Table 13 and Table 14 show that governance is significant and positive for 
investment. However, when controlling for gross cash-flows and Tobin’s Q in Model (3) in Table 
13, neither governance, nor gross cash-flow are significant for investment. Could it be that 
improved governance coupled with growing cash-flows is still not enough to reverse the trend 
of allocation of funds to short term projects, due to risks related to uncertain property rights? 
This might be one explanation for why Russian firms have underinvested in assets while not 
always being financially constrained. According to the pecking order theory27, this could be 
interpreted as an absence of financing constraints. In other words, it could be that demand for 
                                                          
27
 Pecking order theory states that firms prefer to finance investments with internal funds first, then debt and 
finally, equity. 
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investment funds by managers is so low that it does not intersect the upward-sloping portion of 
the supply curve (Figure 11, page 37). This might indicate that managers are colluding with 
major shareholders to hold investment low irrespective of cash flow, because of the risk of 
asset extraction by the state. A manager-controlling shareholder tandem might decide to spend 
the extra cash on short term projects or dividends, rather than to invest in capital assets. An 
alternative empirical explanation could be that the number of GMM instruments is getting large 
relative to the number of groups of observations and as a result standard errors provide an 
inefficient estimation. The absence of significance in TD might then reflect the data limitations 
and further robustness checks are needed. 
Model 5 in Table 13 provides support for Hypothesis 2 - the interaction term between financing 
constraints and governance is positive and significant, meaning that firms classified as 
financially constrained benefit from better governance. 
Table 14 presents the results for the system GMM. Both gross cash flow and Tobin’s Q are 
positive and significant for investment, providing support for the findings in the classical 
investment literature. Again, for firms that are a priori financially constrained, greater 
transparency and disclosure mean greater investment (Model 5). 
In addition to GMM, I also apply VAR to my panel data (for full details on the methodology, see 
Love and Zicchino, 2006) to address endogeneity. By analysing orthogonalized impulse-
response functions I can separate the response of investment to shocks coming from 
governance or other variables. My results (cf. Figure 26 on page 197 in the appendices) indicate 
that the impulse response of investment to a one standard deviation shock in governance has a 
positive impact. 
A second problem might arise due to omitted variables which serve as pre-determinants for 
differences in sales, assets, or gross cash-flows, which, in turn, are shown to be correlated with 
investment. I use panel data techniques with fixed effects, which partially addresses omitted 
variables bias for variables such as industry, region, legal framework, etc. I also use lagged 
dependent variables. 
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A third potential concern is selection bias. The companies in the sample were selected 
according to their size and liquidity. In 2009, they amounted to 90, 76 of which were included in 
a 2008 study. The liquidity of stocks is generally positively correlated with firm size, but there 
are exceptions, especially in cases of minor free-float. There are more than 300 public 
companies in Russia, and the S&P sample may not be representative of all Russian public 
companies. As larger companies tend to be more transparent than smaller ones, the sampling 
method is likely to cause an upward bias in assessments of the transparency of the entire 
population of public Russian companies. On the other hand, since the companies included in 
the sample account for some 80% of the cumulative market capitalization of the Russian stock 
market, they represent a majority of the Russian economy in terms of assets and operations. 
Russian small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) have different priorities. They are operating 
in situations where there is less need for transparency, similar to other SMEs in the rest of the 
world. The costs of transparency and disclosure are quite high, including accounting and 
information technology (IT) expenses, and they can be an obstacle to pursuing good 
governance standards. 
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Table 13: Investment and corporate governance, difference GMM 
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Table 14:  Investment and corporate governance, system GMM 
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1.6.  Conclusion 
I conclude this chapter with a brief summary of my main findings and a discussion of the main 
implications. I tested the significance of capital investment sensitivity to governance through 
internal capital markets. I found governance to be a significant and positive factor for 
investment, using both fixed effects and GMM estimators. 
I analysed the companies owned by majority shareholders, and looked at the sub-panel with an 
oligarch as the controlling shareholder and at the sub-panel with the state as the controlling 
shareholder. I found that governance significantly and positively influences investment in the 
latter case. This might be interpreted as greater transparency and disclosure being a positive 
factor for investment in SOEs. 
Private ownership concentration might replace good governance. Specifically, I found that 
governance does not significantly affect investments when looking at firms controlled by 
oligarchs. When estimating the impact of governance on capital investment through external 
capital markets, I found that corporate governance matters and has a positive impact on 
investments for firms that are a priori constrained.  
External capital has a significant and positive influence on investment. Firms that raised 
additional debt were (are) subject to more scrutiny from banks and were (are) applying better 
governance rules to maximize the use of additional cash flows in investment projects. 
An unexpected result consisted of finding gross cash flow to be not always significantly related 
to investment. This might indicate that managers are colluding with major shareholders to hold 
investment low irrespective of cash flow because of the risk of expropriation. Another reason 
for gross cash flow-investment insensitivity might be the presence of soft budget constraints. In 
an emerging economies context, zero sensitivity of cash flow to investment is interpreted as 
evidence of a weak form of soft budget constraints.  
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Chapter 2. Who is Monitoring the Monitor? The Influence of Ownership 
Networks and Organizational Transparency on Long-Term Resource 
Commitment in Russian Listed Firms 
2.1. Introduction 
The Russian economy has a dichotomous structure. On the one hand, it is controlled by the 
state; on the other, it is controlled by a handful of Russian billionaires or ‘oligarchs’. These 
parties can be immensely powerful and may either provide availability of economic and political 
resources to firms or extract valuable resources from firms (Okhmatovsky, 2010). This chapter 
focuses on the ownership and association networks among oligarchs and the state, and 
proposes a novel extension into the literature on governance in emerging economies. 
Investment is critical for the long-term performance of firms because it boosts productivity, 
enables growth and, thereby, improves performance and profits. Investment can lead to 
increases in the firm’s share price which subsequently increases shareholder value. Thus, fixed 
investments reflect the ability of the firm to invest in long-term growth and performance. 
However, governance arrangements, such as ownership structure and transparency practices, 
may influence the firm’s access to financial, knowledge and political resources, and its 
vulnerability to the funnelling of resources out of the firm by powerful organizational agents 
(Faccio, 2006; Frye and Iwasaki, 2011). In this chapter, I explore the conditions under which 
either resource provision or expropriation is likely to happen. I argue that highlighting these 
organizational strategies in an emerging economy institutional environment is appropriate 
because of greater variation in organizational practices, and the relevance of the emerging 
economy context for institutional research per se.  
I approach the relationships between governance and long-term resource commitment from 
two theoretical perspectives. Resource-dependence theory (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978 and 
2003; Boyd, 1990; Hillman et al., 2009) suggests that firms are constrained by their 
environmental conditions and tend to act to relax these constraints and obtain access to vital 
resources such as finance, expertise, advice and inputs (Burt, 1980; Provan et al., 1980; Boyd, 
1990; Casciaro et al., 2005). Agency theory is based on the recognition that the separation 
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between ownership of the firm and its control by professional managers leads to a principal-
agent problem in which the agent (managers) does not always act in the best interests of the 
principal (shareholders) due to incomplete monitoring and the discretion managers have to 
maximize their own private gains (Berle and Means, 1932; Fama and Jensen, 1983). A vast 
literature has built on these initial insights, and in much of the 20th century was devoted to 
trying to figure out, theoretically and empirically, how best to align the incentives of managers 
with the benefits of shareholders (Fama, 1980; Eisenhardt, 1989; Blair, 1995; Eisenhardt and 
Schoonhoven, 1996).  
A slightly different perspective of agency theory, and one particularly relevant for emerging 
economies, is the principal-principal agency (PPA) model of corporate governance (Claessens et 
al., 2000; Dharwadkar et al., 2000; Young et al., 2008). Principal-principal conflicts between 
controlling and minority shareholders result from concentrated ownership, extensive family 
ownership and control, conglomerate structures and weak legal protection of minority 
shareholders (Young et al., 2008). In particular, concentrated ownership, the predominant 
ownership structure in Russia and other emerging economies, combined with weak external 
governance mechanisms, results in more frequent conflicts between controlling shareholders 
and other shareholders (Morck et al., 2005). These conflicts are created by the controlling 
shareholder’s access to decisions concerning dividends, investments and appointments or even 
sales of assets, and collusion with top management, that generate opportunities for private 
gains and expropriation of minority shareholders.  
In developed economies, concentrated ownership is generally viewed as a possible means of 
addressing traditional principal-agent conflicts (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Shleifer and Vishny, 
1997), but in emerging economies, and in Russia in particular, since concentrated ownership is 
a root cause of PPA conflicts, increasing the ownership concentration is not a remedy and may 
exacerbate the situation (Faccio et al., 2001; Young et al., 2008). In this context, PPA conflicts 
can be resolved by outside monitoring of controlling shareholders or bonding between 
controlling shareholder and other shareholders. The latter occurs when controlling 
shareholders provide an implicit guarantee to protect other shareholders against expropriation, 
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either by developing a reputation for treating minority shareholders well (Gomes, 2000) or by 
cross-listing American Depository Receipts (ADRs) on the US stock exchanges (Doidge et al., 
2004) to signal  higher standards of governance. 
Within the broader institutions-based view of the firm (Ahuja, 2011), I integrate PPA theory 
with Resource-Dependence Theory (RDT) by building on Hillman’s (2003, 2004, 2009) work. In 
particular, I revive the notion of organizational power (Brass and Burkhardt, 1993) and suggest 
that owners that are powerful enough to attract resources to a firm may be powerful enough 
also to redirect resources away from the firm. Thus, although powerful owners may increase 
decision making efficiency by monitoring top managers, the benefits may be more than offset 
by the costs of expropriation enabled by the ability to generate private gains or to collude with 
top managers. However, these tendencies can be countered by the firm’s commitment to 
corporate governance practices such as TD (Patel et al., 2002; Bushman et al., 2003; Berglöf and 
Pajuste, 2005; Hermalin and Weisbach, 2007; Roohani et al., 2009). If firms institute thorough 
and transparent reporting practices, this makes it more difficult for powerful managers or 
owners to draw private benefits. Also, transparent governance facilitates the acquisition of 
resources from other external investors or lenders. Therefore, transparency mitigates agency 
costs, including PPA costs and, as a consequence, alleviates resource constraints. 
I adopt the novel network perspective of ownership to examine the effects of owners’ 
connectivity to one another and to the state (Guthrie et al., 2012). More connected controlling 
owners may provide more relevant resources to the firm, such as information about and 
finance for investment opportunities. On the other hand, more connected owners may be 
particularly powerful and prone to expropriation. However, in the presence of multiple 
blockholders, powerful owners may be monitored by other large shareholders, thus reducing 
the potential downsides of ownership networks. 
As in chapter 1, I test my hypotheses with the panel dataset of large Russian listed firms, 
combined with longitudinal information on their TD practices collected by S&P.  These panel 
data are complemented by cross-sectional information on firms’ controlling oligarch ownership, 
state ownership, conglomerate ownership, stock-market listing and industry association ties, 
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which I use to construct my ownership network measures. I estimate error-correction panel 
models explaining the fixed investments of firms in the period 2000-2010, focusing on the 
moderating effects of ownership network position and ownership structure on the impact of TD 
on investment.  
I find that both centrality in oligarch ownership networks and firms’ TD practices positively 
influence long-term resource commitment to fixed investments, but generally are substitutes 
for determining investments. Peripheral firms – firms with less connected controlling owners – 
rely more on TD to attract and commit resources for investment than central firms, whereas for 
central firms, transparency is less critical. However, the interaction between transparency and 
networks depends on the type of ownership structure underlying the network ties. In 
particular, resources provided through conglomerate or state ownership, or ownership by a 
particularly powerful oligarch connected through the major industry association, are found to 
complement transparency practices. I argue that these types of control create particularly 
severe expropriation hazards (Henisz and Zelner, 2001), which must be mitigated by 
transparent governance in order to commit to investments. TD practices facilitate commitment 
of resources to productive investment rather than their being exploited for ‘nest feathering’ or 
other private benefits for owners. 
In the following section, I introduce the theoretical framework where I integrate PPA theory 
with RDT and develop a set of novel hypotheses on the roles of business networks and 
transparent governance in determining long-term resource commitments. The third section 
introduces the unique panel dataset of Russian listed firms. Regression analyses are presented 
in the fourth section, and the final section summarizes the key results and discusses their 
implications. 
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2.2. Theoretical Framework 
2.2.1. Resource-Dependence Theory and Principal–Principal Agency Theory 
Firms are embedded in a range of relationships with other organizational actors (Granovetter, 
1985). Virtually all organizational outcomes are based on interdependent causes or agents 
(Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). This interdependence creates ties among organizations so that 
they become part of a network. Organizations can be tied to one another through many types 
of connections such as exchanges of information, materials, financial resources, legal contracts, 
ownership, control and services. Some network ties provide salient and trusted information 
that may affect behaviour (Brass et al., 2004) leading to imitation among organizations 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Levitt and March, 1988). I consider ownership networks in which 
firms may be connected to different types of owners, and owners may be connected to each 
other or to a major industry association.   
A firm’s reaction to others in the network is determined in part by the extent to which the 
organization’s operations depend on certain types of resource exchanges (Pfeffer and Salancik, 
1978). Resource availability strongly influences firms’ ability to gain legitimacy and, therefore, 
facilitates network development. For example, Bazoli et al. (2003) find that the availability of 
grant funding influences partnership formation and the legitimacy of organizations. The 
dependence of one organization on another is determined also by the concentration of 
resource control by one or a few organizations, and the importance of this resource to the focal 
organization. Russian SOEs, for example, rely on the state for contracts and financing. An SOE 
will be influenced more by the state the greater is its dependence on the state, i.e., the more 
critical the state is to the functioning and survival of the firm. 
RDT has been used to explain such corporate governance mechanisms as corporate boards, 
because boards provide organizations with resources (Boyd, 1990; Dalton et al. 1999, Hillman 
and Dalziel, 2003; Hillman et al., 2004). Gulati (1999) relies on a resource-dependence 
framework to examine network resources and alliance formation. Other contexts in which RDT 
has been applied include mergers and acquisitions, joint ventures, alliances, political activity 
and executive succession. 
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To the best of my knowledge, the present research is the first to examine how ownership 
networks impact on investments through corporate governance practices. I focus on 
investment rather than profitability measures, because such focus allows me to assess whether 
the controlling owners are re-investing their gains in long-term assets or taking them out as 
cash or dividends. These two alternatives have drastically different implications for firm growth 
and for the dynamism of the economy. Since firms in Russia are generally under-invested 
(Dzarasov, 2011), it is important to understand the impact on investment of better governance. 
Moreover, in the Russian context, profitability, proxied by accounting profits, can often be 
arbitrary since firms manipulate accounts to minimize their accounting profits to minimise 
corporate tax payments (The Russia Corporate Governance Manual, Chapter 13, page 15; 
Sprenger, 2011). Investment appears to be a more reliable measure. Oligarchs can own 
relatively unprofitable firms, but still invest in fixed assets to improve the future productivity of 
the firms they own (Gorodnichenko and Grygorenko, 2008).  
 
2.2.2. An Integrated Framework of Ownership Networks, Transparency and 
Disclosure Practices, and Long-Term Resource Commitments 
Conceptually, my study is close to Hillman and Dalziel (2003) which integrates resource 
dependence and agency perspectives in a study of boards of directors and performance. My 
context of ownership networks is aligned with their focus on boards of directors in that both 
controlling owners and boards can influence the behaviour of top managers through the 
resources they make available (e.g., finance, managerial advice, political power) or because 
they affect agency costs. Thus, resource provision and agency costs are likely to be central for 
understanding the implications of boards and controlling shareholders. 
However, my context of controlling owners in an emerging economy differs fundamentally from 
boards of directors in that the relevant agency costs arise from, and are monitored by, very 
different parties. In an institutionally weak emerging economy, such as Russia, it is possible that 
controlling shareholders take a very active role in the firm’s strategy and management. For 
example, the majority shareholder Khodorkovsky, prior to his imprisonment, directly influenced 
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the strategies of Yukos, transforming it from an under-performing collection of assets to one of 
the largest Russian oil companies at the time (Rigi, 2005). Oligarch shareholders can use the 
company as a vehicle to pursue their own political or financial interests (Morck et al., 2005) 
which do not necessarily coincide with the interests of all shareholders. There is considerable 
evidence that in such conditions, minority shareholders’ value is at risk of being expropriated 
(Black, 2001; Boone and Rodionov, 2002; Dyck, 2003; Guriev and Rachinsky, 2005; Adachi, 
2009). Thus, concentrated ownership can lead to inefficiencies caused by principal-principal 
conflicts of interest (Young et al., 2008).  
In weak institutional and governance environments, controlling shareholders have two options. 
They can provide their firms with valuable resources such as finance or political connections 
and expect greater shareholder returns in the future, or they can expropriate value from their 
firms through unproductive or unfair dividend policies, special (wasteful) investments and 
activities, nest-feathering or empire building. However, the firm’s position in the ownership 
network can enhance, aggravate, or mitigate these resource-dependence and agency issues.  
The firm’s position in the two-mode firm-owner network has implications for both resource 
dependence and agency costs. First, well-connected controlling owners can provide more or 
higher-quality resources. Thus, if the focal firm’s controlling owners are connected to a wider 
network of firms through their other shareholdings, they are likely to be able to act as 
information and resource conduits to the focal firm. Better informed and resource rich firms 
are better positioned to make productive long-term resource commitments through fixed 
investment.  
Second, controlling shareholders can attempt to extract value from the company for their own 
advantage, thus depleting the company of resources that could be committed to productive 
long-term investments. This argument reflects the PPA cost of powerful individual (oligarch) 
owners: who will monitor the monitor? Indeed, there is evidence (Pagano and Roëll, 1998; 
Faccio et al., 2001; Faccio and Lang, 2002; Maury and Pajuste, 2005) that multiple large 
shareholders can monitor one another’s attempts to derive private benefits from their 
companies. A particular case of effective monitoring is formation of controlling coalitions 
71 
94 
 
(Bennedsen and Wolfenzon, 2000). In controlling coalitions, ownership and control are 
distributed among several large owners and no individual shareholder is large enough to 
control the firm. This arrangement creates a credible commitment (a form of bonding) that the 
shareholders will not undertake unilateral action to expropriate funds. As a result, agency costs 
can be mitigated by position in the ownership network that affords the company multiple large 
shareholders (blockholders), reducing value-extraction and enhancing the conditions for long-
term resource commitments. 
Similarly, conglomerate structures can influence firms’ resource dependence and agency issues. 
Russian oligarchs tend to control firms in different industries and often run them as business 
groups or conglomerates. For example, Mr Yevtushenkov, who controls most of his companies 
through the holding company Sistema, has controlling interests in about ten leading listed 
firms, from energy, oil and gas, to telecommunications and chemicals. Many such 
conglomerates include banks, which is a remnant of post-privatization times when financing 
was scarce and best provided ‘in-house’.  
Studies building on RDT (Buckley and Strange, 2011; Estrin et al., 2009) argue for the 
importance of business groups, such as oligarchic conglomerates, to internalize market 
transactions, minimize transaction costs and transfer financial resources between firms so as to 
alleviate financing constraints on investment. These advantages may be more pronounced in 
Russia where external markets are less efficient (Wright et al., 2005). The internal markets 
associated with business groups in emerging markets reduce uncertainty and lower transaction 
costs. Conglomerate ownership ties, therefore, can improve the availability of financial 
resources for investment. 
In contrast, agency-theory based research takes a more negative view that conglomerates 
suffer from agency and coordination problems due to their complex organizations, resulting in 
inefficiency and even exploitation of minority shareholders (Morck et al., 2005). This 
perspective suggests that conglomerate ownership reduces financial efficiency and weakens 
the ability of firms to make long-term investments. Conglomerates have been depicted in the 
literature as either ‘paragons or parasites’ (Khanna and Yaleh, 2007).  
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Firm-state interactions also play a crucial role in many emerging economies in determining 
corporate behaviour and outcomes (Okhmatovskiy, 2010; Okhmatovskiy and David, 2011; 
Hillman et al., 2004). Firms in the firm-state network can provide state actors with inside 
business information, financial resources (corporate taxes, campaign financing, state-backed 
charity financing), and political support (voting and open support of state policies and 
regulations). In exchange, the state can help focal firms enhance their rights and competitive 
positions. State connections provide firms with opportunities to influence regulatory policy 
(Hillman et al., 2004), enhance the firm’s legitimacy (Baum and Oliver, 1991) and facilitate 
access to valuable resources controlled by the state (Xin and Pearce, 1996). Firms connected to 
the state may benefit from preferential treatment (Johnson and Mitton, 2003) and receipt of 
exclusive information regarding state policies (Lester et al., 2008).  
Studies employing the resource dependence view hypothesize that, on balance, the benefits of 
firm-state ties outweigh the costs, and provide evidence that ‘performance benefits accrue to 
firms that create linkages with the political environment’ (Hillman et al., 2009, p. 1413). Inter-
organizational relationships based on dyadic ties developed between business and government 
give rise to political resources that can be enjoyed by the focal firms. Therefore, firm-state ties 
can provide important resources at firm level (Dyer and Singh, 1998; Gulati et al., 1999; Sun, 
Mellahi and Wright, 2012). Empirical studies provide evidence that ties to the state indeed 
enhance performance (Fisman, 2001; Johnson and Mitton, 2003; Siegel, 2007). In a recent study 
of firm-state ties among Russian banks, Okhmatovskiy (2010) distinguishes between board and 
ownership ties to SOEs, and board and ownership ties directly to the Russian state. He finds 
that ties to SOEs are associated with higher profitability, while no significant differences emerge 
for firms with direct ties to the state.  
There are a few reasons why the presence of the state among the firm’s shareholders might 
boost investment. Since management communicates regularly with large shareholders, I can 
expect benefits associated with information exchange such as being informed about changing 
policies. The state as a shareholder can boost the legitimacy of a particular business and 
decrease the perceived risks associated with the business because of expected state support in 
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crisis situations (see banks bail-outs). Finally, if a firm has ties to the state, this firm may be 
privileged when applying for licences, tax exemptions, government contracts, etc., which, in 
turn, can result in more valuable investment opportunities. 
However, from an agency perspective, being controlled by the state can have negative effects 
on investment. While the power of individual owners may be mitigated by other owners, 
reducing the concern of expropriation, the power of the state may be too strong for any 
individual or group of other owners to counterbalance. Thus, having an overpowering state as 
the major shareholder may make other owners less inclined to provide resources for the firm 
for fear of expropriation by the state, with the result that the firm’s capability for long-term 
resource commitments to investment may be limited (Faccio et al., 2001; Faccio, 2006). 
Finally, collective organizations and associations allow concentration on a valuable resource 
(Leiponen, 2008). Unions and trade and professional associations are instances of such 
attempts to achieve coordinated action. Recent research shows that membership in a business 
association is positively related to the firm’s propensity to invest in capital assets (Pyle, 2011). I 
examine the effects of membership in the most developed and influential business association 
in Russia – the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs (RUIE).  
RUIE developed originally as a powerful alliance of Soviet-era enterprise directors, which, in the 
initial stages of the reform era, lobbied for the retention of many price controls, continued 
access to state subsidies, and strict limits on foreign investment (McFaul, 1993; Hanson and 
Teague, 2005). By the mid-1990s, RUIE had begun to adopt a more pro-market orientation and 
was helping to organize a network of independent affiliates. RUIE aspires to act as a lobby 
representing the interests of large firms owned by the oligarchs. RUIE and other interest groups 
seek access to policy makers in order to defend the interests of their members - at the expense 
of others if necessary. This relationship is mutually beneficial since policy makers need the 
information that pressure groups, such as influential oligarchs, provide in order to keep in touch 
with their firms, to know where policy measures are needed, and to determine whether 
planned policies have sufficient support from those directly involved to ensure that they will be 
implemented. Hence, industry associations, such as RUIE, may enhance personal ties when 
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lobbying state officials (Frye, 2002) and contribute to political stability (Hanson and Teague, 
2005). 
Industry associations also provide lobbying members and participating managers or owners 
with access to people and information. By becoming central actors in such an association, firms 
may accrue benefits in terms of privileged access to inputs, advice, expertise or other forms of 
power. These benefits should mitigate resource constraints in the operation of the firm. 
Although industry associations are non-profit organizations that are unlikely to become actors 
that develop powerful relationships over their members; having a major shareholder who is a 
member of the most powerful lobby may still be associated with PPA costs. That is, owners who 
are members of RUIE’s board are likely to be particularly powerful. Thus, although RUIE 
membership is likely to generate access to valuable resources, it may also signal the presence of 
a particularly powerful oligarch.  
Following this review of the key types of ownership networks, I next develop two novel 
hypotheses and consider how firms’ other governance practices influence investments and, in 
particular, interact with ownership and other networks. I am interested in particular in TD 
practices, because these practices influence the ability of the firm’s other stakeholders to 
monitor managers and owners.  
Corporate transparency comprises a set of information, privacy and business policies that 
improve corporate decision making and render operations open for assessment by employees, 
stakeholders, shareholders and the general public. It has been defined as ‘the system by which 
business corporations are directed and controlled’ (Cadbury, 2002, p. 1). The mechanisms of 
governance can be assessed on various factors ranging from board and management 
structures, to shareholder rights to TD of information. My research focuses on a narrow aspect 
of governance, i.e. TD. TD practices are integral to corporate governance (Patel et al., 2002). 
They are an important component of corporate governance frameworks (OECD, 1999) and a 
leading indicator of corporate governance quality (Aksu and Kosedag, 2006). Beekes and Brown 
(2006) find that firms with higher corporate governance standards make more informative 
disclosures. Black et al. (2006) analysed the various measures of corporate governance in Russia 
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and conclude that sophisticated governance indices are not necessarily better predictors than 
TD scores. TD are particularly important in emerging markets, such as Russia, where external 
capital is necessary to sustain high growth rates, and the greatest agency problems centre on 
asymmetric information and expropriation by majority shareholders (Aksu and Kosedag, 2006). 
TD data have been used in many scholarly cross-country studies that assess the relationship 
between accounting transparency, legal origin, culture and economic performance (see, e.g., La 
Porta et al., 1999; Hope, 2003). 
Chapter 1 provides evidence that TD practices directly influence investments. I argue that these 
practices enhance both internal efficiency and the prospects for external finance due to 
improved accountability. As a consequence, Russian firms that adopted better TD practices 
increased their long-term fixed investments. In terms of the framework in this chapter, this 
argument can be interpreted in the light of agency theory: improved TD practices enhance the 
ability of stakeholders to monitor and, thus, to reduce agency costs. 
The interest in this chapter is in how ownership networks and TD practices interact in 
determining investment. I explore how TD practices interact with the firm’s position in 
ownership networks. I expect this to depend on whether networks primarily facilitate 
acquisition of resources or generate agency costs, including principal–principal conflicts.  
When the firm’s position in a specific network primarily yields resources, I expect TD practices 
to substitute for ownership networks in enabling long-term investments. This is because firms 
may already have obtained many of the resources needed, and advanced TD is not necessary to 
acquire the resources for long-term investment. 
H1: Connections in networks that primarily provide resources negatively moderate (substitute 
for) transparency and disclosure practices in their effects on investments. 
In terms of my observable variables, I expect the effect of the interaction term between TD and 
a dummy for peripheral firms to positive and significant. The effect of the interaction term 
between TD and a dummy for central firms is expected to be weaker than between TD and 
peripheral firms.  
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We hypothesise that some firms’ ownership networks and structures are expected to have a 
positive effect on investment, while others are expected to have a negative effect. From an 
agency perspective discussed above, firms which are SOEs, conglomerates, singled-owned or 
RUIE board members are expected to be generating agency costs which produce negative 
effects on investment. For firms that accumulate agency conflicts, e.g. firms that are at the 
same time single-owned, RUIE-members and conglomerates, the effect on investment is 
expected to be more negative 28.   On the contrary, for firms which are controlled and 
monitored by several owners, such networks will mitigate agency conflicts. These network 
effects are summarised in Figure 13. Conglomerate, State and RUIE-networks are expected to 
generate the principal-principal agency costs (‘+’ sign from these ownership networks to 
‘principal-principal agency costs’ concept). Oligarch networks could be either generating agency 
costs (one oligarch, ‘+’ sign) or alleviating agency costs (multiple oligarchs, ‘-’ sign). The agency 
costs have a negative impact on investment (‘-’ sign from agency costs concept to ‘fixed 
investment’). From an agency perspective, when firms’ ownership network positions primarily 
generate agency costs, networks and TD practices are complements. The impact on investment 
of this interaction of agency costs with TD is presented in Figure 13 with a H2(+) sign.  Similar 
mechanisms are investigated in the literatures on venture capital ownership (Chahine et al., 
2007; Chahine and Filatotchev, 2008, Fracassi and Tate, 2012); and boards (Huse, 2005). In my 
study, TD practices enhance monitoring that counteracts the agency conflicts created by 
ownership arrangements. 
H2: Connections in networks that primarily generate principal–principal and other agency costs 
positively moderate (complement) transparency and disclosure practices in their effects on 
investments. 
Conversely, ownership structures that reduce agency costs are substitutes for TD practices, 
because they enhance monitoring and hence accountability. 
                                                          
28
 This direct effect is not tested in the paper, just its interaction with TD (due to data limitation, I only have cross-
sectional ownership and networks data and hence I am limited to interaction effects between ownership networks 
and TD).  
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In terms of my observable variables, I expect the interaction effect between TD and ownership 
networks that accumulate agency costs (such as single owner, state and conglomerate) to have 
a positive effect on investment. Conversely, I expect the interaction effect between TD and 
ownership structures than generate lesser agency costs to have a weaker effect on investment.  
Figure 13: Framework of Transparency and Ownership Networks 
 
In a nutshell, my conceptual framework examines the interactions between ownership 
networks and TD practices that influence firms’ investment performance. Ownership network 
positions are hypothesized to influence firms’ resource dependence and (principal-principal) 
agency costs. Valuable resources and agency conflicts may have direct (respectively positive 
and negative) effects on investments, but I focus here on their moderating effects on the 
impact of TD on investments. As suggested in Chapter 1, TD practices directly and positively 
influence investments. However, these practices are particularly valuable to firms that have 
weaker access to resources or particularly severe agency conflicts.   
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First, if firms do not get access to information, finance and inputs through their ownership 
connections, TD becomes more important for attracting positive attention and improving the 
company’s reputation, thereby enhancing access to these external resources. Second, TD 
practices are particularly important for firms suffering principal-principal conflicts and other 
agency costs. TD of relevant corporate information can substantially reduce the opportunities 
for expropriation and force powerful owners to commit to productive long-term investments 
rather than private exploitation of company assets.  
I examine four different aspects of ownership networks: connectivity of owners and firms in the 
two-mode oligarch-firm network; conglomerate ownership structures; state ownership; and 
major owners’ (oligarchs’) memberships in the RUIE association. Each of these may enhance the 
firm’s resource access or influence its agency costs. Depending on their interaction with TD 
practices, I determine whether these factors primarily increase resource access (negative 
moderating effect – substitution) or agency costs (positive moderating effect – 
complementarity).  
2.3. Data and Operationalization 
I use a unique ownership network dataset that links Russian publicly-traded firms to oligarchs, 
indirectly to other firms, to foreign investors, to conglomerate companies, and to state entities, 
and analyse how these network measures, directly and through their interactions with TD 
practices, impact on investments. The Russian context is ideal for such a study, because there is 
great variation across companies and time, in all the variables of interest. Within an 
industrialized economy, differences in terms of governance practices are more minor and more 
stable, making it difficult empirically to identify their effects.  
Private Russian firms are controlled predominantly by one or two private individuals (oligarchs) 
or the state, in other words, concentrated rather than dispersed ownership is the norm. In my 
sample, I include some 100 of the wealthiest Russian private owners, each of whom has a major 
stake in at least one publicly-listed firm. I collected data on Russian firms publicly listed in 
Russia or abroad, and for each of these firms identified controlling shareholders, including 
federal government, regional government, politicians and oligarchs.  
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Oligarch-owned firms are often structured as pyramids or as part of cross-shareholdings. In 
these structures, the oligarch achieves control of the constituent firms via a chain of ownership 
relations. I dissect this relationship to expose the oligarch, i.e. the ultimate owner of the 
operating assets. Another practice peculiar to such firms is that the oligarch’s shares frequently 
are held on his/her behalf by a nominee shareholder,29 in order to secure the oligarch’s 
corporate and financial anonymity. Therefore, it is the nominee’s not the oligarch’s name that 
appears on companies’ share registrars and accounts. My data are unique in that I do not use 
data on nominee shareholders, but have information on ultimate owners identified through 
interviews with finance professionals close to the oligarchs’ firms, media publications (Forbes, 
Vedomosti, Expert, Finance, and Kommersant), and governance-related associations. I utilize 
S&P’s TD scores in my empirical analyses.  
Finally, standard financial data on the 90 firms are collected for the period 2000-2010 from 
Compustat Global. As a result, I have an unbalanced panel of financial and TD information for 
90 firms, and cross-sectional information on their ownership networks, stock-market listings, 
and industry association memberships. Unfortunately, it was impossible to obtain longitudinal 
information on firms’ ownership arrangements, because of the unavailability of historical data. 
Dependent variable 
Investment refers to the firm’s annual capital expenditures. Capital expenditure is used by firms 
to acquire or upgrade physical assets such as equipment, property or industrial buildings. I use 
the first difference of the natural logarithm of investment as my dependent variable, and 
include the lagged investment term as an independent variable. The rationale for including the 
lagged investment term is the presence of adjustment costs of investment (Brown and 
Petersen, 2009).  
As discussed in section 2.2.1, using investments as a performance measure is justified in the 
Russian institutional context, because it is reasonable to assume that there is scarce 
                                                          
29 A nominee shareholder is normally a company created for the purpose of holding shares and other securities on 
behalf of an investor. The nominee is not the legal owner of the shares, and the underlying investor has the 
‘beneficial interest’ in the shares, i.e. s/he is entitled to all income and capital gains on the shares.  
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overinvestment. Capital investment by Russian firms is low and deficient in quality (Dzarasov, 
2011). Political uncertainty and a fluid institutional environment gave oligarchs an incentive 
structure that induced a preference for asset stripping over long-term investment (Campos and 
Giovannoni, 2006; Braguinsky and Myerson, 2007; Braguinsky, 2009). Therefore, I argue that it 
is unlikely that any Russian firms would make systematic frivolous and unnecessary 
investments, which would reduce the validity of my dependent variable.  
Independent Variables 
The key explanatory variables include the TD score published by S&P for 90 Russian companies, 
as described in section 1.3.  In my analyses, I explore two-mode inter-firm networks where 
firms are linked through a major shareholder. For example, if shareholder A owns a controlling 
stake in company X and a controlling stake in company Y, then companies X and Y are 
connected to each other. Similarly, if owner B has a stake in firm X, then owners A and B are 
connected to each other. I consider controlling shareholders that may be individuals (oligarchs) 
or the Russian state. I examine how the firm’s position in this ownership network in 2005 
affects its behaviour.  
The positioning of each firm within the network influences the information that is conveyed 
through the network (Lipparini and Lomi, 1999). I focus on simple measures of centrality 
because they have been found to be associated with performance enhancement and resource 
acquisition (Ahuja, 2000; Phelps, 2010). In my research, a central firm is the firm with the most 
connected owners, including the state or regional governments. Russian ownership networks 
are relatively sparse, and more complex network measures are not very informative in this 
context (see Figure 28 on page 198 for the 2005 ownership network). 
I project my two-mode network of connected firms and their owners onto a one-mode network 
of connected firms using UCINET 6 (Borgatti et al., 2002). I dichotomize the matrix to (0,1), 
where 1 represents the existence of an ownership tie between firms. I calculate the normalized 
degree centrality of this one-mode binary firm network, denoted here as connectivity. Degree 
centrality is the number of connections to other firms through the controlling owners of the 
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focal firm. Normalized degree is degree divided by the maximum possible degrees expressed as 
a percentage.  
Number of owners represents the number of the firm’s controlling owners in 2005. An 
influential or controlling owner can be a private individual (oligarch), the state (I combine all 
state entities in this category) or a foreign entity (I combine in this category foreign institutions 
or private individuals, who are not citizen of Russia or CIS30). I assume an owner is controlling if 
there is evidence or public knowledge that he exercises power and influences strategic 
decisions in the firm. I account for an owner if he holds at least ten percent of the share capital, 
although most owners exercise absolute control (50 percent plus one share). About a quarter of 
all firms have multiple controlling owners. Most have two owners; 11 firms have three owners, 
and two firms have four controlling owners31. 19 companies have foreign owners. 23 firms are 
controlled by both the state and one oligarch. I assume that having more than one controlling 
owner improves monitoring and reduces opportunities for value extraction. 
To analyse ownership ties further, I distinguish firms that are controlled by the state or through 
conglomerate structures. All ownership data are for 2005. About half of the firms are part of a 
conglomerate. Firms can be integrated vertically, horizontally or both ways. They can be part of 
a portfolio of unrelated firms acquired by an oligarch over time. Examples of vertical integration 
include mostly oil and natural resources firms, which gives access to the entire value chain; 
horizontal integration is most common amongst technology and telecom firms wanting to gain 
market presence.  
I determine also whether a firm is owned by a member of the board of the main business 
association, RUIE.  
The main control variables include Sales, expressed in first and second differences of natural 
logarithms. Sales are annual net turnover from firms’ financial statements. These data were 
collected from Compustat Global. I use the variable sales to control for firm size.  
                                                          
30
 Commonwealth of Independent States 
31
 TNK-BP was a joint-venture between British Petroleum and AAA consortium (Alfa Access Renova, equally 
controlled by four oligarchs), these two holding companies accounted for 4 owners in TNK-BP. Another company 
with 4 shareholders is Varyeganneftegas. 
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2.4. Empirical Analyses 
The ownership and business association membership data are cross-sectional and for 2005 
only; the accounting and transparency and disclosure data span 2000 to 2010. I utilize these 
data in a dynamic model of investment to assess the moderating effects of ownership 
networks. I use an error-correction model estimated in differences (Bond et al., 1997; Mairesse 
et al., 1999; Bond et al., 2003; Becker and Hall, 2008): 
 
(1)  ∆ln(investmentit) = β0 + β1*[ln(investmenti,t-1)-ln(salesi,t-1)] + β2*∆ln(salesit) +  
β3*∆ln(investmenti,t-1) + β4*∆ln(T&Dit)*Xi  + δt + μi + εit 
where ∆ refers to differences in variables; ln(investment) is the natural logarithm of fixed 
investments; ln(sales) is the natural logarithm of sales revenue; ln(T&D) is the natural logarithm 
of the transparency and disclosure score, δt are time dummies, μi are time-invariant 
unobserved firm-level characteristics (fixed effects) and εit is the error term. The lagged 
difference between ln(investments) and ln(sales) is the error-correction term (ect), standard in 
investment models.  
To estimate the moderating effects of the time-invariant ownership variables, I interact the TD 
variable with a set of dummies X that represent the different combinations of ownership 
arrangements and network centrality. This amounts to estimating the interaction between TD 
and the ownership variables, but because of high correlations between the relevant variables, I 
operationalize the interactions through their mutually excluding combinations.  
To build the model for this chapter, I depart from the equation (1) used in section 1.4  of this 
thesis and add the TD interaction effects described above.  
 
I apply fixed effects and dynamic GMM estimators (Arellano and Bond, 1991; Arellano and 
Bover, 1995; and Blundell and Bond, 1998) to estimate the relationship between TD score, 
ownership and investment. The dynamic panel GMM estimators incorporate the dynamic 
nature of the transparency-ownership-investment relationship to provide valid and powerful 
instruments that control for unobserved heterogeneity and simultaneity (Wintoki et al., 2012). 
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The use of the GMM estimator is also strictly required if the lagged dependent variable 
introduces Nickell’s bias (Nickell, 1981; Arellano, 2003).  
The dynamic modelling approach is used in other areas of finance and economics where the 
structure of the problem suggests a dynamic relation between the dependent and independent 
variables. Examples include governance and R&D (Driver and Guedes, 2012), external finance 
constraints and investment (Whited and Wu, 2006), internal finance and investment (Bond and 
Meghir, 1994), economic growth convergence (Caselli et al., 1996), labour demand estimation 
(Blundell and Bond, 1998) and economic growth (Beck et al., 2000). 
However, the dynamic panel estimation methodology has some limitations. It relies on using 
the firm’s history (lags of dependent and independent variables) for identification. Thus, there 
is a potential problem with weak instruments, which becomes greater as the number of lags of 
the instrumental variables increases. This represents an empirical trade-off. Increasing the 
instruments’ lag length makes them more exogenous, but also may make them weaker. I limit 
the number of instruments by using the ‘collapse’ option as in Roodman (2009), which creates 
one instrument for each variable and lag distance, rather than one for each time period, 
variable and lag distance. This option effectively constrains all the yearly moment conditions to 
be the same. Moreover, using the collapse option significantly increases the power of the 
Hansen test of over-identification. 
Table 15 presents the descriptive statistics of all estimation variables and Table 17 their 
pairwise correlations.  Table 16 details the descriptive statistics for the sample used in Tables 20 
and 22.The summary statistics for each sub-group of companies used in Table 20 and Table 22 
are detailed in Tables 21 and 23. The pairwise correlations for the sample used in Table 20 and 
Table 22 are detailed in Table 18. 
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Table 15: Descriptive statistics, total sample 
Variable Obs Mean Median ST&D. Dev. Min Max 
Capital investment, EURm 1,284 347.4 56.8 1,377.3 0.0 27,073.3 
Sales,  EURm 1,464 2,064.1 485.7 6,615.3 0.0 88,127.8 
EBIT margin, % 1,452 -1% 11% 248% -7,330%     99% 
TD score  559 49% 51% 17% 0% 85% 
Connectivity  1,518 22.04 8.19 21.68 0 52.16 
Number of owners 1,518 1.35 1.00 0.69 0 5 
State ownership 1,542 0.46 0.00 0.50 0 1 
Conglomerate ownership 1,531 0.46 0.00 0.50 0 1 
RUIE membership 1,555 0.35 0.00 0.48 0 1 
 
Table 16: Descriptive statistics, sample as used in fixed effects (Table 20 and Table 22) 
Variable Obs Mean Median ST&D. Dev. Min Max 
Capital investment, EURm 298 774 182 2,102 0.5 20,608 
Sales,  EURm 298 5,345 1,344 11,289 20.4 86,214 
EBIT margin, % 298 16% 16% 29%  -379%    63% 
TD score  298 55% 57% 15% 11% 85% 
State ownership 298 0.44 0 0.49 0 1 
Conglomerate ownership 298 0.50 1 0.50 0 1 
RUIE membership 298 0.51 1 0.50 0 1 
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Table 17: Pairwise correlations 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Investment 1.00        
2. Sales 0.88*** 1.00       
3. EBIT Margin 0.02 0.02 1.00      
4. TD score 0.19*** 0.22*** 0.04 1.00     
5. Connectivity of owners 0.07*** 0.02 0.01 -0.02 1.00    
6. Number of owners 0.07*** 0.15*** -0.08*** -0.05 0.03 1.00   
7. State ownership 0.12*** 0.09*** 0.01 -0.01 0.78*** -0.13*** 1.00  
8. Conglomerate 
Ownership 
-0.05* 0.02 -0.03 0.03 -0.45*** 0.28*** -0.41*** 1.00 
9. RUIE membership 0.13*** 0.20*** -0.04 0.02 -0.24*** 0.32*** -0.25*** 0.61*** 
Notes: *p<0.10, *p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
 
Table 18: Pairwise correlations, sample as used in fixed effects (Table 20 and Table 22) 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. Investment 1.00       
2. Sales 0.91*** 1.00      
3. EBIT Margin 0.14** 0.16** 1.00     
4. TD score 0.17*** 0.18*** 0.17*** 1.00    
5. State ownership 0.07 0.00 0.00 -0.15*** 1.00   
6. Conglomerate 
Ownership 
-0.04 0.04 0.13** 0.06 -0.5*** 1.00  
7. RUIE membership 0.21*** 0.28*** -0.09 0.00 -0.37*** 0.63*** 1.00 
Notes: *p<0.10, *p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
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Table 19: Governance, investment and network position 
 
Fixed effects GMM differences 
 
Coeff. 
(se) 
Coeff. 
(se) 
∆Investmenti,t-1   0.223* 0.156 
 
(0.102) (0.085) 
∆Salesi,t 0.692*** 0.830** 
 
(0.194) (0.291)   
∆Salesi,t-1 -0.145 -0.137 
 
(0.179) (0.211) 
ect (Investmenti,t-1-
Salesi,t-1) -0.702*** -1.018*** 
 
(0.101) (0.127) 
TD Score*central firms 0.126 0.216 
 
(0.100) (0.204) 
TD Score*peripheral 
firms 0.291*** 0.231* 
 
(0.084) (0.099) 
constant   -1.422***    
 
 
(0.226) 
 Time Dummies Yes Yes 
R2 0.464 
 Residual dg of freedom 79 69 
N 298 218 
Hansen test 
 
25.95 
Hansen (p) 
 
0.2 
AR(1) 
 
-1.5 
AR(2) 
 
-0.5 
Notes: p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. 
The variable Central firms variable equals 1 if the firm’s 2005 connectivity is greater than the mean and 0 otherwise. Peripheral 
firms variable equals 1 if firm’s 2005 connectivity is greater than the mean and 0 otherwise. ect is error correction term. All 
variables except dummies and ect are in logs. All standard errors are White’s robust errors controlling for heteroscedasticity and 
panel-specific autocorrelation. The difference GMM estimator uses a system consisting of first-differenced equations. I use the 
collapse option of xtabond2 as in Roodman (2009) to avoid instrument proliferation, and a small sample adjustment to correct for 
the small number of observations. I assume conservatively that all the variables are endogenous. AR(1) and AR(2) are tests for first-
order and second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals under the null of no serial correlation. The Hansen test of 
over- identification is under the null that all instruments are valid. 
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The results in Table 19 suggest that ownership connections moderate the effects of 
transparency on investment. I split the connectivity variable at the mean and estimate the 
effect of TD, separately for highly-connected firms and little-connected firms. TD scores are 
positive and statistically significant only for poorly-connected firms. The control variables of 
lagged investment and lagged sales, and the error-correction term are highly significant.  
In economic terms, every 1% increase of TD for peripheral firms would entail a 0.291% increase 
in investment in fixed effects and 0.231% in GMM setting. 
I conduct a Hansen test of over-identification. Since the dynamic panel GMM estimator uses 
multiple lags as instruments, my system is over-identified. The Hansen overidentification test 
yields a J-statistic which is Chi-square distributed under the null hypothesis of validity of my 
instruments. The results in Table 19 reveal a J-statistic with a p-value of 0.2, meaning I cannot 
reject the hypothesis that my instruments are valid. Taken together, the specification tests 
provide empirical support for the validity of my instrumental variables.  
Controlling for ∆gcfi,t-1 (gross cash-flow) and ∆qi,t-1 (Tobin’s Q) as in section 1.4 of this thesis 
does not significantly change the results. Based on the model chosen for this chapter 
(accelerator model in error correction specification) and to the best of my knowledge, all 
explanatory variables were included and the results do not appear to be suffering from omitted 
variables bias.  
Table 20 examines the interaction of TD scores with mutually excluding combinations of a single 
vs. multiple controlling owners, state ownership and conglomerate ties. I expect agency costs to 
be the highest for the combination (1,1,1), where all the ownership arrangements, single 
controlling shareholder, state ownership and conglomerate structure, are present. The 
combination (1,0,1) implies that there is a single controlling owner, no state ownership, and a 
conglomerate structure while the combination (0,1,1) refers to the combination of multiple 
controlling owners, state ownership and conglomerate ties. Combinations (1,0,0), (0,1,0) and 
(0,0,1) describe organizations with only one of these sources of agency costs present.  
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Preliminary results in Table 20 suggest that the coefficient of TD is positive and significant for 
firms with more than one of these agency factors present. In other words, TD matters more for 
firms with agency ‘hazards.’ In economic terms, every 1% increase of TD for the combination 
(1,1,1) for example, would entail a 0.6% increase in investment in fixed effects and 0.4% in 
GMM setting. 
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Table 20: Single owner, state and conglomerate ownership interactions 
 
Fixed effects 
Fixed effects 
with time 
dummies 
GMM differences 
with time dummies 
 
Coeff./ (se) Coeff./ (se) Coeff./ (se) 
∆Investmenti,t-1 0.284* 0.205+ 0.117 
 
(0.120) (0.115) (0.096) 
∆Salesi,t 0.944*** 0.686*** 0.634** 
 
(0.160) (0.185) (0.222) 
∆Salesi,t-1 -0.174 -0.156 -0.131 
 
(0.190) (0.182) (0.218) 
ect (Investmenti,t-1-Salesi,t-1) -0.751*** -0.678*** -0.874*** 
 
(0.100) (0.103) (0.106) 
T&D*(1,1,1) 0.574* 0.595* 0.408+ 
 
(0.260) (0.269) (0.217) 
T&D*(1,1,0) 0.288 0.408* 0.700 
 
(0.180) (0.184) (0.427) 
T&D*(1,0,1) 0.160** 0.184** 0.230** 
 
(0.050) (0.064) (0.075) 
T&D*(0,1,1) 0.807+ 0.759* 0.615 
 
(0.420) (0.316) (0.659) 
T&D*(1,0,0) -0.376 -0.439 -0.856 
 
(1.270) (1.194) (1.999) 
T&D*(0,1,0) -0.050 -0.062 0.051 
 
(0.100) (0.103) (0.200) 
T&D*(0,0,1) 0.288 0.336+ 0.145 
 
(0.190) (0.179) (0.174) 
T&D*(0,0,0) 0.055 -0.170 -0.242 
 
(0.240) (0.202) (0.225) 
constant -1.696*** -1.188*** 
 
 
(0.220) (0.202) 
 
R
2
 0.424 0.474  
df residual 79 79 69 
N 298 298 218 
Hansen test 
 
 52.5 
Hansen(p) 
 
 0.6 
AR(1) 
 
 -2.1 
AR(2) 
 
 -0.8 
Notes: p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Central firms variable equals 1 if the firm’s 2005 connectivity is greater than the 
mean and 0 otherwise. Peripheral firms variable equals 1 if firm’s 2005 connectivity is greater than the mean and 0 otherwise. ect 
is error correction term. All variables except dummies and ect are logged. Time dummies for 2002-2009 are included in fixed 
effects with time dummies and GMM (columns 2-3), but their coeff/se not reported for brevity. All standard errors are White’s 
robust errors controlling for heteroscedasticity and panel-specific autocorrelation. The difference GMM estimator uses a system 
consisting of first-differenced equations. I use the collapse option of xtabond2 as in Roodman (2009) to avoid instrument 
proliferation, and small sample adjustment to correct for the small number of observations. I assume conservatively that all 
variables are endogenous. AR(1) and AR(2) are tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced 
residuals, under the null of no serial correlation. The Hansen test for over-identification is under the null that all instruments are 
valid. 
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Table 21 provides the number of observations and the number of firms for each mutually 
exclusive combination, and their interactions with TD scores, including control variables. For 
example, when controlling for non-missing observations of variables ∆Investmentit, 
∆Investmenti,t-1,  ∆Salesit, ∆Salesi,t-1 and ect (Investmenti,t-1-Salesi,t-1), the total number of 
observations by combination is broken down and sums up to 298, across years, for 79 firms in 
total. This number of observations matches the one found at the bottom of Table 20, for the 
first model (column) with fixed effects on page 90. For the combination (111) – firms with single 
controlling owner, state ownership and conglomerate structure, there are 11 observations and 
3 firms of such ownership structure (column 5), when controlling for non-missing observations 
of all variables. 
For each combination, average values of dependent variable (∆Investmentit in natural 
logarithms and also the annual investment in Euro million) and TD (∆TDit in natural logarithms 
and the initial TD score, on a scale of 0 to 1, 1 being the highest score) are provided. 
Firms with multiple controlling shareholders, state ownership and no conglomerate structure 
(010) or with multiple controlling shareholders, no state ownership and conglomerate structure 
(001) have the highest averages of investment (€2,450m and  €1,070m respectively). 
In most groups, an increase in the independent variable (∆TDit) corresponds to an increase in 
dependent variable (∆Investmentit in natural logarithms).  
The ‘difference generalized method of moments (GMM)’ (second column) shows 218 
observations, which is less than the number of observations in fixed effects model. This 
difference is driven by the fact that GMM uses lagged values of the explanatory variables, and 
creates one instrument for each variable and lag distance with the ‘collapse’ function, so 
observations taken as instruments are deducted from the total number of observations in 
GMM.  
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Table 21: Number of observations and firms in combinations as used in Table 20 
Table 20: 
Single owner, 
state and 
conglomerat
e ownership 
interactions 
Description of 
mutually exclusive 
combinations 
N of 
obs.  
Number of  
obs. across 
years and 
(firms) for 
TD*(XXX), 
e.g. 
TD*(111) 
Number of  
observations (firms) for 
each combi, controlling 
for ∆Investmentit;  
∆Investmenti,t-1;   
∆Salesit; ∆Salesi,t-1 and 
ecti,t-1 (Investmenti,t-1-
Salesi,t-1) 
Mean of the 
dependent 
variable, 
∆Investmentit  
in natural 
logarithms and 
(Investmentit) 
in EURm 
Mean of 
∆TDit  
in natural 
logarithms 
and (TDit), 
on a scale 
of 0 to 1  
(1,1,1) 
Single controlling 
shareholder, state 
ownership and 
conglomerate 
structure 
44 
14 
(4) 
11 
(3) 
0.209 
(€185m) 
0.083 
(0.620) 
(1,1,0) 
Single controlling 
shareholder, state 
ownership and not 
a conglomerate 
structure 
461 
103 
(26) 
69 
(17) 
0.164 
(€489m) 
0.109 
(0.584) 
(1,0,1) 
Single controlling 
shareholder, no 
state and 
conglomerate 
structure 
352 
85 
(28) 
66 
(21) 
0.182 
(€587m) 
0.111 
(0.554) 
(0,1,1) 
Multiple controlling 
shareholders, state 
ownership and 
conglomerate 
structure 
100 
21 
(6) 
16 
(3) 
0.052 
(€90m) 
-0.008 
(0.376) 
(1,0,0) 
Single controlling 
shareholder, no 
state ownership 
and no 
conglomerate 
structure 
212 
49 
(20) 
36 
(13) 
-0.045 
(€146m) 
0.118 
(0.137) 
(0,1,0) 
Multiple controlling 
shareholders, state 
ownership and no 
conglomerate 
structure 
95 
37 
(8) 
36 
(7) 
0.077 
(€2,450m) 
0.073 
(0.450) 
(0,0,1) 
Multiple controlling 
shareholders, no 
state ownership 
and conglomerate 
structure 
214 
68 
(16) 
57 
(12) 
0.084 
(€1,070m) 
0.042 
(0.607) 
(0,0,0) 
No single 
controlling 
shareholder, state 
ownership or 
conglomerate 
structure 
53 
8 
(4) 
7 
(3) 
-0.158 
(€25m) 
-0.084 
(0.503) 
TOTAL for all 
8 sub-groups 
 1531 
obs. 
 
385 obs. 
(112 firms) 
298 obs. (as per fixed 
effects model, Table 20) 
and 79 firms 
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Table 22: Single owner, RUIE association and conglomerate ownership interactions 
 
Fixed effects Fixed effects GMM differences 
 
 
Coeff. / (se) 
with time dummies 
Coeff./(se) 
with time dummies 
Coeff. / (se)  
∆Investmenti,t-1 0.315** 0.239* 0.162+  
 
(0.110) (0.104) (0.082) 
 
∆Salesi,t 0.941*** 0.696*** 0.832**  
 
(0.160) (0.196) (0.250) 
 
∆Salesi,t-1 -0.197 -0.175 -0.074  
 
(0.180) (0.183) (0.220) 
 
ect (Investmenti,t-1-Salesi,t-1) -0.773*** -0.705*** -1.031***  
 
(0.100) (0.105) (0.123) 
 
T&D*(1,1,1) 0.226** 0.251** 0.251*** 
 
 
(0.080) (0.086) (0.070) 
 
T&D*(1,1,0) 1.003*** 0.383 1.745 
 
 
(0.180) (0.534) (1.223) 
 
T&D*(1,0,1) 0.069 0.060 -0.434 
 
 
(0.390) (0.436) (0.577) 
 
T&D*(0,1,1) 0.453** 0.460** 0.187 
 
 
(0.130) (0.147) (0.145) 
 
T&D*(1,0,0) 0.233 0.329+ 0.297 
 
 
(0.170) (0.170) (0.428) 
 
T&D*(0,1,0) -0.119 -0.126 0.111 
 
 
(0.090) (0.095) (0.191) 
 
T&D*(0,0,1) -1.277*** -0.754*** -0.718** 
 
 
(0.090) (0.151) (0.250) 
 
T&D*(0,0,0) 0.280 0.067 -0.482 
 
 
(0.390) (0.364) (0.428) 
 
constant -1.747*** -1.298*** 
  
 
(0.220) (0.243) 
  
R
2
 0.429 0.473   
df residual 79 79 69  
N 298 298 218  
Hansen test   42.8  
Hansen(p)   0.7  
AR(1)   -2.3  
AR(2)   0.1  
Notes: p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Central firms variable equals 1 if the firm’s 2005 connectivity is greater than 
the mean and 0 otherwise. Peripheral firms variable equals 1 if the firm’s 2005 connectivity is greater than the mean and 0 
otherwise. ect is error correction term. All variables except dummies and ect are logged. Time dummies for 2002-2009 are 
included in fixed effects with time dummies and GMM (column 2-3), but their coeff/se not reported for brevity. All standard 
errors are White’s robust errors controlling for heteroscedasticity and panel-specific autocorrelation. The difference GMM 
estimator uses a system consisting of first-differenced equations. I use the collapse option of xtabond2 as in Roodman (2009) to 
avoid instrument proliferation, and small sample adjustment to correct for the small number of observations. I assume 
conservatively that all variables are endogenous. AR(1) and AR(2) are tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation in 
the first-differenced residuals, under the null of no serial correlation. The Hansen test for over-identification is under the null 
that all instruments are valid. 
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Table 22 explores the interactions between TD and the number of controlling owners, RUIE 
membership and conglomerate structures. Again, the combination (1,1,1) implies a single 
controlling owner who is on the RUIE board, and a company associated with a conglomerate 
structure. I interpret RUIE membership as implying that the controlling oligarch is an 
exceptionally powerful individual in the Russian economy. Again, I find that the combinations 
where multiple agency hazards are present tend to interact positively with TD, while 
combinations where only one or none of the agency cost drivers is present do not significantly 
interact with TD. In economic terms, every 1% increase of TD for the combination (1,1,1) for 
example, would entail a 0.2-0.3% increase in investment in fixed effects and 0.3% in GMM 
setting. I suggest that the results, overall, are aligned with the argument that TD practices are 
particularly relevant for firms that are associated with other organizational features that 
generate agency or principal-principal conflicts if the firm wants to be able to commit to 
productive investments. 
Controlling for ∆gcfi,t-1 (gross cash-flow) and ∆qi,t-1 (Tobin’s Q) as in section 1.4 of this thesis 
does not significantly change the results of Table 22  (results not tabulated). 
Similar data analysis is repeated for Table 22. The only difference in combinations is that I am 
replacing state ownership with board membership of Russian Union of Industrialists and 
Entrepreneurs (RUIE). 
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Table 23: Number of observations and firms in combinations as used in Table 22 
Table 22: Single 
owner, RUIE 
association and 
conglomerate 
ownership 
interactions 
Description of mutually 
exclusive combinations 
N of 
obs.  
Number 
of  obs. 
across 
years and 
(firms) for 
TD*(XXX), 
e.g. 
TD*(111) 
Number of  
observations (firms) 
for each 
combination, 
controlling for non-
missing obs. of 
∆Investmentit;  
∆Investmenti,t-1;   
∆Salesi,t; ∆Salesi,t-1 
and ect 
(Investmenti,t-1-
Salesi,t-1) 
Mean of the 
dependent 
variable, 
∆Investmentit  
in natural 
logarithms and 
(Investmentit) 
in EURm 
Mean of 
∆TDit  
in natural 
logarithms 
and (TDit), 
on a scale 
of 0 to 1  
(1,1,1) 
Single controlling owner 
who is on the RUIE board, 
and a company 
associated with a 
conglomerate structure 
248 
71 
(20) 
54 
(15) 
0.183 
(€687m) 
0.130 
(0.550) 
(1,1,0) 
Single controlling owner 
who is on the RUIE board, 
and not a conglomerate 
structure 
31 
8 
(2) 
7 
(1) 
0.073 
(€84m) 
-0.004 
(0.765) 
(1,0,1) 
Single controlling owner, 
not a RUIE member, and 
a conglomerate structure 
148 
28 
(12) 
23 
(9) 
0.193 
(€161m) 
0.053 
(0.594) 
(0,1,1) 
Multiple owners, at least 
one on RUIE board, and a 
conglomerate structure 
228 
80 
(18) 
69 
(14) 
0.065 
(€903m) 
0.026 
(0.557) 
(1,0,0) 
Single controlling owner, 
not a RUIE member, not a 
conglomerate 
642 
144 
(44) 
98 
(29) 
0.094 
(€392m) 
0.105 
(0.562) 
(0,1,0) 
Multiple owners, at least 
one on RUIE board, not a 
conglomerate structure 
38 
21 
(3) 
21 
(3) 
0.160 
(€4,076m) 
0.123 
(0.450) 
(0,0,1) 
Multiple owners, not on 
RUIE board, a 
conglomerate 
86 
9 
(4) 
4 
(2) 
0.278 
(€43m) 
0.112 
(0.553) 
(0,0,0) 
Multiple owners, not on 
RUIE board, not a 
conglomerate 
110 
24 
(9) 
22 
(7) 
-0.077 
(€126m) 
-0.024 
(0.468) 
TOTAL for all 8 
sub-groups 
 
1531 
385  
(112 
firms) 
298 obs. 
(80 firms) 
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Table 23 shows the break downs of observations (firms) for each combination. Certain 
combinations, i.e. (1,1,0) and (0,0,1) contain a very small number of firms, therefore results for 
these combinations may not be robust. The total number of observations for the full 
specification in fixed effects is as reported in Table 22 (i.e. 298). 
In summary, the regression results provide support for my hypotheses. Hypothesis 1 predicted 
that if the ownership network and other organizational features primarily generate resources 
for the company to facilitate investment, then there will be a negative interaction with TD 
because these practices would be redundant for acquiring the resources for investment. I find 
that ownership network connectivity may operate primarily in this way. TD matters only for 
firms that are not well connected through oligarch connections. Hypothesis 2 suggests that 
organizational features that primarily cause agency costs will positively interact with TD in 
predicting investments. I find that firms with state ownership, RUIE-connected oligarch owner, 
conglomerate structure, or a single controlling owner which would be difficult for minority 
shareholders to monitor, benefit significantly from TD practices in committing to investments. I 
argue that these organizational characteristics primarily represent agency hazards for the firms, 
and if firms really want to commit to long-term investments, they will benefit from TD 
practices. 
 
2.5. Conclusion, Implications, and Further Research  
Although concentrated ownership is one of the most important governance mechanisms for 
large firms in emerging economies, these firms are often controlled by the state (e.g. China) or 
families (e.g. Indonesia, South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand) rather than by oligarchs. The unique 
oligarchic network structures in Russia may be filling the institutional vacuum left by the 
collapsed communist economy, ensuring access to the requisite resources for investments and 
improving assets productivity. Also, states in emerging economies tend to exercise control over 
the economy through involvement in the governance of firms in ‘strategic’ industries, and 
provide political support and preferential treatment. This politically motivated intervention is 
likely to affect firm performance and long-term investment. Whilst government involvement in 
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corporate governance is an important aspect of business-government relationship, particularly 
in emerging economies, it has received limited attention in the management literature 
(Okhmatovskiy, 2010).   
I examined the implications of heterogeneity of such ownership network ties that enhance, 
diminish or compensate for other governance practices in determining investment. Some 
network connections are substitute mechanisms for governance practices related to TD 
because they improve accountability and, thus, support investment. Other organizational 
arrangements might complement these governance practices because they generate agency 
conflicts. I expect the mechanisms through which ownership networks influence investment to 
depend on whether ownership arrangements have implications for resource acquisition or 
agency costs.  
To my knowledge, this is the first study to combine analysis of ownership networks and internal 
corporate governance and their impact on firms' strategic long-term resource commitments. I 
viewed ownership and other networks from resource-dependence and agency perspectives and 
examined how these arrangements interact with governance practices related to TD. I argue 
that ownership arrangements can reflect either resource benefits or agency costs, depending 
on type of ownership.  
I found that external ownership connections and connections to an industry association 
moderate the impact of TD practices on investment. I argue that more advanced TD practices 
support investments because, by improving accountability, they tend to improve firms’ internal 
efficiency and decision-making processes and, as a consequence, make more external resources 
available to the firm. Ownership networks moderate the impact of TD practices because they 
can substitute for or complement these practices, depending on whether resource constraints 
or agency costs are the primary drivers of the connections.  
These preliminary empirical results indicate strongly that ownership and governance practices 
interact. I find that firms with poorly connected owners benefit significantly from TD, because 
TD compensates for the lack of resources acquired externally. I find also that firms with a single 
controlling owner, state ownership or conglomerate structure gain more from TD practices 
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when committing to long-term investments. I suggest that these characteristics reflect high 
agency costs because, in the weak institutional environment of Russia, the controlling owner, 
the state or conglomerate arrangement potentially can be used to expropriate value from the 
firm, and small shareholders may not be powerful enough to prevent this. As a result, the 
controlling owner might extract value rather than reinvest in productive assets. However, TD 
practices can counteract this tendency and commit the firm to credible productive long-term 
investments. 
Finally, I found that oligarch owners’ memberships of the board of RUIE complement the effects 
of TD on commitment to investment. I interpret this effect as due to the power of the individual 
involved. Being invited to be a board member appears to signal an exceptionally powerful and 
well-connected individual, which may facilitate resource acquisition for the firms they own, but 
also poses an unusually strong risk of expropriation. The results suggest that the risk outweighs 
the resource benefits. 
This chapter is based on empirical analyses of a unique, purpose-built firm-level dataset of large 
Russian firms. Nevertheless, as usually the case in weak institutional environments, data 
availability and quality present some problems. First, TD scores are longitudinal, but available 
only for 90 firms. Second, ownership and membership data are extremely costly to retrieve, 
and older data are not available. As a result, network measures are available only for a cross-
section, and my panel analyses which include network measures are limited to interactions 
specifications.  
Nevertheless, my analyses generate some robust results that are consistent with my 
hypotheses. I controlled for unobserved heterogeneity, such as changes in the investment 
conditions during the period of study that influence ownership networks, governance practices 
and investment, using a GMM estimator, using difference GMM models. GMM techniques are 
used frequently in the investment literature and are being employed increasingly in 
management studies of the governance-performance relationship. 
This chapter contributes to the management literatures on resource-dependence theory, 
agency theory, corporate governance, networks and emerging economies. It has some 
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implications for policymakers and investors choosing which firms to invest in since better-
networked and more transparent firms are likely to generate more growth through 
investments. It also has implications for managers and owners of firms operating in Russia or 
other emerging economies. For managers and owners of state-owned or conglomerate firms, 
the strategic focus might be to strengthen corporate governance to be better able to commit to 
productive investments, whereas for firms controlled by multiple oligarchs, maintaining ties 
with other ‘connected’ oligarchs might prove a better tactic to increase investments and 
subsequent performance. 
A natural extension to this study would be to devote more attention to the way business 
networks impact on the board composition of Russian firms, e.g. by studying whether CEOs or 
shareholders from these networks are more likely to have membership in one another’s boards 
(board interlocks) and how this particular network-governance interaction influences 
investment policy. It would be interesting also to explore the interactions between external 
networks and governance practices by examining the impact of connectivity on the adoption of 
more stringent practices by the focal firm, through contagion. It is possible that firms learn 
about corporate governance practices through their network connections. Finally, investigating 
the effects of ownership networks in other emerging or developed economies would be 
valuable to assess the generalizability of these results for Russia. 
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Chapter 3: The good, the great and the independent: implications of board and 
ownership structures on investment  
 
3.1. Introduction  
Investment32 depends greatly on the firm’s access to internal or external capital markets. 
Investment studies argue that firms first use internally generated funds (cash-flows or liquidity) 
to finance their investments before resorting to more expensive sources of capital such as debt 
and equity (Myers and Majluf, 1984; Cosh et al., 2009). Hence, firms are considered financially 
constrained if they have used their internal funds and are seeking to raise debt or equity to 
finance their investments (Stein, 2003; Billett et al., 2011). Although there are disagreements 
over how to interpret investment-cash-flow sensitivity (Fazzari et al., 1988; Kaplan and Zingales, 
1997), this sensitivity continues to be used in studies to analyse firms’ investment behaviour 
(Brown and Petersen, 2009). The cost of external finance depends on the information available 
to debt providers and investors. The higher the asymmetry of information or agency costs 
between controlling shareholders and finance providers, the higher will be the cost of external 
finance since providers of funds may be hesitant to provide funding if they believe there is little 
chance that these funds plus a fair return will be returned to them (Bruton et al., 2010; Seifert 
and Gonenc, 2010).  
The extent of the agency problem is determined by the ownership and board structures. A 
board of directors is an emerging governance mechanism in transition economies and has 
received limited attention to date (Iwasaki, 2008). Many scholars are sceptical about boards’ 
opportunities for independent and effective action in these markets (Mironov, 2013), although 
there is evidence that board roles and standards are improving.33 Although block ownership is 
considered a dominant governance mechanism, since ownership concentration in emerging 
markets is high, boards also seem to have a strong impact on the investment-financing relation. 
As a result of concentrated ownership, management is effectively monitored by major 
                                                          
32
 In this chapter, investment refers to the firm’s annual capital expenditure. Capital expenditure is used by firms to acquire or 
upgrade physical assets such as equipment, property or industrial buildings. 
33
  E.g., Sistema, a large Russian conglomerate headed by controlling blockholder Vladimir Yevtushenkov, has a structured board 
of directors, including 5 committees and 8 (of 13) independent directors (60% of the board). 
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shareholders. However, blockholders may be able to extract greater private benefits from 
minority shareholders and creditors (Dharwadkar et al., 2000; Douma et al., 2006; Young et al., 
2008) and, thus, I argue that the board’s monitoring role is more important for both minority 
shareholders and finance providers in these markets (Lei and Song, 2012). The monitoring is 
likely to be particularly efficient if done by a director not affiliated to the controlling 
shareholder (Wright et al., 1998), as independent directors can limit agency costs by 
redistributing information equally amongst all shareholders (Arthurs et al., 2008; Lei and Song, 
2012) and generally protecting the interests of minority shareholders (Becht et al., 2003). 
Through their links to the external environment (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Johnson et al., 
1996; Hillman and Dalziel, 2003), independent board directors’ reputation and objectivity play a 
major role in signalling to finance providers that the firm efficiently allocates its funds to 
profitable investment opportunities (Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1990; Daily and Schwenck, 1996; 
Hambrick and D’Aveni, 1992).  
Recent research building on strategic governance and institutional analysis (Aguilera et al., 
2008; Filatotchev et al., 2006; Wright et al., 2013) proposes that effective corporate governance 
is contingent upon the alignment of interdependent organizational characteristics. Their 
combinations yield different patterns of corporate governance (Adams and Ferreira, 2007; 
Aguilera et al., 2008). Studies examining a single governance mechanism often overlook the 
broad linkages among various governance practices and neglect their complementary or 
substitutive impact on different firm outcomes (Desender at al., 2013). Thus, the effectiveness 
of board monitoring must be considered in light of contingencies related to the ownership 
structure of the firm. The question addressed in this chapter is how investment behaviour, in 
terms of the relation between investment and internal funds, is influenced by combinations of 
governance mechanisms such as block ownership and independence of directors.  
This question is very important from the point of view of emerging economies, because 
governance arrangements may have a substantial impact on whether industrial firms make 
long-term investments into productive assets and enhance the prospects for economic 
development. Investment is also considered as a vehicle for modernization in emerging 
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economies (Hobdari, 2008). The start of economic transition in former centrally planned, now 
emerging economies emphasized the need for capital investment to regenerate and modernize 
obsolete assets and to become competitive in world markets. Early transition policy debates 
focused on the best way to engage in restructuring by investing (Aghion and Blanchard, 1998; 
Estrin and Wright, 1999; Filatotchev et al., 2000, 2001, 2003) and at the time of this research, 
the emerging economies were still in need of modernization (Ledeneva, 2013).  
To address the research question, I focus on Russia, an emerging economy where ownership 
concentration is among the highest in the world (Guriev and Rachinsky, 2005) and the 
transparency of ultimate control structures is low (Chernykh, 2008). Hence, in Russia, large 
blockholders are likely to be the most important governance mechanism. Prior research on 
developed economies focuses on the governance roles of large blockholders in reducing the 
costs associated with ‘vertical’ principal-agent relationship problem, as in agency theory 
(Hoskisson et al., 1994; Hoskisson et al., 2002), and their impact on horizontal principal-
principal agency (PPA) relationship is not well understood. My research offers some insights 
into PPA theory by looking into Russian institutional setting with principal-principal relationship, 
where one of the principals is either the state or an oligarch.       
I focus on two predominant types of block ownership – the state, and controlling private 
individuals or oligarchs.34 Institutional investors do not have de facto control as free float in 
Russia is still low.35  In contrast to developed economies, institutional shareholder activism, 
therefore, is rare in Russia. Employees-shareholders, other than top management, are no 
longer influential.  
There is an ongoing debate about whether block ownership is detrimental or beneficial to 
investments. On one hand, in pursuit of private benefits, blockholders may seek to expropriate 
resources from other investors, including finance providers, through various self-dealing 
activities, including outright theft, transfer pricing, investor dilution, executive perquisites, 
                                                          
34
 The term oligarch denotes an owner with sufficient wealth and strategic ownership to have significant economic and also 
political influence. In line with Guriev and Rachinsky (2005), the term oligarch is not used to imply a legal, economic or moral 
judgment on Russia’s richest businessmen, but merely to refer to Russian industry tycoons. 
35
 Generally, about 5%-20% of total market capitalization. 
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expropriation of corporate opportunities, investment in unprofitable projects for self-interest, 
asset sales to insiders or affiliated corporations at favourable prices, loan guarantees using the 
firm’s assets as collateral and other self-serving financial transactions (Lin et al., 2011). 
Blockholders’ incentives to engage in self-dealing activities are especially strong when they 
have control rights in excess of cash-flow rights because these excessive control rights allow 
this with a relatively small proportion of the financial consequences (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; 
Johnson et al., 2000; Masulis et al., 2009).  
In anticipation of potential expropriation by blockholders in firms with a divergence between 
control rights and cash-flow rights, outside investors will be less willing to invest in these firms 
because they face the risk that the returns on their investment will never materialize. As a 
direct consequence, such firms may become financially more constrained due to very costly 
external finance (Lin et al., 2011). These firms might be forced to forgo significant investment 
projects with positive net present values and/or invest less (Whited and Wu, 2006) than their 
counterparts without powerful blockholders.  
On the other hand, concentrated ownership can be viewed as a remedy for the agency conflicts 
between shareholder and manager (La Porta et al., 2000; Boyd and Hoskisson, 2010; Peng and 
Jiang, 2010). Absolute control enables the shareholder to better monitor the manager; and to 
determine dividend policies and investment projects (Grossman and Hart, 1980; Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1986; Leland and Pyle, 1977; Aghion and Tirole, 1997).  
These conflicting results as to the roles of blockholders are primarily due to the heterogeneity 
of blockholders (Hoskisson et al., 2002; Claessens et al., 2000; Faccio and Lang, 2000) and/or 
the institutions in which these blockholders operate (Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Gomez-Mejia 
et al., 2003; Peng and Jiang, 2010; Tihanyi and Hegarty, 2007; Maury and Pajuste, 2005; 
Connelly et al., 2010). In a developed economy environment, the heterogeneity argument 
primarily characterizes institutional owners, such as investment fund managers, pension fund 
managers (Hoskisson et al., 2002, Tihanyi et al., 2003), private equity investors (Arthurs et al., 
2008; Bruton et al., 2010) etc. In the emerging markets literature, the heterogeneity argument 
primarily applies to other types of blockholders, such as state, business groups (or FIGs) and 
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private individuals or families (Claessens et al., 2002; Filatotchev et al., 2005), the most 
dominant types of blockholders in this institutional context. This research extends the 
heterogeneity argument by demonstrating that the impact of blockholder ownership on 
investment differs based on the type of blockholder. 
This chapter makes the following contributions. It contributes to the governance bundle 
literature (Millar et al., 2005; Filatotchev et al., 2007) by examining block ownership and 
directorship as a bundle and investigating its impact on investment behaviour. Effective 
monitoring depends on interrelated combinations or bundles of governance mechanisms, 
rather than single mechanisms, leading to different outcomes (Rediker and Seth, 1995; 
Sundaramurthy et al., 1997; Filatotchev et al., 2007; Aguilera et al., 2008). A common critique of 
agency theory (and PPA theory) is of ‘its under-contextualized nature’ (Aguilera and Jackson, 
2003; Wright et al., 2013, p. 17). Attention to context means that understanding board 
monitoring abilities requires consideration of the firm ownership structure because the 
interaction leads to different patterns of monitoring and effectiveness (Desender et al., 2013). 
To my knowledge, there has been very little research in emerging economies on the effects of 
ownership and directorship governance bundles on investment in fixed assets. While agency 
theorists have not explicitly discussed the idea that boards vary in their ability to monitor, this 
research argues that boards have different monitoring roles since blockholders are 
heterogeneous. This contextualized approach allows me to explain the monitoring by board of 
different blockholder inefficiencies, and whether board monitoring complements or substitutes 
for blockholder control. I argue that the analysed combinations resulting from different 
structures36 have separate and unique implications for investment behaviour of firms. 
The extant literature on investment-liquidity relation focuses on ownership rather than board 
characteristics. To my knowledge, there are no studies of emerging economies that focus on 
the moderation of ownership and board characteristics on the investment-liquidity relation. 
Moreover, with one exception (Perotti and Gelfer, 2001), this work focuses on economies other 
than Russia. The emerging markets literature on investment behaviour focuses on Estonia 
                                                          
36
 Oligarch-owned firms with independent directors, state-owned firms with insiders, oligarch-owned firms with 
insiders and state-owned firms with independent directors. 
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(Mickiewicz et al., 2004; Hodbari, 2008), Ukraine (Gorodnichenko and Grigorenko, 2008; 
Mykhayliv and Zauner, 2012), Czech Republic (Lizal and Svejnar, 2002), Hungary (Colombo and 
Stanca, 2006), Central and Eastern Europe (Mueller and Peev, 2007) and a few other central 
European economies. These economies, although comparable to Russia, have neither such a 
unique class of private individual owners or oligarchs, nor such elaborate group structures or 
FIGs.  
There is also not much research on developed economies that test the investment-cash flow 
relation in a governance bundle framework. This work tends to focus on one micro- or macro-
governance factor at a time and includes Kathuria and Mueller (1995), Hadlock (1998), Gugler 
and Yurtoglu (2003) and Lin et al. (2011) for the USA, Gugler (2003) for Austria, Haid and 
Weigand (2001) for Germany, Degryse and de Jong (2006) for the Netherlands, Pindado and de 
la Torre (2009) for Spain, Gul and Tsui (2001) for Australia and Goergen and Renneboog (2001) 
and Pawlina and Renneboog (2005) for the UK. 
In studying the effect of governance structures on investment decisions through their role in 
mitigating or exacerbating financing constraints, I adapt the empirical model of dynamic 
investment in Brown and Petersen (2009). Specifically, I contribute to the investment literature 
by including in the model governance variables capturing ownership concentration and board 
composition. As discussed above, few studies integrate governance characteristics into the 
investment-liquidity framework. 
Finally, I make a methodological contribution. While most literature focuses on static cross-
country analysis and macro-level governance variables such as country’s legal origin and 
investor protection (La Porta et al., 1997; Beck et al., 2006), my sample includes ownership and 
directorship panel data at firm level. The time period of research is particularly relevant as 
corporate governance practice in Russia has changed notably in the last 15-20 years. The period 
of study complements the extant literature on post-privatisation years (1990’s) and includes 
important governance reforms (2002-2004) and recent crisis (2007-2008). I utilize GMM 
estimator which addresses unobserved heterogeneity and endogeneity problems frequent in 
the governance literature.  
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The chapter is structured as follows: Section 3.2 sets the theoretical framework and elaborates 
further on concepts such as block ownership, boards and financing constraints on investment 
and presents the hypotheses. Section 3.3 discusses the empirical specification and 
methodology. Section 3.4 describes the data. Section 3.5 presents the results. Section 3.6 
concludes and suggests paths for future research. 
 
3.2. Theoretical framework 
3.2.1. PPA and Governance Bundles 
A salient feature of the concentrated ownership structure in emerging markets is the type of 
conflicts between blockholders and other shareholders. Conflicts between controlling and 
minority shareholders, or ‘principal-principal’ conflicts, result from concentrated ownership, 
family ownership, business group structures and weak legal protection of minority shareholders 
(Young et al., 2008; Faccio, 2006). As a result, the primary agency problem in this environment 
is not the failure of professional managers to satisfy the objectives of diffused shareholders, but 
rather the expropriation of minority shareholders by the controlling shareholders (Bruton et al., 
2003; La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny 2000), what Young, Peng, Ahlstrom, and 
Bruton (2002) call a ‘principal-principal’ or ‘horizontal’ agency relationship. Specifically, 
controlling blockholders can expropriate minority shareholders, which creates a new set of 
agency costs, including mutual monitoring and opportunity costs, that may have an adverse 
effect on firm’s investment. Prior research on developed economies focuses on the governance 
roles of large blockholders in reducing the costs associated with ‘vertical’ principal-agent 
relationship problem, as in agency theory (Hoskisson et al., 1994; Hoskisson et al., 2002), and 
their impact on horizontal principal-principal agency (PPA) relationship is not well understood. 
My research offers some insights into PPA theory by looking into the Russian institutional 
setting, where one of the principals is either the state or an oligarch.       
Rediker and Seth (1995) introduced the concept of governance bundle and proposed that firm 
performance is dependent on the effectiveness of the bundle of mechanisms selected rather 
than any particular mechanism. Applied to my research, the underlying assumption is that the 
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firm will find its own efficient governance bundle based on a cost-benefit trade-off, to achieve 
the optimal level of investment given the level of internal funds. Governance mechanisms often 
have significant interaction effects and either substitute for or complement each other (Ward 
et al., 2009; Filatotchev et al., 2007). When one mechanism acts as a substitute for another, this 
refers to the direct functional replacement of the first mechanism by the second. One 
mechanism can also complement another: the presence of one mechanism strengthens the 
other and leads to more effective governance to attract funds for investment. The previous 
literature focuses on the substitutability of monitoring and incentive systems (Rediker and Seth, 
1995; Tosi et al., 1997; Zajac and Westphal, 1994) or their complementarities (Rutherford et al., 
2007).  
In the context of this thesis, monitoring by directors can either substitute for or complement 
monitoring by a particular blockholder, e.g. oligarch. In particular, independent and active 
boards can prevent blockholders or managers from tunnelling funds out of their firms to the 
detriment of minority shareholders or investors (Becht et al., 2003). In this scenario, control by 
oligarchs is weak or inefficient and independent board monitoring acts as a substitute to 
sanction the bad behaviour of oligarchs and/or managers which could damage other 
shareholders. In particular, independent directors’ reputation and objectivity play a major role 
in signalling to investors that managers acting on behalf of controlling shareholders do not 
squander funds and invest efficiently, which enhances the reputation and credibility of the firm 
(Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1990), reduces the cost of external capital, and alleviates constraints 
on investment (Daily and Schwenk, 1996; Hambrick and D’Aveni, 1992). In the case of boards 
composed exclusively of insiders who act in tandem with blockholders, board monitoring is not 
sufficient to prevent malicious activities by blockholders. In this case board monitoring and 
blockholder control complement each other. 
 
3.2.2. Board Structure – the Russian Context 
Although board monitoring is pivotal to my research, it has often been criticized for its 
inefficiency in the literature on emerging economies (Black, 2001; Peng et al., 2003; Mironov, 
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2013). The scope of board monitoring and other board competencies is determined by Russian 
legislation. I summarize these regulations in the following points (Iwasaki, 2008):  
First, the term of office for directors is one year. A staggered board is not permitted, in contrast 
to the US and France, for example. All directors must be elected through cumulative voting, a 
system that aims at protecting the interests of minority shareholders. A board chairman is 
elected among the directors approved at a shareholder meeting by a simple majority.  
Second, the management and supervisory boards of Russian joint stock companies (JSC) strictly 
prohibit their managers from assuming board membership. In spite of the law, many companies 
had ‘informal’ dual CEOs,37 which had a negative impact on firm performance (Judge et al., 
2003).  
Third, the Law on JSC includes no provision preventing the board chairman from being elected 
from among insiders. It is also likely that a top manager with significant ownership could 
appoint an individual under his influence to board chairman.  
Fourth, the Corporate Governance Code is a kind of government decree issued by the Federal 
Commission for Securities Market (FCSM) in April 2002, compiled on the basis of the OECD’s 
Corporate Governance Principles. The Corporate Governance Code devotes much space to 
matters regarding boards of directors; however, it contains very few concrete board 
composition targets. One specifies that JSCs should have at least three independent directors 
who account for no less than 25% of board membership. The presence of independent 
directors is a requirement for companies listed on western stock exchanges and on the Russian 
stock exchanges for top-tier A1 and A2 quotation lists. In practice, the criteria for determining 
independence are purely technical and do not take account of all conflicts of interest.38  
With regard to the competences of boards of directors, the Law on JSCs classifies them as: 1) 
overseeing acquisitions, divestitures and other restructuring; 2) overseeing major capital 
financing, expenditures and transactions; 3) preparing general shareholders’ meeting; 4) 
                                                          
37
 The board chair is effectively dependent on the CEO.  
38 E.g., boards of directors of SOEs often include directors who are executives of other SOEs. These executives are 
highly dependent on the state, yet technically meet the requirements of the Corporate Code for independence. 
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nominating, compensating, monitoring and replacing corporate executives; and 5) reviewing 
and guiding corporate strategy. These provisions ensure that corporate boards in Russia fulfil 
the same role and functions as those in developed countries. 
These five competencies are covered mainly by two roles. The first role of a board director is 
the agency role, referring to the governance function where a director serves shareholders by 
ratifying the decisions of managers who act on behalf of blockholders and monitor the 
implementation of those decisions (Baysinger and Butler, 1985; Baysinger and Hoskisson, 
1990). The second role consists of the board director providing essential resources or securing 
those resources through linkages to the external environment (Boyd, 1990; Johnson et al., 
1996; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Hillman et al., 2000). Resource dependence theory proposes 
that directors bring resources to the firm, such as information, skills, access to key constituents 
(i.e. suppliers, buyers, public policy decision makers) and legitimacy (Gales and Kesner, 1994). In 
recent years, external pressure for greater corporate accountability has intensified, adding 
another role for boards, i.e. involvement in the strategic decision making process, or the fifth 
competency listed above (Power, 1987; Galen, 1989; Weidenbaum, 1985).  
An independent director is an outsider, i.e. a director who a) has not been employee or 
manager in the three years prior to the appointment, b) is not affiliated to the firm, its officers 
or relatives, and c) is not a representative of government. The independent directors may be 
business experts, who are active in or retired executives from other organizations. In this case, 
they bring expertise and knowledge to the firm as a result of their experience in internal 
decision making in other firms. The independent directors can also be ‘support specialists’ 
(Hillman et al., 2000), providing expertise and linkages in specific areas that support the firm’s 
strategies in areas such as capital markets, mergers and acquisitions, law and public relations.  
A large number of Russian companies now appoint independent board directors to monitor top 
management (Iwasaki, 2008). The majority of Russian companies is either governed by a board 
of directors with an extremely high proportion of independent outside representation on the 
board or completely dominated by insiders (Iwasaki, 2008). Empirical and conceptual research 
suggests that ownership structure and board composition are closely linked (Peasnell et al., 
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2005; Roosenboom, 2005; Connelly et al., 2010). However, there is limited research on the 
influence of ownership on board structure (Connelly et al., 2010). 
 
3.2.3. The Influence of Board Structure on Performance Outcomes 
Although there is agreement about the importance of boards of directors for firm strategy and 
performance, the existing studies are inconclusive about their effects on firm performance 
(Dalton et al., 1999; Becht et al., 2003). Independent directors are considered important for 
controlling agency costs, because they can be more effective in aligning interests of owners and 
managers (Daily and Dalton, 1992, 1994). These directors often have relatively little knowledge 
of the firm’s specific strategies, but they apply their broad corporate experience in fulfilling 
their oversight role (Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1990). Prior research indicates that independent 
directors are involved in strategic change, restructuring and corporate entrepreneurship 
(Johnson et al., 1993; Pearce and Zahra, 1992; Zahra, 1996). They are likely also to support 
international diversification because of potentially positive returns (Tihanyi et al., 2003). Lei and 
Song (2012) show that board independence improves firm performance in emerging markets 
with high ownership concentration. Some evidence shows that independent directors improve 
board performance (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003) or that stock price reacts positively to news 
of the appointment of an outside director (Rosenstein and Wyatt, 1990). The sudden death of 
an independent director can entail a stock price decline (Nguyen and Nielsen, 2010), but other 
evidence suggests that there is no significant relation between firm performance and board 
composition (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991; Byrd and Hickman, 1992; Mehran, 1995; Romano, 
1996; John and Senbet, 1998). In emerging economies, however, boards often have yet to 
establish institutional legitimacy and, thus, are not always so effective. Research indicates that 
they are often the ‘rubber stamp’ for controlling shareholders (Young et al., 2008). 
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3.2.4. Ownership-Directorship Bundle Framework 
To address the research question, which is how governance bundles of ownership-directorship 
impact on investment behaviour, and generate empirically testable hypotheses, I create a novel 
conceptual framework (see Figure 14).  
I use this framework to examine the impact of four ownership-board combinations. Ownership 
is categorized into two dominant groups – state and oligarchs. Oligarch-owned standalone firms 
and conglomerates (often called business groups or FIGs in the management literature) 
dominate the largest industry sectors; SOEs are particularly present in strategic sectors (gas, 
energy, railways, fixed telephony and defence). Either group can have boards with or without 
independent directors. The following four sections deal with these four configurations and 
correspond to each quadrant in Figure 14. They correspond to the firms that are 1) ‘Chasing 
external capital’ or oligarch firms monitored by independent directors; 2) ‘Old school’ or firms 
controlled by the state and monitored by ‘insiders’; 3) ‘Reformers’ or firms controlled by the 
state and monitored by independent directors and 4) ‘Laggards’ or firms controlled by oligarchs 
and monitored by ‘insiders’ . 
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Figure 14: Ownership-Directorship Bundle Framework 
 
 
3.2.4.1.  ‘Chasing external capital’ or oligarch firms monitored by independent 
directors  
A common belief is that the first oligarchs owe their fortunes to the ‘loans-for-shares’ auctions 
held in the mid-1990s, which are widely regarded as the most scandalous episode of Russian 
privatization (Guriev and Rachinsky, 2005). With the deregulation of the Soviet economy in the 
1990s, a few well-connected individuals set up their own businesses. These medium-sized 
companies, which are not part of a larger business group, are still often controlled by the 
owner-oligarch who also manages the company by assuming the role of an executive chairman 
or CEO.   
In larger Russian conglomerates, or FIGs, owned by oligarchs, management is often delegated 
to hired professionals. These conglomerates may have better access to capital than other 
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privately controlled firms through internal capital markets (Guriev and Rachinsky, 2005; Buckley 
and Strange, 2011; Estrin et al., 2009; Khanna and Palepu, 2000; Perotti and Gelfer, 2001). 
These advantages may be more pronounced in Russia where external markets are less efficient 
(Wright et al., 2005). Moreover, Gorodnichenko and Grygorenko (2008) argue that oligarch-
owned conglomerates may obtain performance advantages compared to other privately 
controlled firms due to lower separation of ownership and control, better protection against 
the grabbing hand of the state, and better control of hold up problems due to their vertically 
integrated group structures.  
While there are benefits to conglomerates, they can have certain disadvantages: they tend to 
be large cumbersome organizations that carry coordination, agency and administration costs 
(Claessens et al., 2002; Ferris et al., 2003; Morck et al., 2005). For corporate governance, the 
low transparency of such loosely-affiliated business groups makes it difficult to identify and 
challenge unfair intra-group transactions since such networks provide significant opportunity 
for collusion or other unethical transactions (Hoskisson et al., 2000; Young et al., 2008). In 
business groups, minority shareholders from a member firm are more likely to experience 
expropriation when the control rights of the controlling shareholders are greater than the cash 
flow rights – a practice referred to as ‘pyramiding’ (Bertrand et al., 2002; Claessens et al., 2002; 
Lin et al., 2011). Such contradicting predictions do not allow to conclude whether 
conglomerates are ‘paragons or parasites’ (Perotti and Gelfer, 2001; Khanna and Yaleh, 2007).  
Given these conflicting results, I test whether the presence of independent directors might 
improve an oligarch’s accountability to other shareholders and lead to investment in fixed 
assets. The monitoring of managers acting on behalf of the blockholder by independent 
directors might prevent the oligarch from tunnelling the resources away from investments. 
Propping and tunnelling mechanisms were often set up by controlling blockholders to divert 
resources as dividends and other payments to the detriment of other shareholders (Friedman 
et al., 2003). The independent directors would prevent tunnelling by monitoring and ratifying 
management decisions.  
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Oligarchs are more focused on financial outcomes and efficiency than the state (Guriev and 
Rachinsky, 2005; Gorodnichenko and Grygorenko, 2008). The oligarch may have an incentive to 
voluntarily increase the board’s independence to monitor any unfair diversion of the firm’s 
assets (Dahya et al., 2008; Lei and Song, 2012) or to attract external funds when financially 
constrained. The resulting gain in terms of increased efficiency outweighs the losses from 
engaging in tunnelling activities (Johnson et al., 2000; Bae et al., 2002; Bertrand et al., 2002). 
I expect strong and positive cash flow-investment sensitivity for oligarchic firms with 
independent directors. The positive sensitivity of investment to cash-flow might be generated 
by a need for funds. Oligarch–controlled firms that are financially constrained will appoint 
independent directors to gain access to external finance.  
Firms controlled by oligarchs with independent directors on the board represent the majority of 
oligarch-owned firms in my sample. I denote such firms as ‘chasing external capital’.  An 
example of an oligarchic conglomerate with independent directors on the board would include 
Sistema, the largest publicly-traded diversified holding company in Russia, controlled by a self-
made oligarch Vladimir Yevtushenkov and with dual listing on the London Stock Exchange.39 
Sistema’s board of directors is comprised of eight independent directors, out of thirteen. Six out 
of the eight independent directors are foreign citizens, all top executives in related industries or 
professional services. Sistema’s corporate governance is based on transparency of all processes 
for investors and partners, a proactive and professional Board of Directors and a consistent and 
collegiate approach to decision-making.40  
                                                          
39
 Sistema has its headquarters in Moscow, and operates a number of consumer service businesses in the areas of: 
IT and telecoms — Mobile TeleSystems, Moscow City Telephone Network, SkyLink, MTS India;  Microelectronics — 
Sitronics, NIIME, Mikron, STROM telecom; Insurance — ROSNO;  Banking — MBRD (Moscow Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development); Real Estate — Sistema-Hals; Retail — Detsky Mir Group; Media — Sistema 
Mass Media; Oil businesses — Bashneft, Ufaorgsintez, Novoil, Ufaneftehim, Ufimskiy NPZ, Bashkirnefteprodukt, 
Bashkirenergo; other businesses — Intourist (Travel Services), RTI Systems (Radio and space technology), 
Binopharm (Pharmaceuticals), Olympic Sistema (Sport). Yevtushenkov’s net worth is $6.7bn (Forbes, March 2013) 
40
 Source: Sistema 
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About 75% of the oligarch-controlled companies with independent directors are part of a 
business group or conglomerate in my sample. Perotti and Gelfer (2001) find that for business 
groups with ownership links to banks, the cash-flow to investment coefficient is negative, 
meaning that these groups have an internal capital market that redirects finance to firms with 
better investment opportunities. Perotti and Gelfer find also that for conglomerates without 
banks, investment is shown not to be significantly correlated with cash-flow. For independent 
or standalone firms, investment is sensitive to cash flow. Although my data do not allow to 
separate oligarch-controlled firms into sub-groups, i.e. conglomerates with banks and 
conglomerates without banks, I hypothesize that the oligarch-owned firms that appoint 
independent directors are in search of external funds, and independent directors provide 
access to such funds through their external contacts (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003) or by increasing 
the firm’s credibility for investors by guaranteeing heightened monitoring. I hypothesize that 
board monitoring is a substitute for blockholder monitoring since the former controls for 
efficient allocation of funds between projects or divisions and prevents the blockholder from 
expropriating funds from minority shareholders. Hence, I should observe positive investment to 
internal finance (cash-flow) sensitivity. 
H1. For firms controlled by oligarchs and monitored by independent directors, there is a positive 
relation between investment and internally generated funds.  
 
3.2.4.2. ‘Old school’ or firms controlled by the state and monitored by ‘insiders’ 
A form of blockholding that has gathered popular and scholarly attention in recent years is 
state ownership (Connelly et al., 2010). In Russia, the state controls 33% to 50% of Russian 
traded firms41 (Chernykh, 2008). Although state ownership tends to be higher in emerging 
economies and those with poorer protection of property rights (La Porta et al., 2002), it is also 
frequent in developed countries, including the USA and the UK, where it resulted from market 
failures. State ownership is occurring typically in industries characterized by natural monopolies 
and resources or industries of strategic interest, such as defence, or where firms are simply 
                                                          
41
 Other sources provide a number up to 60-80% (see note 14) 
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considered too big to fail (banking, insurance etc.). The question of which firms and industries 
should have state ownership, and which should compete in open markets, occupies a vast 
space in literature. The empirical studies, however, produce conflicting results. Some research 
highlights the problems of state ownership (D’Souza and Megginson, 1999; Shleifer, 1998) and 
describes state control as a source of inefficiencies. This stream of research argues that the 
state tends to pursue its own political or social goals and uses its control to divert firms’ 
resources to achieve these goals (Shleifer, 1998), or is lacking in monitoring and incentives for 
managers to perform better (Aharoni, 2000).  
These problems include lack of innovation, poor financial performance, political extraction and 
diversion (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Chang and Wong, 2004) and increased corruption 
(Megginson and Netter, 2001). Thus, state ownership may present an extreme form of the 
principal-principal problem, whereby powerful owners expropriate minority shareholders (La 
Porta et al., 2000; Dharwadkar et al., 2000; Young et al., 2008). SOEs have weaker governance 
mechanisms, lack the incentives to control subsidiary firms, and thus, do not actively seek to 
appoint independent board members as mediators.  
There are also studies pointing to benefits of state ownership, particularly when it comes to its 
impact on access to finance. Soft budget constraints are usually seen as a positive stimulus for 
investment (Lizal and Svejnar, 2002), although they can also slow down growth by making 
market reforms ineffective (Kornai, 1986; Mickiewicz, 2010). Firms face soft budget constraints 
if there is willingness of the state to provide additional resources or otherwise bail them out. 
The extent of a soft budget constraint should be positively correlated with the extent of state 
ownership of productive assets (Kornai et al., 2003). The budget constraint is ‘soft’ when it is 
non-binding, and can range from subsidies to soft loans. State ownership is beneficial for firms 
that employ moderate to high levels of debt (Le and O’Brien, 2010). State ownership generates 
firm ties to government officials, which may help firms obtain land or information, and secure 
contracts for specific projects (Xin and Pearce, 1996, Luo, 2003; Luo and Chen, 1997; Nolan, 
2001; Tian and Estrin, 2007). Such connections to the state provide opportunities for affecting 
mandatory policies (Hillman et al., 2004) and for enhancing firms’ legitimacy (Baum and Oliver, 
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1991). Studies show that connections to the state may enhance firm performance (Luo and 
Chen, 1997; Fisman, 2001; Johnson and Mitton, 2003; Siegel, 2007). Furthermore, because 
others recognize these potential benefits, state ownership may give firms competitive 
advantage over rivals in attracting the best partners for joint ventures (Hitt et al., 2000; Luo and 
Chen, 1997) or enable preferential treatment from state-owned banks42 or other state entities 
(Fisman, 2001; Johnson and Mitton, 2003; Faccio, 2006).   
In the case of SOEs, a negative sensitivity of internal finance to investment can be interpreted 
as presence of soft budget constraints. If the budget is ‘soft’, firms with negative NPV may 
survive, and growth opportunities are no longer correlated with investment or firm value 
(Mickiewicz, 2010). The firm shares the risks with the state, the additional profits may be 
skimmed off, and the structure of the incentives is affected. It becomes more profitable for 
firms to focus on lobbying the state officials to ‘soften’ the budget constraints, rather than 
competing against other firms in the market economy.  
The SOEs that do not appoint independent directors may not feel the need to be transparent 
and to have access to external capital. In fact, they may not be financially constrained and may 
be subject to soft budget constraints, a condition generally attributed to the negative cash flow-
investment sensitivity. Soft budget constraints suggest the SOEs might squander funds to 
unproductive uses and then beg for state bailouts. Research shows that the state often finds 
declaring such firms bankrupt even more costly than being subjected to another round of 
bailout, with the only remedy being institutional reform (Mickiewicz, 2010). Russian SOEs are 
primarily composed of boards with only inside directors. These SOEs are classified in the 
framework as ‘old school’, having not adopted advanced governance practices. I hypothesize 
that when firms are controlled by the state and do not appoint independent directors, board 
composition and ownership structure become complements, such that they are both inefficient 
in optimizing flow of liquidity to investment projects. 
 
                                                          
42
 E.g. , the biggest banks in Russia are state-controlled. They are Sberbank, Vneshtogbank, Gazprombank and Bank 
Moskvy. 
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H2. For firms controlled by the state and monitored by inside directors, there is a negative 
relation between investment and internally generated funds. 
 
3.2.4.3. ‘Reformers’ or firms controlled by the state and monitored by 
independent directors  
Situations of soft budget constraints occur when the state would like to enforce better 
performance, but the managers of SOEs behave opportunistically and the outcomes of their 
actions are only observed with delay. Once the performance data are revealed, the government 
may choose to subsidize the firms, since bankruptcy of a state-owned firm has negative utility 
for politicians. Thus, government faces a problem of post-contractual opportunism, or moral 
hazard. This creates the soft budget situation generating disincentives to perform (Driffield et 
al., 2012). However, efficient board monitoring can mitigate this problem by both diminishing 
information asymmetries between state and firms (regarding performance), and pushing for 
non-subsidization (by imposing credible rules that restrict opportunities for arbitrary public 
assistance). SOEs face stronger incentives to enhance their investments and productivity to 
protect themselves against external shocks and the risk of bankruptcy. This makes the 
predicted moderating effect of board monitoring and internal funds on investment, positive 
and significant. 
 
I hypothesize that when an SOE decides to appoint independent directors to the board, the 
state and managers are seeking a more efficient capital allocation, which will result from better 
monitoring and advice from independent directors. The state as a shareholder might be looking 
to diminish the negative effects of soft budgeting, translating into a positive relation between 
investment and internally generated cash-flow.  
Some SOEs with independent directors also have a foreign investor stake, which might suggest 
that this would push better governance standards in SOEs such as board independence. An 
alternative explanation for independence on SOEs boards may lie in SOEs’ origins. The vast 
majority of middle- and large-scale enterprises in Russia are privatized enterprises, many of 
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which still have state shares. These former SOEs still attract much more public attention than 
private firms (Iwasaki, 2008). This means that, compared with fully privately-owned firms 
established during the transition period, traditional former SOEs are likely to have more 
independent outsider directors in order to be properly accountable to the state and the public 
rather than being opportunistic and squandering state funds (Beiner et al., 2004). Board 
independence and ownership concentration are substitutes when firms are controlled by the 
state in terms of monitoring.  
H3. For firms controlled by the state and monitored by independent directors, there is a positive 
relation between investment and internally generated funds. 
 
3.2.4.4. ‘Laggards’ or firms controlled by oligarchs and monitored by ‘insiders’  
Although oligarchs’ conglomerates are often viewed as progressive (Guriev and Rachinsky, 
2005; Gorodnichenko and Grygorenko, 2008), some oligarch-controlled groups may have more 
governance issues than their state-owned counterparts.  
Soft budgeting (Kornai et al., 2003) characterizes state involvement and bailouts in SOEs or 
large strategic firms too big to fail, and does not apply to privately owned firms, with the 
exception of FIGs which retain a connection to the state through their banks (Modigliani and 
Perotti, 1997; Wright et al., 1998; Von Hirschhausen, 1998; Estrin and Wright, 1999; Perotti and 
Gelfer, 2001). Hence, I argue that a negative relation between internal funds and investment 
may arise from a reallocation driven by the desire of the controlling oligarch to move resources 
around in order to appropriate them better. In other words, the negative investment-internal 
finance sensitivity can be interpreted as evidence of extensive financial reallocation across 
entities of the oligarchic conglomerate, or tunnelling in the case of independent oligarchic 
firms. 
I hypothesize that when oligarchic firms are primarily monitored only by insiders, they are 
engaged in some form of inefficient internal funds reallocation or tunnelling, meaning that 
internal finance negatively and significantly influences investment. Hence, when oligarchic 
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boards are dominated by insiders, there is a complementarity effect between board 
composition and ownership structure in their impact on investment. 
H4. For firms controlled by oligarchs and monitored by ‘insiders’, there is a negative relation 
between investment and internally generated funds.  
Figure 15: Hypotheses Framework 
 
 
3.3. Empirical specification and methodology 
To empirically evaluate the impact of blockholders and directors on financing constraints as 
measured by internal gross cash flow sensitivity to investment, I begin with the dynamic model 
of investment that includes measures of the use of external finance (Brown and Petersen, 
2009). The specification includes cash flow sensitivities of investment of the different 
ownership and board structures (see below). The cash flow sensitivities allow me to test for the 
different financial and soft budget constraints of the different ownership categories (Goergen 
and Renneboog, 2001; Mykhayliv and Zauner, 2012).  
State*Ind. 
Board  
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121 
 
             
                
     
               
    
               
    
   
            
    
               
    
                   
                                          
 
where subscript i represents the firm;               is the natural logarithm of first 
differences in investment in long term fixed assets;         is the natural logarithm of first 
differences in internal gross cash flow;     is Tobin’s Q;       is the new long term debt; 
         is the new common equity;   
   represents a dummy variable related to Block 
Ownership, where superscript k indicates ownership type, either Institutional Investor (  
  ), 
State (  
 ) or Oligarch (  
 );  
  represents a dummy variable related to the type of board 
directors, either independent  
    or insider  
   . According to my theoretical framework, I 
have four main interaction effects with gross cash-flow       , to account for four type of 
firms: 1) oligarchs with independent directors; 2) state with insiders; 3) state with independent 
directors and  4) oligarchs with insiders43. Finally,    controls for year fixed effects;    is a firm 
specific effect and     is random error term. The firm fixed effects are removed by first-
differencing. 
This dynamic specification of investment, based on Brown and Pedersen (2009), is the Q-model, 
and does not include sales or the error correction term, unlike the accelerator models in error 
correction specification used in previous chapters. Q-models of investment provide an 
empirically fruitful framework for the analysis of firms’ decisions to invest. As described earlier, 
Q is a proxy for investment opportunities or investment demand. Q-models are as widely used 
as accelerator models in investment literature, if not more (Blundell et al., 1992). Hence, the 
empirical specification differs from the previous chapters as it is based on a different model. 
Typically, financing constraints are measured as internal gross cash flow       sensitivity to 
investment. Firms which are more likely to face binding financing constraints exhibit greater 
sensitivity of investment to cash flow. For more detail on the empirical specification and 
                                                          
43
 The fifth interaction effect, i.e. institutional investors with independent directors, is not theorised. There are no 
firms controlled by institutional investors with only insiders on board. 
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methodology refer to Schiantarelli (1996), Hubbard (1998), and Bond and Van Reenen (2007). 
There are two main approaches to testing the investment-cash flow relation. The sample can be 
split into constrained and unconstrained firms (e.g. according to dividend pay-out ratio as in 
Fazzari et al., 1988 or access to funds as in Kaplan and Zingales, 1997). Alternatively, the model 
is estimated for the entire sample with the inclusion of interactive terms, each consisting of a 
dummy variable set to 1 if the firm’s ownership satisfies a certain criterion (Goergen and 
Renneboog, 2001). The ownership concentration and financial status of the sample firms are 
not restricted to one sub-sample over the whole time period, but are allowed to vary over time 
and to move from one sub-sample to another (i.e. constrained-non-constrained). The 
advantages of this latter approach are discussed in Cleary (1999) and used in Goergen and 
Renneboog (2001), Driver and Guedes (2012), and Mykhayliv and Zauner (2012) among others. 
I use a unique longitudinal dataset of Russian listed firms complemented by information about 
firms’ major blockholders and board characteristics, to capture dynamic adjustment processes 
and to control better for the effect of omitted variables (Hsiao, 1986). One of the characteristics 
of my sample is that the firms are selected from a non-random population, i.e. the Russian 
companies listed on foreign or local stock exchanges. 
 
Dependent Variable 
Investment 
The dependent variable, which is the first difference of natural logarithms of capital 
expenditures, is defined in sections 1.4 and 2.3 of the previous chapters. The rationale for 
inclusion of the lagged investment term                   is also discussed in section 1.4. 
Independent Variables 
Block ownership 
Block owners are majority shareholders (>50%). I define three types of block owners: state, 
oligarch, and institutional (foreign) investors. After excluding missing observations, 73% of 
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observations correspond to firms with majority shareholders highlighting the predominant 
concentrated ownership structure of Russian companies. Of this sample, 51% are oligarch-
controlled firms, 46% are state controlled and only 3% are majority owned by foreign investors. 
In this chapter, I look at ultimate control as opposed to immediate ownership, disentangling 
pyramid structures, cross-holdings and other mechanisms that mask the ultimate ownership of 
the firm. 
Independent board directors 
These are outsiders, i.e. directors, who are not employees or managers and not affiliated with 
the firm, their officers and relatives. The variable takes the value 1 if there is at least one 
independent director on the board and 0 otherwise. Extant literature in developed economies 
found a lack of consistency by firms in interpreting the definition of ‘independent’ and a lack of 
disclosure of information (Brennan and McDermott, 2004). This issue is coupled with general 
unreliability of data in Russia.  Where the information is unavailable or inconsistent, I classify 
the directors based on the definition above. For example, those directors on SOEs’ boards who 
are or have in the past served state roles as directors, executives, politicians or bureaucrats are 
not considered as independent, even if the firm discloses them as independent. The ties to the 
state are so strong that once a director is affiliated with an SOE or state institution, he is usually 
considered embedded with the interests of the state, particularly if appointed on the board of 
other SOEs (Okhmatovskiy, 2010). 
According to IFC survey (2003), 71% of surveyed firms did not appoint independent directors to 
their boards. The ratio of independent to non-independent directors, at 1:9 on the average 
Russian board, leaves much room for improvement.   
The data on independent directors is not explicitly included in TD scores computed by S&P. The 
sub-component of TD score, dealing with “Board and Management Structures and Processes” 
(cf. Appendix 2) on page 183) does not include disclosure of information on board 
independence.  So the independent directors variable brings a new dimension to the TD sub-
component on boards. 
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Internal gross cash flow 
Internal gross cash flow is based on standard specification (Brown and Petersen, 2009) and is 
defined in section 1.4.  
 
Main Control Variables 
Debt 
Debt measures net new long-term firm indebtedness. My approach of including external 
finance is similar to Bond and Meghir (1994), who include equity and debt terms, instrumented 
with lagged values, in a dynamic model of physical investment. Carpenter (1995) adds changes 
in debt level to the investment model and finds evidence of significant financing constraints in 
firms with low growth opportunities (low Tobin’s Q) and low dividend pay-out ratios. I include 
stock and debt issues to control for possible omitted variables bias and to evaluate the 
changing role of external finance for investment.  
Equity 
Equity measures net new funds from stock issues. 
Tobin’s Q 
Tobin’s Q, as described in chapters 1 and 2, is defined as the ratio of market value to total book 
value of assets. A low Q (between 0 and 1) means that the cost of replacing firm's assets is 
greater than the value of its stock. This implies that the stock is undervalued. Conversely, a high 
Q (greater than 1) implies that the firm's stock is more expensive than the replacement cost of 
its assets, which implies that the stock is overvalued. This measure of stock valuation is the 
driving factor behind investment decisions in Tobin's model. The coefficient of gross cash flow 
to investment measures the severity of financing constraints. Implementing this idea requires 
controlling for investment opportunities; otherwise cash flow might capture movements in 
investment opportunities instead of movements in internal funds. Investment opportunities or 
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demand are most often proxied by Tobin’s Q, as in this case. Most studies find that firms which 
a priori are more likely to face binding financing constraints exhibit greater sensitivity of 
investment to cash flow, as in Hubbard (1998) and Bond and Van Reenen (2007). 
3.4. Data and descriptive statistics 
Financial data for the period 2000-2010 is sourced from Compustat Global and enriched with 
publicly available firm information. Ownership and board data were collected manually from 
public sources, such as business media Vedomosti, Forbes and Kommersant; and web 
disclosures. I use accounting data of Russian firms; the quality of these data has been 
questioned (Kuznecovs and Pal, 2012; Braguinsky and  Mityakov, 2013). An attenuating factor is 
that the firms are listed and often dual listed on foreign exchanges. The accounts for such large 
companies are mostly prepared according to International Accounting Standards (IAS) and 
audited by reputable accounting firms. Note that oligarch-owned firms appoint independent 
directors more often than state-owned firms. Given that privately-owned firms are more 
financially constrained than state firms, board composition and the presence of outside 
directors facilitating access to resources, are particularly important for bringing foreign direct 
investment (FDI) and for managing scarce domestic investment wisely and efficiently (Rueda-
Sabater, 2000). 
Table 24 lists number of observations, mean, median, standard deviation from mean, minimum 
and maximum values for the most common raw variables used in the empirical specification. 
Average annual sales for the sample are €2.1 billion which is quite high due to some big outliers 
and high standard deviation. Median annual sales are €483 million. Average capital investment 
amounts to €346 million and median investment to only €57 million. 
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Table 24: Descriptive Statistics, EUR million. 
 
Table 25: Descriptive statistics, EUR million, sample used in analysis of Table 27 
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Table 26: Pairwise correlations, sample used in analysis of Table 27 
 
3.5. Results and discussion 
I report the results in Table 27. Models (1) and (2) show the results for fixed effects, while 
models (3) and (4) show GMM estimators in differences. In models (2) and (4), I introduce 
Tobin’s Q to control for investment opportunities. While the results of model (1) to model (2) 
and model (3) to model (4) do not change significantly, the drop in the total number of 
observations (from N=218 to N=139) can be attributed to missing observations in Tobin’s Q. 
The limited data on Tobin’s Q is due to the relative infancy of the Russian stock market with 
earlier years in the period having fewer listed and liquid firms.   
The effect of gross cash flow on investment for oligarch-controlled firms with independent 
directors on their boards is positive, per model (1) where the effect of gross cash flow (         
to               for such firms is 0.187*. This means that for an increase of 1% in gross cash-
flow, investment would increase by 0.187% which supports hypothesis 1. A positive internal 
financing (cash-flow)-investment relation for oligarch-controlled firms means that in presence 
of independent directors, oligarchs are able to stimulate investment spending when the firm 
has high cash-flow, or restrict investment when the internally generated funds are low. I 
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interpret this as successful monitoring of managers and oligarchs by independent directors, 
which increases the oligarchs’ accountability to other shareholders, reduces the possibility of 
propping and tunnelling of funds, and increases investment. In spite of many short comings of 
boards as mechanisms for governance in Russia, my finding indicates that board independence 
is the most important among the major governance mechanisms. This result is consistent with 
Lei and Song (2012) and Chen et al. (2006) who find positive and significant relations between 
board independence and firm value in developed markets.  
However, per model (1) and (2), for those oligarch-controlled firms with insider boards, the 
gross cash flow–investment relationship is statistically insignificant. In the case of insider 
boards, monitoring and influence on controlling oligarchs and management is insufficient to 
prevent reallocation of funds between conglomerate entities or other forms of tunnelling in the 
case of standalone firms.  
For SOEs with insider boards, the gross-cash flow investment relationship is also negative and 
statistically significant in model (2), supporting hypothesis 2. The monitoring of insider boards is 
insufficient to prevent soft budgeting of SOEs.  
For SOEs governed by boards with independent directors, I find a positive and significant cash-
flow to investment relationship (0.46*), supporting hypothesis 3. SOEs appointing independent 
directors have a higher incentive to improve access to funds for investment, and the 
appointment of independent directors gives them additional ways through directors’ resources 
and expertise to attain this incentive. 
Finally, for the few firms controlled by foreign investors with independent directors, the 
relationship between internal cash flow and investments is very strong statistically. In economic 
terms, for such firms, every 1% increase in cash flow entails 1.378% increase in investment 
(model 2). 
Ownership and boards are endogenous of investment and other firm outcomes or attributes. 
For example, different investors take ownership stakes in companies owing to the presence of 
firm attributes and decisions that managers make related to performance or strategy (Bushee, 
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2004; Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001; Connelly et al., 2010). It could be that independent 
directors are more inclined to serve on the boards of more progressive firms in terms of 
governance, rather than SOE. The board influences firms’ attributes through monitoring, 
sanctioning and market signalling. But firm’s attributes also determine certain board structures. 
For example, it might be easier to appoint independent directors for better performing firms 
since there is less perceived risk to the director’s reputation. 
Endogeneity of the explanatory variables makes ordinary least squares inconsistent. Moreover, 
investment is a dynamic process which cannot be consistently estimated with fixed effects. In 
this case, GMM techniques are applicable (Arellano, 2003) because they are more aligned to a 
dynamic model with lagged dependent variable on the right hand side. Relying on the GMM 
framework, Hansen (1982), Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988) and Arellano and Bond (1991) develop an 
appropriate matrix of GMM-type instruments. The big advantage of this method is that 
instruments are lagged variables of the dataset at hand.  
I use Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) difference GMM estimator, 
which is robust to heteroscedasticity and arbitrary patterns of autocorrelation within firms, 
with the small sample correction, where I entertain the possibility that all my independent 
variables are endogenous. A variable is endogenous if current and past errors are correlated 
with current and future values of the variable.  
I report robust standard errors which are consistent with panel-specific autocorrelation and 
heteroscedasticity. The results of the GMM models (models 3-4) are consistent with the fixed 
effects (models 1-2).  
For firms controlled by oligarchs and monitored by independent directors, there is a positive 
and statistically significant relation between investment and internal funds (0.419**) in Model 
(3), which confirms hypothesis 1. This means that for an increase of 1% in gross cash-flow, 
investment would increase by 0.419% in a GMM setting, which is more than 0.187% in fixed 
effects. When controlling for Tobin’s Q, the coefficient of cash-flow for this sub-group is 
statistically insignificant. 
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For firms controlled by the state and monitored by inside directors, there is no statistically 
significant relation between investment and internal funds.  
For firms controlled by the state and monitored by independent directors, there is a positive 
and statistically significant relation between investment and cash-flow (0.403*) in model (4), 
confirming hypothesis 3 with GMM estimator, which effect is in line with fixed effects (0.456**) 
For firms controlled by oligarchs and monitored by insiders, there is no statistically significant 
relation between investment and internally generated funds. 
Finally, for firms controlled by foreign institutional investors, the relation between internal 
cash-flow and investment is statistically strong in GMM setting (both models 3 and 4), with 
coefficient range of 1.031*-1.195**. 
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Table 27: Investment, blockholders and board independence 
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Table 28 shows the break downs of observations (firms) for each combination as they appear in 
Table 27. The total number of observations for the full specification in fixed effects is as 
reported in Table 27 (i.e. 218 and 139 for models 1 and 2 respectively). 
The average values of the dependent variable, ∆Investmenti,t  in natural logarithms and the 
original variable, Investmenti,t , in million euros, for each sub-group show that both state-
owned firms and oligarch-owned firms with independent directors on board invest more on 
average in fixed assets44.  
 
  
                                                          
44
 For the state-owned firms, I compare the medians of groups with and without independent directors, due to a 
high standard deviation of investment for the group without independent directors (see the footnote 45) 
Table 28: Number of observations and firms in combinations from Table 27 
 
Table 27: 
Investment, 
blockholders and 
board 
independence, 
page 131 
Description of 
mutually 
exclusive 
combinations 
No of 
obs. 
Number of  
obs. across 
years for 
∆gcfit*(O
k
it*D
k
i), 
e.g. ∆gcfit* 
(O
o
it*D
ind
i) 
Obs. for each 
combination, 
controlling for 
non-missing 
obs. of control 
variables Model 
(1), fe 
Obs. for each 
combination, 
controlling for 
non-missing 
obs. of control 
variables Model 
(2), fe 
Mean of the 
dependent 
variable, 
∆Investmenti,t  
In natural 
logarithms 
and 
(Investmenti,t
) in EURm 
∆gcfit*O
s
i*Di
ind
 State controlled, 
Independent 
Director(s) on 
board 
45 30 22 21 0.243 
(€184m) 
∆gcfit*O
s
i*Di
ins
 State controlled, 
no Independent 
Director on board 
141 97 79 51 0.246 
(€457m)
45
   
∆gcfit*O
o
i*Di
ind
 Oligarch-
controlled, 
Independent 
Director on board 
134 102 86 47 0.108 
(€734m) 
∆gcfit*O
o
i*Di
ins
 Oligarch 
controlled, no 
Independent 
Director on board 
52 33 23 12 0.173 
(€133m) 
∆gcfit *O
ii
i*Di
ind
 Controlled by 
institutional 
investors, 
Independent 
Director on 
board
46
 
16 10 8 8 0.016 
(€138m) 
TOTAL number of 
obs. 
   218 obs. (as per 
model 1) 
139 obs. (as per 
model 2) 
 
 
  
                                                          
45
 The median investment for this group is €158m, which is lower that the median for state controlled, 
independent directors group (€177m) 
46
 There are no firms controlled by institutional investors and with insiders only on the board. 
3.6. Conclusion, implications and further research 
 
There are various tactics employed by owners on managers to mitigate financing constraints on 
investment. Where ownership and management of firm are inseparable, controlling 
blockholders can exercise direct tactics to improve access to funds for investment through 
internal capital markets, lobbying, greater bargaining power with managers (Pound, 1998). 
However, ownership can have negative effects on investments in presence of private benefits 
of control for blockholder over minority shareholders (Grossman and Hart, 1988), such as 
tunnelling and asset stripping. Tunnelling, ‘the transfer of assets and profits out of firms for the 
benefits of those who control them’ (Johnson et al., 2000, p.22), and asset stripping, i.e. 
obtaining firms’ assets significantly below the market value, can be interpreted as an extreme 
form of private benefits of control (Mykhayliv and Zauner, 2012).  
I find that the presence of independent, non-executive directors is a valid mechanism for both 
oligarch-owned firms and SOEs to significantly influence investment behaviour. Independent 
directors, by monitoring of managers and controlling shareholders, make firms more 
accountable to minority shareholders, which, in turn, limits tunnelling of funds and improves 
investments. Without independent directors, the relationship between gross cash flow and 
investments is negative for both oligarch-owned firms and SOEs.  
Overall, the following theoretical and empirical contributions emerge. First, theoretically, I 
contribute to the broader corporate governance literature by accounting for how institutional 
factors and heterogeneity of blockholders can alter the implications of key theoretical 
considerations such as ownership and directorship structures: I find significant differences in 
the investment behaviour of state-owned and oligarch-owned firms. I also add to PPA theory by 
focusing on how agency conflicts between blockholders and minority shareholders can be 
mitigated by boards monitoring the oligarchs. In particular, the presence of independent 
directors economically and statistically significantly alters the investment policy of the firm, for 
both types of blockholders.  
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Research on how the composition of the board of directors determines its strategic behaviour 
provides inconclusive results. In light of this, Rediker and Seth (1995) and Desender et al., 
(2013) point out that research on a single governance practice often neglects the broader 
linkages to other governance traits in the firm, and their joint impact. Building on this stream of 
the literature, I adopt a contingency approach to explain how the firm’s board composition 
affects firm monitoring of blockholders towards investment. I find that board composition and 
ownership structures can be complements or substitutes in their impact on investment. Board 
independence is a substitute for ownership, while an insider board complements ownership in 
terms of monitoring the efficient allocation of funds to investment. 
Although I find no qualitative difference in investment behaviour between oligarch-owned and 
state-owned firms with insider directors, theoretically, I argue that the negative effect of gross 
cash flow on investment is likely to stem from different aspects of tunnelling. Whereas state-
owned firms’ behaviour is likely to reflect soft budget constraints, oligarch-owned firms’ 
behaviour probably reflects tunnelling of funds either among conglomerate units or from firm 
to managers and owners. 
Finally, I extend the conceptual governance bundle literature (Millar et al., 2005; Filatotchev et 
al., 2006 and 2007) and the investment literature (Brown and Petersen, 2009) to emerging 
markets and test the external validity of their findings (based on dispersed ownership), in an 
environment where firm ownership is mostly concentrated. To my knowledge, there is very 
limited research on emerging economies studying the moderation effect of ownership and 
directorship bundle on financing constraints on investment. Relative to previous investment 
research, the context in which I test the relationship between board composition and 
investment is novel, since few studies investigate these relationships for emerging market listed 
firms. In addition, an analysis of Russian firms allowed me to explore the relationship between 
board composition and the investment behaviour in the absence of strong board legal liability 
given weak investor protection. Therefore, it is not clear that similar results would eventuate in 
a context of high investor protection, as shareholder legal protection could have an influence 
on the shareholders’ incentives and abilities to directly monitor management. I have argued 
136 
 
that the analysed combinations resulting from different structures each have unique 
implications on investment. I used panel data techniques which allow controlling for fixed 
effects. I used dynamic panel data (Arellano and Bond version) to address the issue of 
endogeneity and unobserved heterogeneity and, especially, causality.  
This chapter has a number of limitations that open up opportunities for further research. First, 
my focus was on Russia, which questions to what extent I can generalize the analysis to other 
emerging and mid-range economies. In many ways, governance mechanisms in Russia resemble 
most of those in China: (i) SOE are prominent in both countries; (ii) concentrated and pyramid 
ownership structure prevails; (iii) the owner often holds the position of board chair and has 
complete control over strategic decision making; and (iv) property rights tend to emerge from a 
continuing process of negotiating and networking. However, Russia has some unique features: 
oligarchy emerged in Russia to a much larger extent than has happened in China. Comparative 
study of the governance mechanisms in China and Russia would be a promising avenue for 
future research.  
Second, while this chapter highlights the influence of ownership structure on board 
independence and monitoring, I do not discuss other board functions. Future research could 
explore how other board characteristics, such as board remuneration, are contingent on firm 
ownership. 
Finally, I cannot claim that my approach completely resolves all of the outstanding issues 
relating to blockholders’ investment behaviour when it comes to empirically prove difference in 
looting47 between oligarch-owned and state-owned firms with insider directors. However, I do 
suggest it narrows the number of possible inferences that one can draw. In particular, I believe 
that my procedure more clearly distinguishes inefficiencies from other outcomes, explained by 
switching of internal funds coefficient sign from negative to positive when in presence of 
independent board monitoring. For example, Perotti and Gelfer (2001) found it difficult to 
distinguish the opportunistic transfer or resources, from more efficient internal distribution. 
                                                          
47
 Opportunistic transfer of resources 
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The findings in this chapter have implications for policymakers and, in particular, for reform of 
corporate governance. Policy making and implementation should progress to a more context-
dependent understanding of corporate governance. Regulation focusing only on board 
independence may not be sufficient since board monitoring depends on ownership structures.    
Finally, this chapter demonstrates that blockholder ownership is a corporate governance tool 
whose impact on investment differs based on the type of blockholder. I argue that blockholder 
heterogeneity is related to board composition and monitoring ability and, as a consequence, 
two boards each with independent directors, but different blockholders may lead to monitoring 
of different inefficiencies. Similarly, blockholders’ decisions on the structure of the board of 
directors determine their predisposition to soft budgeting or funds reallocation (efficient or 
inefficient). These impacts also depend on the institutional setting in which the relationships 
occur. My primary theoretical arguments draw on the integrated PPA-governance bundle 
perspective and contribute, theoretically and empirically, to this line of research by showing 
that board composition and monitoring are contingent on ownership structure. 
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Chapter 4. Discussion and Contributions 
4.1. Introduction 
Central to this thesis is the recognition that firms’ investment behaviour is not only determined 
by financing choices, but also by corporate governance practices. The heterogeneity of these 
practices means that, in interaction, they can substitute or complement for each other in 
determining fixed investments. To my knowledge, this is the first study to examine the impact 
of multiple governance practices on investment behaviour in Russia, and only the second study, 
after Perotti and Gelfer (2001), to focus on investment, cash-flow and governance in the 
Russian context. In particular, I believe this thesis is the first to combine analysis of ownership 
networks and internal governance and their impact on firms’ investment behaviour in both the 
Russian context and other settings with similar institutional characteristics. 
To address the central research question of this thesis, i.e. how governance practices influence 
firms’ investment in fixed assets, I used data on an emerging economy, Russia, where the 
dynamics of governance mechanisms can be observed. I hypothesized that the investment 
behaviour of Russian firms would respond significantly to changes in TD and other governance 
practices. This holds particularly for locally listed firms, where potential dual listing entails 
improvement in TD scores to the level of Western firms. While the Russian setting is 
appropriate to study the impact of variation in TD and other governance practices on long-term 
investment, it also provides a unique institutional setting to test the boundary conditions of 
traditional Anglo-American theories. I superimpose Russian institutional characteristics on the 
governance-investment relationship. I examine this relationship through different theoretical 
lenses and take the financing constraints (Chapters 1 and 3), RDT (Chapter 2), governance 
bundle (Chapter 3), and PPA (Chapters 2 and 3) perspective. 
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4.2. Discussion and Individual Contributions  
The thesis research comprises three empirical studies that consider the direct effects and 
moderating effects of TD scores, networks, ownership and board structures on investment.  
Chapter 1 analysed the direct impact of TD scores on fixed tangible investment, and the effect 
of the interaction between TD scores and financing constraints on investment. I test the effect 
of corporate governance on financing constraints through investment, a factor that has not 
been tested extensively in the Russian context; most of the literature examines the effect of 
governance on firm performance, which is a very widely used indicator of shareholder value. I 
performed tests on my total sample of firms, and on two sub-samples according to 
predominant type of ownership – state or oligarch. This chapter contributes to the literature on 
Russian corporate governance by analysing investment behaviour, as opposed to performance 
measures, looking at a unique and time variant measure of governance in the Russian context, 
i.e. TD scores, over a longer time period than most other work on TD. The research in this thesis 
is based on empirical analyses of a unique, purpose-built firm-level dataset of large Russian 
firms. I contribute also to the literature on soft budget constraints and tunnelling and to the 
literature on financing constraints more generally.  
Chapter 2 examined the implications of heterogeneity of ownership network ties that enhance, 
diminish or compensate for other governance practices in determining investment. Some 
network connections are substitute mechanisms for governance practices related to TD 
because they improve accountability and, thus, support investment. Other organizational 
arrangements might complement these governance practices because they generate agency 
conflicts. To my knowledge, this is the first study to combine analysis of ownership networks 
and internal corporate governance and their impact on firms' strategic long-term resource 
commitments. I show that external ownership connections and connections to an industry 
association moderate the impact of TD practices on investment. Ownership networks moderate 
the impact of TD practices because they substitute for or complement these practices, 
depending on whether resource constraints or agency costs are the primary drivers of the 
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connections. I find that firms with poorly connected owners benefit significantly from TD, 
because TD compensates for lack of external resources.  
I found that firms with a single controlling owner, state ownership or conglomerate structure, 
gain more from TD practices when committing to long-term investment. I suggest that these 
characteristics reflect high agency costs because the controlling owner, the state or 
conglomerate arrangement, potentially can be used to expropriate value from the firm, and 
small shareholders may not be sufficiently powerful to prevent this. As a result, the controlling 
owner might extract value rather than reinvesting in productive assets. However, TD practices 
can counteract this tendency and commit the firm to credible productive long-term 
investments. 
Finally, I found that oligarch owners’ membership of the RUIE board complement the effects of 
TD on commitment to investment. I interpret this effect as due to the power of the individual 
involved.  
In Chapter 2, I examined the effects of block ownership and board composition on the 
sensitivity of firms’ investment strategies to the availability of internal funds. Overall, the 
following theoretical and empirical contributions emerge. First, I contribute to the broader 
corporate governance literature by accounting for how institutional factors and heterogeneity 
of blockholders can alter the implications of key theoretical considerations such as ownership 
and directorship structures: I find significant differences in the investment behaviour of state-
owned and oligarch-owned firms. I also add to PPA theory by focusing on how agency conflicts 
between blockholders and minority shareholders can be mitigated by boards monitoring the 
oligarchs. In particular, the presence of independent directors economically and statistically 
significantly alters the investment policy of the firm, for both types of blockholders. Finally, I 
extend the governance bundle literature on emerging markets (Millar et al., 2005; Filatotchev 
et al., 2007) and the investment literature (Brown and Petersen, 2009) by examining the 
ownership-directorship bundle and its impact on financing and investment. Although I found no 
qualitative differences in investment behaviour between oligarch-owned and state-owned 
firms with insider directors, theoretically, I argue that the negative effect of gross cash flow on 
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investment is likely to stem from different phenomena. Whereas state-owned firms’ behaviour 
is likely to reflect soft budget constraints, oligarch-owned firms’ behaviour probably reflects 
tunnelling of funds either among conglomerate units or from firm to managers and owners. 
Empirically, I contribute to existing studies of financing constraints at firm level in an emerging 
markets context. I test how type of owner, size of ownership share and board structure interact 
to determine the impact of liquidity on investment. To my knowledge, there is very little 
published research on emerging economies studying the moderating effect of ownership and 
directorship bundle on the investment-liquidity relation. I argued that the analysed 
combinations resulting from different structures each have unique implications for investment.  
I find that the appointment to the board of non-executive directors ensures that the increase in 
liquidity translates into an improvement in fixed investment, for both SOEs and oligarch-owned 
firms. Independent directors, through monitoring of managers and controlling shareholders, 
make them more accountable to minority shareholders and improve the firm’s credibility for 
external investors, which, in turn, limits soft budgeting for SOEs and tunnelling of funds for 
oligarch-owned firms, and improves investments. Without independent directors, the 
relationship between gross cash flow and investments is negative for both oligarch-owned firms 
and SOEs. 
Table 29: Findings from the three empirical chapters 
 Findings 
Essay 1 I find that corporate governance has a positive and significant impact on fixed 
tangible investment. I find also that SOEs are more sensitive than oligarch-
owned enterprises to improved governance, but less sensitive to the changes in 
internal funds (cash-flows), suggesting that SOEs might be subject to soft 
budget constraints. 
I find that governance of financially constrained firms positively and significantly 
affects investment. Firms are considered financially constrained if they have to 
issue more equity. 
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Essay 2 I find that a firm’s position in an ownership network and its corporate 
governance practices in terms of transparency and disclosure are positively 
associated with fixed investment. I find also that ownership network position 
and transparency practices significantly interact: firms in peripheral network 
positions tend to benefit more from improvements to their TD practices. 
However, this interaction depends on the type of network ties: single or 
multiple controlling owners, state, conglomerate and industry association ties. I 
find that firms with a single controlling oligarch owner, conglomerate owner, or 
industry association tie benefit particularly from transparency practices in 
committing to long-term investment. I interpret these findings through 
reference to resource dependence and agency theories. 
Essay 3 I find that the presence of independent, non-executive directors is a valid 
mechanism for both oligarch-owned firms and SOEs to mitigate financing 
constraints on investment. Independent directors, through monitoring of 
managers and controlling shareholders, make them more accountable to 
minority shareholders, which in turn allows for higher funds allocation to 
profitable projects. Without independent directors, the relationship between 
gross cash flow and investments is negative for both oligarch-owned firms and 
SOEs. For SOEs, I interpret this finding as due to the existence of soft budget 
constraints. For oligarch-owned firms, particularly if they do not have access to 
internal capital markets, I interpret the negative investment-internal finance 
relation as evidence of tunnelling. 
 
4.3. Overarching Contribution  
The three empirical chapters in this thesis contribute to the extant literature on governance. 
The thesis focuses on the impact of governance on fixed investment in transition economies by 
studying Russian listed firms in the ten year period from 2000 to 2010. My thesis contributes in 
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being one of the first pieces of research to directly test the agency theory, RDT theory, 
governance bundle and cash-flow theories’ hypotheses on the role of governance in 
determining the fixed investment behaviour of Russian firms. I test the boundary conditions of 
these theories on one of the largest economies in the world. Precisely, the relationships in the 
Russian context differ from the Anglo-American context where these theories were developed 
due to 1) concentrated ownership structures (SOEs, oligarchs and FIGs); 2) contractual and 
relational inter-firm networks; 3) weak legal protection and underdeveloped external capital 
markets. 
While the investment behaviour of firms is central to all studies in the fields of economics, 
finance and management, Russia is a unique context in which investment depends not only on 
firms’ fixed or variable characteristics, such as industry or cash-flow, but also on the 
heterogeneous characteristics of those officers who control or monitor the firm, i.e. oligarchs, 
state, or board of directors. The results are statistically significant and lead to a number of 
implications for corporate governance theory, practice and public policy, which are discussed in 
Section 4.5.   
 
4.4. Limitations 
What are the potential methodological limitations? My thesis is based on empirical analyses of 
a unique, purpose-built firm-level dataset of large Russian firms. However, as is usual in the 
case of weak institutional environments, data availability and data quality present some 
problems48 (Perotti and Gelfer, 2001; Braguinsky and Mityakov, 2013). First, TD scores are 
longitudinal, but available only for 90 firms. Second, ownership data are extremely costly to 
retrieve, and older data are not always available. S&P’s TD scoring system companies were 
selected according to stock liquidity. These are the largest and the most traded companies on 
the Russian stock exchanges. The Russian stock market currently (2013) includes some 300 
actively traded firms, this number was around 20 at the beginning of my study period (2000). 
                                                          
48
 However, these data issues do not prevent research based on Russian data to be published in top finance 
journals, e.g. Mironov (2013) in Journal of Finance, Braguinsky and Mityakov (2013) in Journal of Financial 
Economics, as long as the limitations are acknowledged. 
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However, I am confident that my sample is representative of most publicly traded Russian 
industrial firms.  
Russian firms consistently under-report profits to avoid paying full corporate tax 
(Gorodnichenko et al., 2008; Sprenger, 2011; Mironov, 2013), even though the corporate tax 
rate in Russia is amongst the lowest in the world (20% in 2009). The use of capital investment 
rather than profits avoids the impact of under-reporting49.     
While I used GMM as an estimator to control for endogeneity, an appropriate natural 
experimental setting might have allowed deeper investigation of the endogeneity issue. Prior 
studies on TD use the introduction of corporate governance reforms in Russia as an exogenous 
event (Kuznecovs and Pal, 2012). However, they find no significant differential positive effect of 
corporate governance reform on firm value among their treatment group of firms. An 
appropriate instrument in this context has yet to be found. 
While this research uses a number of governance measures, such as TD, ownership and board 
independence, I do not discuss other internal governance mechanisms, such as board and 
managers incentives, or external, such as auditing and market for corporate control. This is 
primarily due to the lack of disclosure of such data or insufficient usage of such mechanisms 
(e.g. market for corporate control).  
 
4.5. Implications and Further Research 
For scholars, my findings suggest that a combination of PPA and RDT in a transition economy is 
more fruitful than straightforward application of agency theory. PPA focuses on formal 
relationships between principal shareholders, while RDT captures the flow of resources and 
monitoring between owners that result from the formation of owners’ network ties. These 
owner networks may be based on informal ties (blat), which continue to be essential 
                                                          
49
 Since Russian assets are underinvested, there is no reason to believe that investment numbers are further 
decreased by under-reporting. Prior to privatization, Russian firms over-reported investments and profits to 
comply with 5-year Gosplan (state planning). Since privatization, they are no longer on central planning and there 
is no apparent evidence of investment over-statement. 
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characteristics of transition economies. In other words, while PPA focuses on conflicts among 
the principal shareholders and how to resolve them using governance mechanisms, RDT brings 
in a broader institutional view by examining how relationships between shareholders can be 
influenced by the resources that they provide to each other. In this thesis, I analyse the flow of 
resources through a network of shareholders connected by share ownership in the same firm. 
Ownership networks, through which resources and information flow, moderate the impact of 
governance practices, because they can substitute or complement for these practices, 
depending on whether resource constraints or agency costs are the primary drivers of the 
network connections. 
While the setting of my research is limited to the analysis of ownership structures and 
governance on investments, a potential avenue for research would be to explore how outside 
competition, via exports or foreign direct investment (FDI), would limit the malfeasance due to 
the concentrated ownership arrangements described in the last chapter. Economists and policy 
makers believe that FDI can improve host countries’ technological capacities and managerial 
style, both at companies receiving FDIs and at companies working in the same industry or in 
upstream industries. Recipients of FDI are significantly more productive than domestic firms in 
Russia (Tytell and Yudaeva, 2007). Further research would analyse the spillover effect of FDIs on 
ownership-investment relation. If there is a positive spillover effect of FDIs on managerial and 
ownership behaviour to companies related or receiving the FDI, then the tunnelling of funds 
might be reduced, as evidenced by a positive internal funds-investment relation. 
In addition, scholars may also wish to explore relational aspects of governance, i.e. how human 
and capital skills impact both monitoring and ‘adding value’ aspects of corporate governance. 
Relational governance moves well beyond agency theory to draw on such management 
theories as the resource-based view, stewardship theory, stakeholder theory and social capital 
theory (Uhlaner et al., 2007). Growing literature uses agency theory in combination with these 
theories to explain entrepreneurial behaviour (Toms, 2006), strategic choice and organizational 
structure (Toms and Wright, 2002), network dynamics (Toms and Filatotchev, 2004) and the life 
cycle of corporate governance (Filatotchev et al., 2006).  Further research may wish to explore 
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more fully how relational and contractual governance interact with one another in their impact 
on investment behaviour of firms. Are they substitutes or complements with each other? Are 
trust and shared vision (among shareholders, board members and managers) precursors to the 
effective functioning of the firm?  
My research also has some implications for investors choosing in which firms to invest since 
better-networked and more transparent firms are likely to generate more growth through 
investments. It has implications also for managers and owners of firms operating in Russia or 
other emerging economies.  
For managers and owners of state-owned or conglomerate firms, the strategic focus might be 
to strengthen corporate governance to promote more commitment to productive investment, 
whereas for firms controlled by multiple oligarchs, maintaining ties with other ‘connected’ 
oligarchs might prove a better tactic to increase investments and subsequent performance.  
For existing shareholders and regulators, my research shows that the appointment of 
independent directors might result in improved monitoring and better allocation of funds to 
profitable investment projects. Policy makers should concentrate their efforts on the 
enforcement of shareholder rights in order to facilitate better access to external capital and 
investments in productive assets. In a market economy, it is the interaction between product 
and capital markets that disciplines firms (Nickell, 1996). In the longer run, it is clear that 
modernization and restructuring of assets cannot be successful without active financial markets 
that discipline manufacturing firms as well as their blockholders, board members and 
managers, if they fail to deliver shareholder value (Jensen, 1986; Peng, 2004; Peng et al., 2003). 
My findings are applicable to other emerging economies dominated by concentrated ownership 
- whether state, family, private or institutional. A potentially promising avenue for future 
research would be to compare Russia with another powerful emerging nation, such as China or 
India. Both China and India have similar concentration of ownership in the hands of state and 
business groups, but some significant differences remain. For example, India differs from both 
Russia and China as it does not have the legacy of the communist regime, and suffers from 
relatively poor infrastructure and factor market development. Multi-country analysis that 
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includes other CIS or CEE50 countries would also be relevant. The comparative research should 
differentiate among countries along the dimensions of institutional development, infrastructure 
and factor market development (Hoskisson et al., 2013) to provide a better understanding of 
the country context. 
 
4.6. Conclusion 
To conclude, I acknowledge that firm investment behaviour is a phenomenon that is influenced 
by the existence of capital market imperfections resulting from institutional and information 
asymmetries. The start of economic transition in former soviet economies emphasized the need 
for huge capital investment to modernize obsolete capital stock and to enable these economies 
to become competitive globally (Hodbari, 2008). Early transition policy debates focused on the 
best ways to restructure SOEs, with fixed investment seen as the main vehicle. Transfer of 
ownership to private owners was seen as pivotal for providing much needed funds to finance 
investments. However, new owners have faced and continue to face challenges related to 
securing external finance and allocating sufficient internal funds to investments. The 
importance of considering the governance implications in this context is paramount. This 
doctoral research does not treat governance factors in isolation; it has considered them 
conceptually and empirically as a system of interrelated institutional elements, in a unique 
setting, Russia.   
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Appendices 
1) Appendices to Introduction 
 
Figure 16: Use of terms governance, transparency and disclosure, 1970-2008 
 
Source: N-gram viewer, computed according to n-gram model. Notes: Smoothing of 3 is applied, which means that 
the most left value (year 1970) will be calculated as (‘count for 1970’ + ‘count for 1971’ + ‘count for 1972’ + ‘count 
for 1973’), divided by 4. The y-axis shows the percentage of the unigrams contained in Google’s sample of books 
written in English and published in the US, are ‘governance’, ‘transparency’ or ‘disclosure’.  
 
Figure 17: Use of terms governance, ownership and board of directors, 1970-2008 
 
Source: N-gram viewer, computed according to n-gram model. Notes: Smoothing of 3 is applied, which means that 
the left most value (year 1970) will be calculated as (‘count for 1970’ + ‘count for 1971’ + ‘count for 1972’ + ‘count 
for 1973’), divided by 4 
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Figure 18: The use of investment term applied to governance term, 1970-2008 
 
Source: N-gram viewer, computed according to n-gram model. Notes: The figure shows percentage of occurrences 
of investment modifying governance, i.e. it includes mentions of investment governance and all other instances 
when the word investment applies to governance. 
 
Figure 19: Use of terms governance (‘корпоративное управление’), oligarchs (‘олигархи’) 
and fixed investment (‘капиталовложение’) in Russian publications, 1970-2008 
 
Source: N-gram viewer, computed according to n-gram model.   
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Figure 20: Russian investment as a percentage of GDP 
 
 
Notes: Figures after 2010 are estimates. Source: National Statistical Office. Latest actual data: 2011. Gross capital 
formation includes statistical discrepancy. GDP valuation: Market prices. Base year: 2008. Primary domestic 
currency: Russian roubles. Data last updated: 09/2012. Retrieved from International Monetary Fund, at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2012/02/weodata/weorept.aspx?sy=1990&ey=2017&scsm=1&ssd=1&s
ort=country&ds=.&br=1&pr1.x=62&pr1.y=17&c=922&s=NID_NGDP&grp=0&a=#notes 
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2) Appendices to Chapter 1 
 
Table 30:  Measuring corporate governance risks in Russia 
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Figure 21: Distribution of companies by total TD score, 2008-2009 
 
Note: The gap in transparency between the highest and the lowest scorers in the ranking remains considerable and 
even increased over 2008-2009. In 2009, the scores ranged from a high of 80% (78% in 2008) for the top ranked 
company to a low of 20% (28% in 2008) for the lowest ranked company. Some companies in the middle tier of 
2008 dataset have improved their performance, while for some other companies from the middle tier and some 
outsiders transparency has worsened significantly. As a result, the score dispersion within the rank has increased. 
The average gap between the neighbouring companies amounts to almost 0.68 percentage points which is higher 
than in 2008 (0.56 percentage points) but almost the same as in the 2007 dataset. The average TD index for the 
top 10 companies remained virtually unchanged from 2008 to 2009 at 75.6%. 
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Figure 22: TD sub-scores distributions graphs 
 
 Histogram Ownership Structure and 
Shareholder rights score 
 
 Histogram Fin. and operational 
information score 
 
  
 
 Histogram Board and Management 
structure score 
 
Note: Ownership and Shareholder rights score and Board and Management score show a normal distribution 
shape with highest frequency of 50% score. A number of firms have high Financial and Operational information 
score in the range of 60%-80%. 
 
 
 
 
0
1
0
2
0
3
0
4
0
5
0
F
re
q
u
e
n
c
y
0 1.2 .4 .8.6
Ownership structure and shareholder rights score 
0
2
0
4
0
6
0
F
re
q
u
e
n
c
y
0 1.2 .4 .6 .8
Financial and Operational Information score
0
2
0
4
0
6
0
F
re
q
u
e
n
c
y
0 .4.2 .6 .8
Board and management structure and process score 
186 
 
Figure 23: TD sub-scores correlations graphs 
 
Ownership str. & s/holder rights score to 
financial and operational information score 
Board management structure score to fin. and 
operational information score 
 
  
Board management structure score to 
ownership and s/holder rights score 
Correlation between log of capex and total 
T&D score 
  
Note: The 3 sub scores are correlated. If a firm has high reporting of financial and operational information, it will 
likely report sufficient information on board, management and ownership structures. The log of capital 
expenditure (investment) is correlated with Total TD score.  
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Figure 24: Distribution of aggregate market capitalization by transparency, 2008-2009 51 
 
 
 
Figure 25 : Relationship between firm market capitalization and transparency, 2009 
 
Note: The 2009 TD dataset shows that, similar to previous years, a major portion of total market capitalization is 
represented by companies with high levels of transparency. In 2009 (see Figure 24) this relationship was especially 
pronounced. Companies with TD scores higher than 60% represent about 78% of aggregate market capitalization. 
This effect can be explained both by the generally greater transparency of big companies (Figure 25) compared to 
smaller ones, and by the positive impact of greater transparency on the company’s market value. 
Disclosure to investors of some important elements remains low, especially in relation to information on the terms 
of employment contracts with CEOs, details of directors’ and executives’ remuneration and information on 
auditors’ provision of non-audit services (Table 31: Weakest areas of disclosure by the largest Russian companies, 
2007-2009). 
                                                          
51
 Market capitalization numbers were computed based on the market capitalization of companies averaged for the period 
1.1.2009 to 18.5.2009 (Source: S&P) 
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Table 31: Weakest areas of disclosure by the largest Russian companies, 2007-2009  
 
Component 2007 2008 2009 
1. Ownership Structure 
 Number and indemnity of all the shareholders holding more than 10% 
 Disclosure of share of beneficiary owners more than 75% 
23 
43 
29 
42 
26 
48 
2. Shareholder rights    
 Evidence of existence of code of business conduct and ethics 
 Announcement of recommended dividends before the record date 
 Calendar of important future shareholder dates 
24 
29 
34 
22 
15 
42 
27 
36 
44 
3. Financial Information    
 Detailed earnings forecast 
 Disclosure of whether auditor renders non-audit services 
 Non-audit fees paid to the auditor 
 Indication that related-party transactions are made on market or non-
market terms 
4 
16 
11 
15 
26 
14 
19 
7 
8 
19 
19 
12 
23 
39 
4. Operational information    
 Social reporting 11 8 7 
5. Board and management information    
 Details of CEO’s contract 
 Record of attendance at board meetings 
 Information on ratio of in person and in absentia board meetings 
3 
23 
23 
2 
24 
32 
1 
29 
37 
6. Board and management remuneration    
 Specifics of directors’ pay 
 Specifics of managers’ pay 
33 
6 
30 
6 
20 
6 
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Table 32: TD Scores of 10 Most Transparent Russian Companies 
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Table 33: List of 90 Russian companies with S&P TD scores (in 2009)  
(Arranged alphabetically)  
Acron 
Aeroflot 
AFI Development 
AvtoVAZ 
Baltika 
Bank Saint Petersburg 
Bashneft 
C.A.T. oil 
Central Telecommunications Co. 
Cherkizovo 
Comstar-UTS 
СТС Media 
Dixy Group 
Enel OGK-5 
Eurasia Drilling 
Evraz Group 
FGC UES 
Fortum (formerly TGC-10) 
Gazprom 
Gazprom Neft 
GlobalTrans 
IDGC Holding 
IDGC of Centre 
IDGC of North-West 
IDGC of Urals 
IDGC of Volga 
IDGC of Centre and Volga Region 
INTER RAO UES 
Irkutskenergo 
RusHydro 
KAMAZ 
LSR Group 
LUKOIL 
M.Video 
Magnit 
Mechel 
MMK 
Mobile TeleSystems 
Mosenergo 
MOESK 
Norilsk Nickel 
North-West Telecom 
NOVATEK 
Novolipetsk Steel 
Novorossiysk Commercial Sea Port 
OGK-1 
OGK-2 
OGK-3 (WGC-3) 
OGK-4 
OGK-6 
Open Investments 
Pharmstandard 
PIK 
Polymetal 
Polyus Gold 
Raspadskaya 
RAZGULAY Group 
RBC Information Systems 
Rosneft 
Rostelecom 
Sberbank 
Seventh Continent 
Severstal 
Sibir Energy 
Sibirtelecom 
Sistema 
Sistema-Hals 
Slavneft-Megionneftegaz 
SOLLERS (formerly Severstal-Avto) 
Surgutneftegas 
Tatneft 
TGC-1 
TGC-4 
TGC-5 
TGC-6 
TGC-9 
TGC-14 
TMK 
TNK-BP Holding 
Uralkali 
Uralsvyazinform 
Veropharm 
Vimpelcom 
Volga TGC (TGC-7) 
VolgaTelecom 
VSMPO-AVISMA 
Bank Vozrozhdenie 
VTB 
Wimm-Bill-Dann Foods 
X5 Retail Group 
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Table 34: Criteria for TD survey 
Block 1: ownership structure and shareholder rights 
Component 1. Ownership structure 
Disclosure of: 
1. The number and par value of issued ordinary shares. 
2. The number and par value of issued other types of shares disclosed. 
3. The number and par value of authorized but unissued shares of all types. 
4. The identity of the largest shareholder. 
5. The identity of holders of all large stakes (blocking: > 25%; controlling: > 50%). 
6. The identity of shareholders holding at least 25% of voting shares in total. 
7. The identity of shareholders holding at least 50% of voting shares in total. 
8. The identity of shareholders holding at least 75% of voting shares in total. 
9. The number and identity of each shareholder holding more than 10%. 
10. Indication that management is not aware of the existence of any stake exceeding 5% other 
than those reported. 
11. An update on shareholder structure after the record date. 
12. Shareholding in the company by individual senior managers. 
13. Shareholding in the company of individual directors. 
14. Description of share classes. 
15. Shareholders by type. 
16. Percentage of cross-ownership. 
17. Information on exchange listings. 
18. Information on indirect ownership (e.g., convertible instruments). 
Component 2. Shareholder rights 
Disclosure of: 
19. Corporate governance charter or corporate governance guidelines. 
20. Evidence of existence of a code of business conduct and ethics. 
21. Content of code of business conduct and ethics. 
22. Articles of association (including changes). 
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23. Voting rights for each voting or non-voting share. 
24. How shareholders nominate board members. 
25. How shareholders convene an extraordinary general meeting (EGM). 
26. Procedure for initiating inquiries with the board. 
27. Procedure for putting forward proposals at shareholders meetings. 
28. Formalized dividend policy. 
29. Announcement of recommended dividends before the record date. 
30. Review of last shareholders meeting. 
31. Full minutes of general shareholder meeting (GSM). 
32. Calendar of important shareholder future dates. 
33. GSM materials published on the web site. 
34. Detailed press releases covering last corporate events. 
35. Policy on information disclosure. 
Block 2: Financial and Operational Information 
Component 3. Financial information 
Disclosure of: 
36. The company’s accounting policy. 
37. The accounting standards it uses for its accounts. 
38. Accounts according to local standards. 
39. Annual financial statements according to an internationally recognized accounting standard 
(IFRS/U.S. GAAP). 
40. Notes to annual financial statements according to IFRS/U.S. GAAP. 
41. Independent auditor’s report on annual financial statements according to IFRS/U.S. GAAP. 
42. Unqualified (clean) audit opinion on annual financial statements according to IFRS/U.S. 
GAAP. 
43. Audited IFRS/U.S. GAAP financial statements published before 30 April. 
44. Unaudited IFRS/U.S. GAAP financial statements published before 30 April. 
45. Audited IFRS/U.S. GAAP financial statements published before annual general meeting. 
46. Unaudited IFRS/U.S. GAAP financial statements published before 30 June. 
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47. Disclosure of related-party transactions (RPTs): sales to/purchases from, payables 
to/receivables from related parties. 
48. Indication that RPTs are made on market or non-market terms. 
49. Exact RPT terms. 
50. Interim (quarterly or half yearly) financial statements according to an internationally 
recognized accounting standard (IFRS/U.S. GAAP). 
51. Notes to these financial statements. 
52. Whether these financial statements are audited or at least reviewed. 
53. Consolidated financial statements according to local standards. 
54. Methods of asset valuation. 
55. List of affiliates in which company holds a minority stake. 
56. Ownership structure of affiliates. 
57. A basic earnings forecast of any kind. 
58. A detailed earnings forecast. 
59. Segment analysis (results broken down by business line). 
60. Revenue structure (detailed breakdown). 
61. Cost structure (high degree of detail). 
62. Name of auditing firm. 
63. Whether audit firm is a top-tier auditor. 
64. Auditor rotation policy. 
65. How much the company pays in audit fees to the auditor. 
66. Whether auditor renders non-audit services. 
67. Non-audit fees paid to the auditor. 
Component 4. Operational information 
Disclosure of: 
68. Details of the firm’s type of business. 
69. Details of products or services company produces or provides. 
70. Output in physical terms. 
71. Description of functional relationships between key operating units within the group. 
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72. Industry indicators that allow comparison with peers. 
73. Other financial indicators. 
74. Characteristics of fixed assets employed (including licences). 
75. Efficiency indicators. 
76. Discussion of corporate strategy. 
77. Plans for investment in future years. 
78. Detailed information about investment plans in the coming year. 
79. Output forecast of any kind. 
80. Overview of trends in the relevant industry; regulatory environment with regard to industry. 
81. Market share for any or all of the company’s businesses. 
82. Social reporting (e.g., Global Reporting Initiative). 
83. Overview of compliance with ecology law. 
84. Principles of corporate citizenship. 
Block 3: Board and Management Structure and Process 
Component 5. Board and management information 
Disclosure of: 
85. List of board members (names). 
86. Details of directors’ current employment and position. 
87. Other details: previous employment and positions, education, etc. 
88. Date of appointment to the board. 
89. Name of chairman. 
90. Details on role of company board of directors. 
91. List of matters reserved to the board. 
92. List of board committees. 
93. Names of all members of current committees. 
94. Bylaws relating to other internal audit functions than the audit committee. 
95. Information on ratio of in absentia and in person board meetings. 
96. Record of attendance at board meetings. 
97. List of senior managers not on board of directors. 
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98. Senior managers backgrounds. 
99. The non-financial details of CEO’s contract. 
100. The number of shares held by managers, in other affiliated companies. 
101. Policy on assessment of board of directors and training provided to them. 
Component 6. Board and management remuneration 
Disclosure of: 
102. Decision-making process related to directors’ pay. 
103. Specifics of directors’ remuneration, including salary levels. 
104. Form of directors’ salaries, such as in cash or in shares. 
105. Specifics of directors’ performance-related pay. 
106. Decision-making process to determine managerial (not directors’) pay. 
107. Specifics of managers’ (not directors’) remuneration, such as salary levels and bonuses. 
108. Form of managers’ (not directors’) pay. 
109. Specifics of managers’ performance-related pay. 
110. Level and composition of CEO’s remuneration. 
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Table 35: Investment and direct impact of governance, cross section Ordinary Least Squares  
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Figure 26: Impulse responses - VAR model  
 
 
Note: Errors are 5% on each side generated by Monte-Carlo with 1000 reps. VAR model with three variables: Log of 
investments (lncapxr), log of sales (lnsaler) and log of total TD score (lntotal) 
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3) Appendices to Chapter 2 
 
Figure 27: Two-mode firm-owner matrix52  
 
                                                          
52
 Owners are represented by (blue) squares, firms by (red) circles   
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Figure 28:  State cluster (2-mode)53 of the whole network 
 
Note: this figure represents the firms connected through ownership ties to the state (the state is at the centre of 
the cluster with the most connections). 
                                                          
53
 Owners are represented by (blue) squares, firms by (red) circles   
